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Summary
Despite the great potential it promises in enhancing quality and reducing costs of care,
information technology poses new threats to health data security and patient privacy.
Our study in this dissertation thus focuses on technically addressing concerns of data
security and especially individual privacy arising from current health care systems that
represent a highly dynamic, distributed, and cooperative setting. In particular, we give
a systematic study of the following typical yet closely related issues.
We ﬁrst discuss user authentication techniques, building a uniﬁed trust infrastruc-
ture for health care organizations. User authentication is a fundamental and enabling
service to achieve other aspects of data security within or beyond organizational bound-
aries. Discussions in this part thus lays a foundation for solving other data security
and individual privacy issues in this dissertation and beyond. We suggest incorporating
various user authentication techniques into a uniﬁed trust infrastructure. To that end,
each organization establishes a security manager overseeing the organizational trust in-
frastructure and manages security related matters. Of particular interest is unifying
password authentication into the trust infrastructure by a novel two-server password
authentication model and scheme. The two-server system renders password authentica-
tion compatible with other authentication techniques, and also circumvents weaknesses
inherent in the traditional password systems.
The next issue we study is to present a remote login scheme that allows users to
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access a health care service in an anonymous manner. In other words, outside attackers
cannot link diﬀerent accesses by the same user. Our proposed scheme possesses many
salient features, including resilience to DoS attacks. In later chapters, the anonymous
login scheme and the user authentication techniques discussed earlier (e.g., password
authentication) could be adapted for the purpose of entity authentication if necessary.
However, as this is straightforward and orthogonal to the issues discussed thereof, we
do not consider this aspect.
The scenario the anonymous login scheme deals with is by nature still at the level
of individual organizations. We next explore a more complicated, inter-organizational
procedure, medication prescription. We clarify and address privacy concerns of patients
as well as doctors by proposing a smart card enabled electronic medication prescription
system. Care is given to protect individual privacy while still enabling prescription data
to be collected for research purposes. We also make the system more accord with real-
world practices by implementing “delegation of signing” that allows patients to delegate
their prescription signing capabilities to their guardians, etc.
The last topic we study in a broad sense continues the class of research on “achiev-
ing user privacy while enabling medical research” as the medication prescription system,
but considers a quite diﬀerent scenario: a health care organization (e.g., a hospital) out-
sources the health data in its repository to other organizations (e.g., a medical research
institute). This actually involves “secondary” use of health data, which are an aggre-
gation of medical records rather than individual records (the medication prescription
system deals with individual records). Privacy protection therefore should be enforced
at a level beyond individual data items, and the outsourcing organization has more
viii
interests to be protected against the receiving organizations. In particular, ownership
enforcement over the data in outsourcing is another issue to be addressed, in addition
to the protection of individual privacy referred to in the data. We seamlessly combine
binning and digital watermarking to attain the dual goals of privacy and copyright pro-
tection. Our binning method allows for a broader concept of generalization, and our
watermarking algorithm is a hierarchical scheme resilient to the speciﬁc generalization
attack, as well as other attacks common to database watermarking. The experimental
results demonstrate the robustness of our techniques.
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Information technology becomes increasingly essential to health care, enabling the health
care industry to improve the quality of care provision while at the same time reducing
its cost. This trend is clearly witnessed by the fact that more and more health care
organizations are developing electronic medical records (EMRs) for facilitating clinical
practice, setting up internal networks for sharing information and simplifying adminis-
trative and billing processes, utilizing public networks especially Internet for enabling
inter-organizational collaborations of care, reimbursement, beneﬁts management, and
research. The application of information technology to health care both drives and
is driven by structural changes of the health care industry and its methods of care.
Take U.S. for example, during the past few years, the health care industry has seen the
following signiﬁcant changes [53,59].
• Consolidation of care providers that serve diﬀerent aspects of the care continuum,
e.g., hospitals and primary care clinics, into integrated deliver systems (IDSs).
IDSs may also include ﬁnancing services that oﬀer health plans and pay for care.
The rapid growth of IDSs is due largely to the promises of cost savings and expan-
sions of market share through consolidation and federation, and the improvements
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in the quality of care by a continuum of time of care management. IDSs entail
a signiﬁcant increase in the use of information technology to store, analyze and
share health data within and possibly beyond the limit of individual IDSs. IDSs
now rapidly become the primary means of care delivery.
• Rise of managed care, such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs), has
greatly altered the practice of medicine and created new demands for informa-
tion. Managed care uses capitation systems to pay for health care and manage
risk, in contrast to traditional ways of insurance where care providers or patients
are reimbursed for services they oﬀered or received. In a capitation system, care
providers get reimbursed based on the number of patients enrolled in their care
rather than on the services rendered. Meanwhile, managed care providers involve
extensive examination of aggregate data to deﬁne optimal approaches to the man-
agement of chronic diseases; introducing increasingly sophisticated approaches to
manage care of groups of patients with similar health problems; analyzing the
use of medical resources such as medications, specialists, and surgical procedures.
Managed care has contributed to a shift in the view of medical care from mostly
an art based on clinical judgement to mostly a science based on empirical data.
• New entrants that collect and consume health information. These organizations
typically provide products and services to the health care industry and have de-
veloped signiﬁcant business interests that involve the collection and analysis of
health data. Medical data surgical suppliers, pharmaceutical companies, and ref-
erence laboratories are such organizations. Furthermore, existing players in the
industry are expanding their roles. For example, insurance companies establish
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their own provider networks, and care providers begin to set foot in administration
and ﬁnancing of care.
By and large, these changes have led to a tremendous increase in the collection
and use of patient health data and in the sharing of health data across organizational
boundaries. A central enabling element to the above trends of integrated functions and
managed care is the development of Electronic Medical Records (EMRs).
EMRs provide comprehensive and accurate information concerning patients’ medi-
cal histories, health problems, laboratory results, therapeutic procedures, medications,
account management and billing, etc. Over time, the content of EMRs is anticipated to
expand beyond that of paper records and include medical imagery and telematic video
[53]. EMRs oﬀer many advantages over traditional paper records. The primary beneﬁt
of using electronic records is eﬃcient and ﬂexible access. For example, EMRs allow
multiple users simultaneous access to the information from a variety of locations; with
EMRs, ﬁne-grained access is possible in the sense that access can be limited to just the
portion of the record that is pertinent to the user. Electronic data can also be used
to accomplish tasks that are not possible in the paper format. For example, electronic
records can be organized, displayed, and manipulated in a variety of diﬀerent ways that
are tailored to particular clinical needs. This in turn enables the capabilities of real-
time quality assurance, decision support systems, event monitors, and availability at the
point of care. Electronic records also promise the improvement of clinical research based
on extensive analysis of clinical data [12,43,176].
Clearly, information technology has revolutionized health care into a setting of in-
creasing computerization and networking. Nevertheless, the wide and extensive use of
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information technology poses new threats to health data security and individual pri-
vacy contained in the data. Traditional paper records had a physical embodiment, were
awkward to copy, and were accessible only from central repositories. The diﬃculty
of moving information increased dramatically with the volume of records being trans-
ferred. Computerization and networking have changed this situation radically. EMRs
have no physical embodiment, are easily copied, and are accessible from multiple points
of access. Large numbers of records can be transferred as easily as a single one. The
existence of networks and especially Internet makes data transfer across administrative,
legal, and national jurisdictions to a maximum ease. However, it is obvious that the
advantages oﬀered by EMRs and networking can be adversely exploited for purposes of
compromising security of health data.
EMRs also raise the possibility that accurate and complete composite pictures of in-
dividuals can be more easily drawn. As a result, people would reasonably raise concerns
about the aggregate even if they had no concerns about any single data element. In
an electronic system, large scales of data retrieval and data aggregation can be accom-
plished almost instantaneously and invisibly. Moreover, any such aggregated database
itself might become an interesting target for those seeking information. The emergence
of new information processing tools e.g., data mining [14], that are widely used for re-
search purposes [43,176] signiﬁes the emerging challenges in keeping individual privacy
in health care systems, where data outsourcing and secondary use of data are becoming
common now.
It is now clear that information technology has on the one hand greatly beneﬁted
health care by changing its practice and methods of care, while on the other put data
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security and individual privacy in an ever more vulnerable state. This thus motivates
the need for protection of health data. We next discuss the signiﬁcance in maintaining
data security and individual privacy in health care.
1.1.1 Why Security and Privacy Matters
Health data are in nature private and sensitive, and keeping patient privacy is quite
relevant to the fundamental principle of respecting human right in a civilized society. In
practice, compromise of data security and individual privacy may result in varying se-
quences to individuals, ranging from inconvenience to ruin. For instance, inappropriate
disclosure of health information could harm patient’s economic or social interests, such
as causing social embarrassment [59] and aﬀecting employment and health insurance ac-
quisition [106,122,145]; if patients believe their information cannot be kept conﬁdential,
they would be reluctant to share health information with their doctors, which results in
reduced quality of care; the corruption of health data might mislead doctors to wrong
treatment for patients, thereby damaging the patients [18,151].
As far as care providers are concerned, the ethical and professional obligation for
protecting patient privacy has long been well recognized. Since the fourth century B.C.,
physicians have abided by the Hippocratic oath in keeping secret patient information
they learnt in the course of care: Whatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of my
dealing with men, if it be what should not be published abroad, I will never divulge,
holding such things to be holy secrets. Over the centuries, the bound upon the health
care community by ethical and professional obligation has never been weakened, and new
codes of ethics adaptable to the dramatic changing health care setting are continually
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under review [105]. On the other hand, realizing their health information may be at stake
in today’s digital era, public attention to the security and privacy of health information is
at an all-time high. According to a latest survey [174] conducted by the Medical Record
Institute, U.S., up to 76.9% of the respondents worried about security of patient data,
and 60.2% prioritized privacy breaches by authorized or unauthorized users as a “major
concern” regarding data security. Health care organizations hold the responsibility to
mitigate public worries, as maintaining their patients’ privacy is a matter of trust and an
important factor in sustaining a positive public reputation. Privacy breaches may erode
public conﬁdence on care providers, and the industry as a business would be harmed.
Furthermore, protection of health data and individual privacy is now quite under the
jurisdiction of laws around the globe, going far beyond the scope of ethical, professional
responsibilities and business interests. For example, in U.S. there are both federal and
state laws and regulations on the protection of health information [180], among which the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [86] represents the latest
and the most comprehensive drive for security in health care; in Europe, European
Union issued the Recommendation R(75) [147] and Privacy Directive [144], etc., and
each member country has its own laws and ethical codes as well, such as the Health
and Social Care Act 2001 in UK; other countries have similar laws, regulations, and
ethical codes: Singapore has the Medical Ethics & Health Law [167], South Korea has
act regulating the protection of personal information maintained by public agencies
[108] and Japan has the Data Protection Bill [98]. Under legal mandates, health care
providers responsible for privacy breaches will be, and have been sued and subjected to
administrative sanctions [59].
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As made it clear, ensuring data security and individual privacy favors not the sole
interest of patients, but also that of the overall health care industry; protection of health
data concerns not only the good ethical and professional faith, but also compulsory
compliance with laws, regulations and codes of ethics.
1.1.2 Challenges in Protection of Health Data
As stated earlier, health care is a setting of federation and consolidation of various
organizations with interleaving interests, security and privacy concerns thus arise from
within individual organizations, across integrated delivery systems, between and among
providers, payers, and secondary users [53]. We discuss the challenges in protection of
health data in such a highly complex setting from the following perspectives.
At the policy level, great diﬀerences exist among distinct stakeholders as to what
constitutes valid use of the health information. No consensus exists across the health
care community regarding the legitimacy of each stakeholder’s demand for health in-
formation. This lack of consensus diﬀerentiates health care domain from military and
ﬁnancial sectors where a general consensus on information policy exists [8]. Conse-
quently, consistent policies synchronizing interests of various stakeholders in the federa-
tion of organizations are quite challenging. Even at the level of individual organizations,
policy establishment is also very diﬃcult. A wide range of context factors complicate
access management in health care. They include conﬂict interests between patients and
care providers over the security and privacy of data; diﬀerent perspectives on the ac-
cess issues by diﬀerent stakeholders [141]; diversity in health care business models and
frequent changes of health care environment [29]; the role users’ responsibility plays
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in access control [179]; diﬀerent contextual elements of access, such as time, location,
etc [11]; the involvement of non-medical parties, such as medical research, employers,
clearing houses; emergency access of health data.
From a technical perspective, data protection should be enforced upon data in stor-
age, data in transmission, data in business transactions, and data in sharing. As such,
there exists no one-size-ﬁts-all solution for the protection of health data [73, 175], and
diversity of the health care setting entails methods that are tailored to the speciﬁc sce-
narios and needs. For example, in the process of medication prescription, individual
privacy includes not only patient’s privacy but also doctor’s privacy stake, and their
privacy concerns vary with respect to diﬀerent parties such as pharmacy and insurer.
A sound solution to medication prescription has to address every aspect of the privacy
issues. As an another example, [148] empirically demonstrated the failure of deploying
ﬁrewall without attuning to the unique requirements of a health care application. In
health care, data protection techniques and solutions must take into consideration of
the diﬀerent types of modalities (e.g., text, image, audio) contained in the health data,
as well as the various facilities (e.g., Internet, wireless networks, workstations, servers)
upon which health care applications are built. Moreover, it is prudent to attune secu-
rity solutions to the real-world medical practice. Otherwise, signiﬁcant overheads and
obstacles would be incurred upon normal working practice, and it is also being seen as
a serious assault on professional independence [13]. Protection solutions in health care
should also integrate and keep compatibility with the legacy systems that have con-
sumed large amounts of money, and are currently providing for the smooth functioning
of routine tasks. Finally, it is important to notice that information sharing that leads to
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secondary use of health data goes beyond simple exchanges of data among organizations,
yielding new security issues in current health care systems.
With appropriate policies and techniques in place, organizations may still have oper-
ational handicap in enforcing security [8]. First, security practice has its its uniqueness
in health care. Unauthorized accesses to data in military and ﬁnancial domains are
likely to be used for criminal purposes, e.g., the spies steal military or ﬁnancial secrets.
With health information, such breaches and uses may be more insidious, whereas the
damages are less overt. Managing staﬀs in both military and ﬁnancial organizations are
given strong liability to curb criminal use of the housed data; breaches are often followed
by punishment. In contrast, security breaches in health care organizations are less likely
to be made public, and the public normally presumes the high ethical standards upon
health care personnel are enough of a deterrent to the data misuse, which turns out
not to be the case in practice. Second, security deployments in health care industry
lack market incentives. Patients generally select care providers and health plans for
reasons other than their ability to protect patient information. The fact however is that
information security has proven itself to be more of business policies and procedures
that must be managed from a business perspective [30]. The lack of market incentives,
together with the impropriate views such as investing in security decreases performance
and increases costs, would hinder active executive involvement. Third, most health care
professionals do not keep pace with the advances of information technology, and they
often lack awareness and training in security enforcement. Human factor can consti-
tute the weakest link in the chain of security. User awareness promotion and training
has been repeatedly outlined in virtually any guideline on health data security (see for
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example, [30,52,57,161–163]).
From a legal perspective, security solutions in health care must comply with legis-
lation. No industry is more challenging for technicians than health care in this aspect,
and they have to navigate a set of laws, regulations and codes of ethics in an attempt
to ﬁnd satisfactory solutions [152]. The adopted security solutions must at a minimum
meet the stipulations of health laws, standards, codes of ethics and other relevant laws
and regulations.
To summarize, protection of health data in health care systems is not purely a
technical issue, with social and organizational factors also playing a major part [6]. And
it is important to bear in mind that technology alone cannot safeguard health data,
and sound solutions require balanced implementation of sound security policy, good
system administration practice, proper management and use of technology, and strict
accordance with law regulations.
1.2 Scope of the Research
We have seen that information technology has posed considerable threats to health
data, and protection of health data and individual privacy is of great signiﬁcance but
challenging in current health care systems. This motivates and justiﬁes our study on
ensuring data security and individual privacy in this dissertation. Before discussing our
contributions, we ﬁrst see general security requirements for health care systems.
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1.2.1 Security Requirements for Health Care Systems
To make our discussions more concrete and clearer, we derive security requirements upon
health care systems from a typical setting in health care as shown in Figure 1.1, which
includes several typical parties involved in care, together with the data ﬂows among
them. We stress that the intent of this ﬁgure is not (and in fact impossible) to cover
the whole health care setting that includes all parties and all data ﬂows, but to convey
some characteristic aspects of practical health care systems. Moreover, extending this
representative system to more complex scenarios by integrating other parties, functions











Figure 1.1: A Typical Health Care Setting.
In this setting, patient Alice chooses her care provider (e.g., physician and hospital),
and naturally, the care provider hosts her medical records. The care provider may
sometimes need to send, e.g., blood samples, to an outside clinical laboratory for test
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and analysis. As a result, the laboratory will retain a record of the test. When Alice
enrolls in a health beneﬁts plan, the health insurance company obtains her health data.
One day Alice is ill, then she visits her physician who prescribes medication for her.
Alice ﬁles the prescription at the local pharmacy, so the pharmacy keeps parts of her
health data. To enhance care quality and eﬃcacy, the care provider may cooperate
with managed care for cost-eﬀective research (or the care provider itself belongs to the
managed care). Frequently, Medical researchers acquire health data for the purpose of
medical research after gaining approval of his institutional review board and permission
of Alice. Upon court order, the care provider bears the responsibility to provide patient
data to the governmental oversight agency for investigation, or for checks on the record-
keeping procedure at the provider organization. This is a very brief description of the
system. Moreover, in many cases, how and where the patient data are collected may
vary, quite dependent on factors such as what health plan Alice enrols in, and how the
parties associate with one another.
A main characteristic represented by Figure 1.1 is that health care is a highly net-
working and cooperative setting, and health data are distributed across various places.
Based on this setting, we derive the following general security requirements for health
care systems.
Conﬁdentiality: Conﬁdentiality consists of the fundamental part of data security,
referring to the holding of information from inappropriate disclosure. The demand for
data conﬁdentiality in health care is clear since health data are sensitive and private in
nature. Achieving data conﬁdentiality involves protection of health data in repository
by means of access control within individual organizations, as well as protection of data
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in transmission across organizational boundaries.
Privacy: Privacy is a term often confused with conﬁdentiality, and they are often
used exchangeably. But in a strict sense, they have diﬀerences. In simple terms, privacy
refers to an individual’s desire and right to be left alone and to be protected against
physical and psychological invasion or the misuse of their property. In contrast, conﬁ-
dentiality concerns protecting against theft, disclosure, or/and improper use, and data
must be disseminated only to authorized individuals or organizations with a need to
know. Let us see an example: if an organization surreptitiously collects patient infor-
mation for marketing purposes via the Internet, it is intruding an individual’s privacy;
if a doctor disclose a patient’s records to an external doctor without permission, he is
violating conﬁdentiality.
For the purpose of discussions in this dissertation, we draw a easy distinction be-
tween conﬁdentiality and privacy as follows: (individual) privacy clearly relates to (data)
conﬁdentiality, and the simplest way to achieve individual privacy is to maintain data
conﬁdentiality, i.e., not to disclose the data in question whatsoever. But achieving indi-
vidual privacy involves more than simply keeping data conﬁdential. Consider a scenario
in Figure 1.1 where the health care provider shares patient records with the medical re-
search for investigating the long-term eﬀects of certain medications. The care provider
wants to keep patient privacy, so de-identiﬁed data are transferred to the medical re-
search. Data conﬁdentiality in this scenario is not a concern with respect to the medical
research, since the medical research gets the data; in contrast, individual privacy involves
preventing the medical research from inferring some useful information on patients from
the de-identiﬁed data.
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In practical applications, anonymity and unlinkability are two important properties of
(individual) privacy, where anonymity refers to the prevention of disclosing information
that leads to the identiﬁcation of users (anonymity has no identifying information and
hence provides privacy), and unlinkability requires that data of the same user cannot
be recognized as such. Unlinkability amounts to a form of strong user privacy.
Health care professionals also have privacy concerns in health care systems. For
example, doctors’ prescription patterns are contained in their prescription histories,
which could be taken advantage of by the corresponding care provider to act against
the doctors themselves [8]. Therefore, individual privacy in health care systems includes
both patient privacy and doctor privacy. Moreover, as secondary use of health data
for purposes such as clinical research and cost-eﬀective research becomes increasingly
common, ensuring individual privacy is of urgency yet complex.
Integrity: Integrity refers to the assurance of information being kept intact. Signif-
icance of maintaining integrity of health data is clear: corruption of health data could
delay patient treatment for lack of right information or mislead the health care profes-
sionals to give wrong treatment. It is prudent practice to check data integrity before
use of the data, be they fetched from local storage or transferred from other locations.
Authentication: Authentication comprises user authentication and data authenti-
cation. User authentication is to establish the validity of a claimed identity, while data
authentication involves verifying the integrity and authenticity of the data (authenticity
can be understood as the conﬁdence in the validity of a transmission, a piece of data,
or data originator). User authentication is a premise for enforcing access control over
health data in repositories. Data authentication is by necessity a crucial step in ensuring
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that data originate from the claimed party and have been kept unmodiﬁed.
Availability: Availability refers to the fact that upon request, a system provides
data (or service) to the authorized users in a timely fashion. Disruption of data avail-
ability can cause catastrophic consequences [10] in health care systems. Furthermore,
data availability is of paramount importance in the event of emergency, in which case
data availability must override other concerns.
Accountability: Accountability is the assurance that any access to data is recorded
and can be traced. Accountability oﬀers one of the strongest deterrents to data abuses
by both insiders and outsiders. Accountability is normally achieved by auditing trails
that closely couple with access control mechanisms. The content of the auditing trails
normally contain details about data access, typically including the identity of the re-
quester, the data and the time of the access, the source and the destination of the access
and a reason for access.
Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation is the cryptographic service that legally pre-
vents the originator of a message from denying authorship at a later date [164]. Non-
repudiation has been a quite useful property in e-commerce, and we believe it is also
critical for inter-organizational transactions in health care. For example, [23] gave a
health care application that implemented non-repudiation.
Rights Enforcement: As already stated, secondary use of health data is quite
common and essential in current health care practice (e.g., in Figure 1.1, care provider
shares patient data with medical research or with managed care). However, when health
data are given to the secondary users, care provider will lose complete control over the
data. A concern of redistribution of the data by the secondary users thus arises. For
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one thing, health data are an important asset to care provider that has collected and
compiled the data, and it is thus important for care provider to assert data ownership.
For the other, in case of data redistribution leading to inappropriate information disclo-
sure, rights enforcement tools can help trace the liable parties. While agreements are
normally signed by the secondary users on the use of the shared data (e.g., they promise
not to illegally redistribute the data), technical means is a more eﬀective deterrent.
Note that traditional security mechanisms such as access control and encryption are
completely ineﬀective in controlling health data in secondary use. As a matter of fact,
health care community now has growing awareness on the need of right enforcement (see
e.g., [49,53,104,183]), and it is suggested that eﬀective right enforcement over systemic
data ﬂows is among the primary unresolved technical problems in health care domain
[53].
These are the common and general security requirements for health care systems,
although they may need to be reﬁned when considering particular applications, scenarios
and contexts. While construction of a secure health care system should consider all these
requirements (each may require considerable work), our main focus in this dissertation
is on ensuring individual privacy.
1.2.2 Our Contributions
Health care community has long held the obligations for ensuring data security and
individual (patient) privacy, and as a result, considerable eﬀort has been dedicated to this
subject. Most of the past investigations in general concentrated on either establishing
guidelines and policies on regulating health care professionals and practices (e.g., [10,
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17,40,52,53,59,93,127,146,161–163,179]), or constructing end-to-end secure health care
systems with oﬀ-the-shelf security tools from a more engineering-inclined perspective
(e.g., [19,33,35,36,39, 111, 125, 130, 152]). Work in the former class normally examined
insuﬃciencies in the protection of health data by health care professionals and care
organizations, and then came up with recommendations, guidelines and policies towards
correct health care practice. In contrast, work in the latter class explored applying well
established security primitives and techniques to health care systems, for example, using
encryption to secure data in transmission, or developing access control mechanisms and
deploying ﬁrewall to safeguard data in storage. Limitations of these existing methods
include (1) most of them constructed “secure systems” that keep conﬁdentiality of health
data, that is they concentrated mainly on making data secure in the local storage and in
transmission; (2) they seldom considered protecting health data in secondary use where
care providers lose control over the data. This aspect becomes clearer as secondary
use of health data becomes increasingly important and common in current and future
health care systems; (3) few work addressed emerging issues and concerns such as rights
enforcement and strong individual privacy. Take individual privacy for example, patients
are increasingly concerned about individual privacy in care, as with in e-commerce.
However, health care community is slow in responding to the increasing demand for
strong individual privacy such as unlinkability in health care transactions; (4) some of the
existing proposals might not endeavor to respect the real-would practice when achieving
protection objectives; (5) compliance with law regulations was not seriously taken into
consideration by many of the existing work. But things changed dramatically now: for
example, in U.S. as HIPAA takes eﬀect, organizations failing to meet law stipulations
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would incur legal action.
The scope of this dissertation is concerned with a systematic study on techniques
to solve data security and especially individual privacy issues arising from health care
systems, represented by the setting in Figure 1.1. The intent of our study is not to
construct a complete health care system, but to address several typical and closely
related issues, and the techniques we propose can be readily integrated into any practical
system. We focus on emerging issues in current and future health care systems, and our
design takes into consideration the compliance with law regulations (e.g., HIPAA [86]).
For the latter, throughout the dissertation we assume that each patient (or physician)
has a personal smart card at her disposal, and each care organization has a security
manager (we shall discuss security manager in Chapter 3). Note that HIPAA endorses
the use of smart card and the establishment of security manager (where it is termed
privacy oﬃcer) in health care systems.
In particular, the following issues will be studied in this dissertation.
• Building a uniﬁed trust infrastructure for health care organizations.
User authentication is a fundamental part of data security, and is an enabling ser-
vice for achieving other aspects of data security within or beyond organizational
boundaries. As signiﬁed by Figure 1.1, health care systems represent a highly dy-
namic and complex setting, various user authentication techniques are thus nec-
essary for satisfying varying demands of organizational and inter-organizational
applications. We suggest each care organization build a uniﬁed trust infrastruc-
ture that accommodates various user authentication techniques and modes, e.g.,
short password, identity certiﬁcate, attribute-based certiﬁcate, anonymous creden-
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tial, and group signature. To that end, each organization establishes a security
manager that manages the organizational trust infrastructure and handles secu-
rity related matters. Our focus is to unify password authentication with other
authentication techniques that can directly exploit the security manager as the
CA (Certiﬁcation Authority) or the TTP (Trusted Third Party). Our solution is
a novel two-server password authentication model and scheme that enlists the se-
curity manager for operating a back-end authentication server. In addition to ren-
dering password authentication compatible with other authentication techniques
in the organizational trust infrastructure, the two-server password authentication
system also circumvents weaknesses inherent in the traditional password systems,
e.g., oﬀ-line dictionary attacks against the server password database. We remark
that the establishment of organizational trust infrastructure in individual care
organizations enables to solve other data security and individual privacy issues
beyond this dissertation.
• Anonymous remote login for health care services.
With the organizational trust infrastructure in place, we are ready to solve secu-
rity issues beyond organizational boundaries. We know that an immediate eﬀect
of the application of information technology, especially EMRs and networking, in
health care is the enabling of care organizations to allow users (e.g., physicians
and patients) to access clinical services and data from oﬀ-site locations. However,
sensitive information pertaining to users such as individual preferences, life styles,
health conditions is conveyed from the services they are accessing. For example,
if a user frequently visits the website of a dental service, most probably the user
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has dental problem. Furthermore, when widely collected and compiled, user infor-
mation of such a kind can be used by some organizations for marketing purposes,
etc [22]. In light of this, we propose an anonymous login scheme that enables
a care organization to provide anonymous remote login service to its aﬃliated
physicians and patients. In other words, the proposed anonymous login scheme
hides users’ access patterns in the process of remote login, so that accesses by
the same user cannot be linked. The scheme has many salient features, including
resilience to DoS attacks, which is important yet hard to achieve in anonymous
systems. Anonymous login is of particular interest and importance as long as users
are concerned about their privacy involved in the login process, and are willing to
attain strong user privacy.
We stress that in later chapters, the anonymous login scheme and the user authen-
tication techniques discussed earlier (e.g., two-server password authentication)
could be adapted or extended for the purpose of establishing trust among parties
that involve in inter-organizational transactions if they need to authenticate each
other and/or set up a secret channel. However, as this may be straightforward
and orthogonal to the issues in question there, we often do not explicitly discuss
this aspect.
• Privacy preserving medication prescription.
The scenario the anonymous login scheme considered is essentially still at the level
of individual organizations. We next move to a more complex, inter-organizational
process, namely, medication prescription. Medication prescription is a routine pro-
cess in health care systems. The following facts suggest protection of individual
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privacy involved in medication prescription needs special treatment. First, the
involvement of diverse parties, especially non-medical parties in the process com-
plicates the protection of prescription data. Second, both patients and doctors
have privacy stakes in medication prescription, and the privacy concerns have dis-
tinct implications with respect to diﬀerent parties. Third, medication prescription
should not proceed in a truly anonymous manner: certain involved parties need to
conduct useful research on the basis of aggregation of prescription data; prescrip-
tion data has to also be identiﬁable in some extreme circumstances, e.g., under the
court order for inspection or for assignment of liability. Another important issue
in medication prescription needs to be addressed is the delegation of prescription
ﬁling capability by patients to other people. This feature accords with a common
practice in medication prescription that others instead of the patients themselves
collect the prescribed medicine. They may be a patient’s guardians, relatives, or
friends who accompany the patient to visit the doctor.
To address all these issues, we propose a smart card enabled electronic medication
prescription system. Smart cards carried by patients play an important role: for
one thing, smart card is implemented to be a portable repository carrying up-
to-date personal medical records and insurance information, providing doctors
instant data access crucial to the process of diagnosis and medicine prescription;
for the other, with the private signing key being stored inside, smart card enables
a patient to sign electronically the prescription pad, declaring her acceptance of
the prescription. A strong proxy signature scheme achieving mutual agreements
on delegation is proposed to implement the delegation functionality.
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• Privacy preserving and right enforcement of health data in outsourcing.
A main objective of the medication prescription system is to ensure individual
privacy (of doctors and patients), while at the same time enabling relevant par-
ties to collect prescription data so as to conduct research based on the statistical
analysis of these data. We continue this line of study on “achieving user privacy
while enabling medical research”, but consider a quite diﬀerent scenario: a health
care organization (e.g., a hospital) outsources the health data in its repository
to other organizations (e.g., medical research institute). This actually involves
“secondary” use of health data. As we already made it clear, the demand for such
kind of secondary use of health data is increasing steadily for purposes of clinical
research and cost-eﬀective research, which are essential in the provision of better
quality care. The health data to be outsourced are an aggregation of medical
records rather than individual records. Privacy protection therefore should be en-
forced upon beyond individual data items, and the outsourcing organization has
more interests to be protected against the receiving organizations. In particular,
besides the protection of individual privacy referred to in the outsourced data,
copyright (ownership) enforcement over the data is another issue to be addressed.
We present a uniﬁed framework that seamlessly combines techniques of binning
and digital watermarking to attain the dual goals of privacy and copyright pro-
tection. Our binning method is built upon an earlier approach of generalization
and suppression by allowing a broader concept of generalization. To ensure data
usefulness, we propose constraining binning by usage metrics that deﬁne max-
imal allowable information loss, and the metrics can be enforced oﬀ-line. Our
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watermarking algorithm watermarks the binned data in a hierarchical manner by
exploiting the very nature of the data. The method is resilient to the generaliza-
tion attack that is speciﬁc to the binned data, as well as other attacks intended
to destroy the inserted mark. We implemented the techniques, and the tests show
promising experimental results.
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we review related work
that demonstrates the status quo of security implementation in health care systems.
We also give a brief survey on access control in health care in a separate subsection,
considering access control is an extensively studied topic in literature; moreover, to
facilitate the development of practical access control for health care applications, we list
many features that are necessary for health care systems and thus should be incorporated
in the basic role based access control model.
In Chapter 3, we discuss user authentication in health care systems, and suggest
building a uniﬁed trust infrastructure for health care organizations that accommodates
various user authentication techniques and modes, e.g., short password, identity certiﬁ-
cate, attribute-based certiﬁcate, anonymous credential, and group signature. To make
password authentication compatible with other authentication techniques and modes,
we propose a novel two-server password authentication system.
In Chapter 4, we propose an anonymous login scheme that provides users (physicians
and patients) remote access of clinical services and data in an anonymous manner. The
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proposed scheme possesses a salient feature that diﬀerent login sessions by the same user
cannot be linked by outside attachers, thereby achieving strong user privacy.
In Chapter 5, we present a smart card enabled privacy preserving medication pre-
scription system. We analyze diﬀerent implications of patient privacy as well as doctor
privacy with respect to diﬀerent parties, and accordingly address these privacy con-
cerns. To well accord with the real world practice, we propose a strong proxy signature
scheme for the purpose of implementing “delegation of signing” in medication prescrip-
tion. Smart card is heavily used in this proposal: on the one hand, smart card is enlisted
as a portable repository housing up-to-date personal medical records and insurance in-
formation; on the other hand, smart card serves as a tamper resistant device storing
inside private signing keys, enabling signing of medication prescription pads.
In Chapter 6, we investigate preserving of individual privacy and ownership of health
data in outsourcing. In particular, we present a uniﬁed framework that seamlessly
combines techniques of binning and digital watermarking to attain the dual goals of
privacy and copyright protection. Our binning method extends an earlier approach
of generalization and suppression, allowing a broader concept of generalization. Our
watermarking algorithm is a hierarchical scheme by exploiting the very nature of the
binned data. It is resilient to many malicious attacks intended to destroy the inserted
mark, including generalization attack that is speciﬁc to our scenario. We conducted
extensive experiments on the proposed techniques, and promising results were obtained.




Due to the very nature of health data, health care community has long held the pro-
fessional and ethical obligations for ensuring data security and patient privacy. As the
use of information technology becomes increasingly prevalent in health care domain,
considerable eﬀort has been invested to studying security issues in health care infor-
mation systems. Past studies in general fall into two classes: the ﬁrst class focused
on establishing guidelines and policies on regulating professionals and care practices,
see e.g., [10, 17, 40, 52, 53, 59, 93, 127, 146, 161–163, 179]; the other class studied security
solutions at a technical level. Since the latter class is more relevant to our work in this
dissertation, we thus in what follows choose to give a brief introduction to the work
in this class, which indicates the status quo of security implementation in health care
systems. In addition, considering access control has bee an extensively studied topic in
literature, we review access control in health care systems in a separate subsection for
clarity reasons, and list many features that are useful and thus should be implemented
in role based access control for health care applications. We believe these features can
be a good starting point for the development of a practical access control mechanism
for health care systems.
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2.1 Security Implementation in Health Care
Medical images represent a main data modality in health care systems. Many applica-
tions explored securely accessing or transferring medical images. [87] reported a simple
system designed to transmit pictures and radiographs of a severely fractured ankle over
WWW (world wide web) for viewing by a consultant, followed by recommended treat-
ment. Security however is not strictly strengthened in this system and only “password”
is needed to access the medical images. Similarly, the system in [85] is also intended to
deliver medical images via WWW. However, security is much more strengthened, e.g., a
proxy server and a ﬁrewall is employed to safeguard health data from external attacks,
and SSL is taken to protect data ﬂow.
To facilitate health care application development over WWW, it is more and more
accepted that proven middleware technology such as CORBA, structured representation
technology such as XML, in combination with established health care standards must
collaborate and integrate seamlessly. [74] examined systematically the eﬀorts in devel-
oping component-based standards speciﬁc to health care environment that can ﬁt ﬁnely
with existing health care standards such as HL7 [83], and DICOM [58]: for example,
OMG has developed COBARmed [51]; Microsoft’s Healthcare Users Group commits it-
self to the development of ActiveX-based implementation of HL7 messaging objects [3];
XML is introduced to HL7 to enable the latter to take a more object-oriented view [84].
The system in [24] is an example making use of CORBA to construct an open, stream-
lined, automated, monitored platform to distribute clinical images in an environment of
a large consortium of hospitals. In [26], CORBA and OLE were deployed into health
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care applications so as to evaluate their capabilities in developing distributed applica-
tions: Patient record data object providing a consistent speciﬁcation for accessing the
data was created by CORBA. Two clients of the data object were developed. One, using
OLE, illustrates access information within the organization. The other, developed as a
WWW browser, demonstrates access information from outside. [29] identiﬁed the main
issues in constructing by CORBA compatible component-based technology a security
environment where a user will be viewed the same across the heterogeneous systems,
and access control decisions will be consistent across all components of the environment.
[39] developed a toolset using object-oriented techniques including the uniﬁed modelling
language (UML) to facilitate the diﬀerent users’ views for security analysis and design
of health care information systems. The proposals we come up with in this dissertation
are independent of the techniques and standards at the implementation level.
Legacy systems that are currently providing for the smooth functioning of their
systems contain large prior investments; therefore it is necessary to integrate them into
the new systems. The integration process however is diﬃcult due to the incompatible
format used and the facts that security factors are not taken into consideration in the
time of their deployment. The solution strategy suggested in [103] was that information
is communicated using messaging standards such as HL7, and archived and used in such
ways that can exploit the Internet and distributed object technologies. An example is to
develop and use a HL7-to-CORBA gateway. Similar approach was also used in [102] to
adapt the legacy system to the new WWW environment. It appeared that hiding legacy
systems behind “brokers” is a practically economical solution. The “brokers” act as an
intermediary to support interoperability, implement security services at the application
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level.
The MIPA project (Medical Information Privacy Assurance) [2] was aimed to develop
privacy technology and privacy-protecting infrastructures to facilitate the development
of a uniform health care information system so that individuals can actively protect
their personal information. The project contained three systems: an e-prescription
system (which will be reviewed shortly), a credential-transfer system and a centralized
anonymous repository for medical records. The credential-transfer system allowed for
the construction of trust among health care organizations and their external business
associates on the protection of patients’ health data. Users use pseudonyms rather
than anonymous transactions when they contact with organizations. The centralized,
anonymous repository provided a Centralized Medical Database (CMDB), where strong
user authentication and audit records of accesses are powerful abuse deterrents. The
patients can specify who may read/update their medical records, and for what duration.
So, in compliance with the HIPAA regulations, patients have control over their medical
records. Anyone accesses the data must get consent from the patients. Exceptional
cases, e.g., FBI agents access the data holding court order, were accommodated in this
system. The ﬂavor of the MIPA project is much similar to that in this dissertation, and
most of the issues we study are independent of those in the MIPA project.
With HIPAA taking eﬀect, health care community is forced to comply with the legal
regulations on protection of health data. [152] systematically studied how PKI (Public
Key Infrastructure) is used by health care organizations to comply with HIPAA. It
also illustrated using PKI for important business solutions with the help of detailed
case studies in other sectors such as ﬁnancial, government, and consumer industries.
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It highlighted how to meet domestic and international regulations for corporate-level
and government-level standards on security and privacy. We believe PKI is an essential
element for trust establishment in health care environment, whereas we discuss to include
PKI as a part in the organizational trust infrastructure, which also incorporates may
other user authentication techniques and modes (see Chapter 3).
Medication prescription is a typical routine service in health care systems, involv-
ing multiple parties (some are non-medical organizations), and these participants have
distinct privacy concerns. Several work looked into addressing individual privacy in the
process of medication prescription. The work in [136] was aimed at protecting doctors’
identities in the prescription pads while at the same time allowing data to be aggregated
for the purposes of research and statistical analysis. The enlisted method is presenting
prescription data in two distinct batches: one batch includes prescription information
with scrambled doctor references and the other batch contains the scrambled doctor
references and the doctor information. A trusted third party is involved in the process
so the data collector is not able to identify doctors who did not agree to being iden-
tiﬁed. The ﬁrst batch is encrypted with a public encryption key of the data collector
and the second batch is encrypted with a public key of the third party; both batches
are sent to the respective parties. Only the third party, possessing the corresponding
private key for decryption, can then recover the second batch data in the readable form.
Analogously only the data collector can decrypt the ﬁrst batch of data. The anonymous
E-prescription system in [2, 8] sought to achieve similar objectives of protecting indi-
vidual privacy while enabling useful research, but using quite diﬀerent approaches. In
particular, patient privacy is reserved by each patient applying for a pseudonym from
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the insurer and signing the prescription under the pseudonym, and anonymity revoca-
tion is accomplished by the insurer; anonymity of doctors is achieved by each doctor
joining a group and then issuing group signatures on the prescription pads by using a
group signature scheme (e.g., [1,47]). Another work relates to medication prescription is
[132], which presented a clearing scheme for the Germany health care system, addressing
the privacy issues among various parties such as physician, insurers, pharmacies, etc.,
in an overall context of medical processes. We also address individual privacy involved
in medication prescription in Chapter 5, based on the above work and especially on
[8]. However, two main features distinguish our system from others: ﬁrst, we introduce
smart card into our system, acting as both a repository housing latest personal health
and insurance data and a prescription signing device; second, we implement delegation
of signing, allowing patients to delegate their prescription signing capabilities to other
people. This feature is of particular interest to e.g., disabled patients.
Finally, to get a complete picture on security implementation in health care systems,
we next introduce a comprehensive project providing secure accesses to clinical data via
WWW, namely PCASSO (Patient-Centered Access to Secure System Online) [19, 33,
124,125]. PCASSO is a research, development, and evaluation project to exploit state-
of-the-art security and WWW technology for health care, intended to provide secure
access to clinical data for health care providers and their patients using Internet. In
what follows, we in turn examine security measures taken at the server side, the client
side, and the internet link between server and client.
1. PCASSO Server
PCASSO addressed server vulnerabilities by hosting its server and clinical data
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repository on a high-assurance OS (Data General’s B2 DG/UX). Of the rating deﬁned in
the Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, Class B2 pro-
vides PCASSO with the following security functions: user authentication, identity-based
(discretionary) access control, label-based (mandatory) access control, ﬁnely grained
privileges, auditing, and trusted communication path. DG/UX’s advanced label-based
access control mechanism protects PCASSO executables from virus infection, and pa-
tient data from access by unauthorized software. The server uses host and packet ﬁlters
that prohibit administrative access from any machine other than trusted local machines.
Advanced logging capabilities monitor critical aspects of PCASSO execution, and ad-
ministrative tools allow the system administrator to query and analyze the audit trail to
review system behavior, to identify potential system misuse and intrusion, and to view
statistical reports. The principal architectural components of the PCASSO Server are
the Administrator, the Importer, the Encryption service, the RDBMS, the hypertext
transfer protocol daemon (HTTPD), and the File System.
Administrator. The Administrator is a trusted application that provides the PCASSO
system administration capabilities.
Importer. The Importer is a trusted application responsible for importing patient
record information from the UCSD interface engine (in HL7 format) into the PCASSO
Clinical Data Repository (CDR) and Research Data Repository (RDR). The Importer
is also responsible for establishing the initial sensitivity labels for all information.
Encryption Service. The Encryption service provides an end-to-end conﬁdential,
authenticated communication service for the PCASSO Client-Server Protocol (PCSP),
which is based on SSL.
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RDBMS. The RDBMS is a Class B1 Oracle relational database management system
(Trusted Oracle 7.2) that is responsible for managing the patient-centric Clinical Data
Repository (CDR), which contains the patient records, and the research data repository
(RDR), which contains only non-patient-identiﬁable information and has a non-patient-
centric organization. The CDR and RDR are separate Oracle instances. These databases
physically reside within operating system ﬁles dedicated to the Database Domain. Stored
procedures managed by the RDBMS log accesses to the CDR, and store these data within
patient records, enabling access through the normal patient-record interface.
HTTPD. The HTTPD is a standard Internet Web server that provides the initial
login Web page to allow access to the PCASSO System from Internet Web browsers via
the HTTP protocol. File System. The DG/UX ﬁle system contains all the ﬁles that
store information within the PCASSO System.
2. PCASSO Client
PCASSO clients are normally PCs running windows 95. Because Windows95 lacks
architectural features fundamental to security (e.g., self-protection, process/virtual ad-
dress space isolation), they must be considered high-risk from an assurance perspective.
The PCASSO client software provides features and countermeasures in its design and
implementation to raise the level of sophistication and costs necessary to compromise
patient data. They include the following:
(1) The client is designed as a read-only system, providing no mechanisms for the
display applets to store sensitive patient data to the client computer’s ﬁle system. In
addition, the client’s Web browser does not cache HTML, images, or Java code when
interacting with sites through secure channels, thus reducing the risk posed by malicious
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applications or users who browse or poison secondary storage devices for cached patient
information or applet code.
(2) The client is provided encryption services that implement authentication and end-
to-end conﬁdentiality. These encryption services prevent lower-layer malicious network
protocols or device drivers from eavesdropping on data as they are exchanged between
the Java Virtual Machine and the network interface.
(3) Client applets are stored on the PCASSO server and downloaded upon the estab-
lishment of the secure connection. By avoiding storage of client applets on the insecure
Windows ﬁle system, PCASSO eliminates the risk that binaries may be modiﬁed or
replaced.
(4) Client applets are restricted to the Java runtime “sandbox”, thus providing a
boundary of containment as to where the data handling and display applets can store
or forward sensitive patient records.
(5) Client applets check for other applets execution, thus reducing the potential of
interference or subversion.
(6) The client stores no authentication data on the Windows 95 machine; these data
are stored on a read-only diskette that is inserted only when the client user is instructed
to do so, thus reducing the window of opportunity available to entities attempting to
compromise the client’s authentication information.
(7) Client applets avoid the use of keyboard entry for inputting user authentication
data; instead, Java widgets employ graphical mouse-oriented interfaces that allow users
to enter sensitive information, while limiting the exposure of these data to capture
(e.g., keyboard interrupt monitoring). The server maintains the association between
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the connection and the PCASSO User ID, allowing the client to clear the ID, password,
and key password, from memory to avoid capture by a malicious application.
(8) Applets convert textual information to images to increase the diﬃculty for ma-
licious processes to search resident data structures for sensitive information.
3. Internet Link
All the data in transit are encrypted by PCASSO Client-Server Protocol (PCSP)
that is based on SSL.
With all these measures in place, PCASSO provides assurance of correct operation
through formal, disciplined design and development methodologies, as well as through
functional and penetration testing. It is evident that PCASSO implemented a secure
end-to-end health care system, with emphasis on keeping health data secure from outside
attackers. Our study in this dissertation goes beyond building a secure end-to-end
system for achieving data security against outside attackers, and we focus on addressing
individual privacy, which further involves data protection towards legitimate parties.
2.2 Access Control in Health Care
Access control constitutes a fundamental part of data security within organizations, and
has been an extensively studied subject in literature. We believe many existing studies
are instrumental in developing a practical access control mechanism for health care
systems. In this subsection we give a brief survey on access control and mainly RBAC
(role based access control) in health care, and list features that are useful and should be
implemented in RBAC for health care applications. These features are a good reference
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and starting point for developing a practical access control mechanism for health care
systems.
R. Anderson [11] proposed a security policy model for health care information sys-
tems that allows the British Medical Association (BMA) to meet security requirements
of the electronic patient record (EPR) and is the base of any proposed system claims
to operate the EPR. Anderson’s model is composed of a set of principles based on a
statement found in the Good Medical Practice booklet issued by the General Medical
Council (GMC), which says: patients have a right to expect that you will not pass on any
personal information, which you learn in the course of your professional duties, unless
they agree. This model is the ﬁrst security policy model that spells out clear and concise
access rules for clinical information system. Aljareh and Rossiter [9] gave an in-depth
analysis of Anderson’s model including the diﬃculties for practical implementation.
In the last few years, role based access control (RBAC) and its variants have ac-
quired a great importance among access control models. Traditional discretionary access
control (DAC) bases authorization decision on discretion of individual users, thereby in-
applicable to the majority of health information; the most commonly used mandatory
access control (MAC) in the form of multi-level mechanism that associates information
with labels as “TOP SECRET”, “SECRET”, and “CONFIDENTIAL” is not suﬃciently
ﬂexible for industry use [26]. In contrast, in RBAC, rights and permissions are assigned
to roles rather than to individual users; users acquire these rights and permissions as they
activate appropriate roles. Such an idea greatly eases the administration of authoriza-
tion, as roles are stable while users are volatile in an organization. The major beneﬁts
of RBAC are the ability to express and enforce enterprise-speciﬁc security policies and
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to simplify the process of security management.
It was accepted [26] that RBAC is a more suitable access control model than other
models for health care systems, since health care practice tends to manage access rights
to patient data around medical “roles” that associate with individual patients. Numer-
ous eﬀort has been dedicated to investigating application of RBAC and its variants to
health care setting. [102] presented a demonstration of the use of RBAC with patient
records, proving usefulness and applicability of RBAC to health care systems. [80] re-
ported a preliminary framework to integrate hierarchical access control into the health
care system. In particular, it identiﬁes four kinds of principals, i.e., clinically-qualiﬁed
staﬀ (e.g., physicians, nurses), non-clinically qualiﬁed medical staﬀ (e.g., technicians,
secretaries), non-medical staﬀ (e.g., programmers), patients; furthermore, a document
is partitioned into Q ranked equivalence classes with the property that an authority
with permission Pm can decrypt all parts of the document encrypted at equivalence
classes Ej provided m > j. Consequently, master key holders can decrypt the entire
document, while more restricted users can only decrypt those parts of the document
for which they hold the appropriate key authority. Main weaknesses associating with
this framework include coarse granularity of the principal classiﬁcation and involving no
contextual information.
As a high-level access control model that uses the abstraction concept of role to re-
duce the complexity of authorization management, RBAC requires intermediate struc-
tures to implement its abstraction concepts on lower level access control on a platform.
Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE) model [28], a lower level mandatory access con-
trol mechanism, can be used to predate RBAC towards that end. In DTE, subjects (or
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transaction programs) are assigned “Domain” labels and objects are assigned “Type”
labels. Associating with each Domain-Type pair is a set of allowable access modes.
The data structure that contains access modes for all Domain-Type pairs is called the
Domain-Type Access Matrix. The system in [54] used a combination of RBAC and
DTE, augmented with a logic-driven authorization engine, in an attempt to construct
a dynamic authorization framework supporting multiple authorization types in health
care systems. Contextual constraints are implemented in this framework, such that each
individual authorization request is assigned a type and the conditions needed to satisfy
the requirements for that authorization type are checked dynamically. Once the condi-
tions are checked using certain context information, the DTE subject-domain table is
read to assign the correct domain (based on the invoked subject) to the user session.
The actual permissions required for the subject to carry on its intended operation are
read oﬀ from another DTE table - i.e., the Domain-Type Access Matrix.
eMEDAC [130, 131] enhanced an original MEDAC policy that was a three-layer
model with role based concept being introduced but not fully implemented. eMEDAC
instead reinforced the role-based concept to better embrace MAC and DAC. eMEDAC
exploited the concept of a Hyper Node Hierarchy (HNH) to inherit permissions (discre-
tional control) and derive security labels (mandatory control) instead of retrieve them
as stored static labels from database. This gave a more ﬂexible access control and save
of storage space. HNH are used to construct User Role Hierarchies (URH) and Data
Set Hierarchies (DSH) and to derive the security labels (consisting of a security level
and a category set) of user roles and data sets. Flexibility however comes at expense
of eﬃciency. [77] further improved eMEDAC by combining team based concept with
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role based concept. A primary contribution of such a combination is the feasibility to
accommodate in a natural way the context information in the role based access control.
From this perspective, this method is a well founded context based access control model,
as “Team” includes with itself context information consisting of user context and object
context. This model is able to, on the one hand, leverage the scalable security adminis-
tration beneﬁts of RBAC, while one the other provide ﬁne-grained permission activation
and deactivation to individual users and object instances. For example, it is thus pos-
sible to assign and administer broad permissions for doctors on object types based on
some role deﬁnitions and yet activate a doctor’s permission to a patient’s records (object
instances) only when he is taking care of the patient. An implementation of this model
in a relational database management system for a health care organization was given. In
[129], this role-based policy was again implemented in a decentralized manner by virtue
of digital certiﬁcates for authentication. In particular, three types of digital certiﬁcates
are used: Identity Certiﬁcate (IC) for authentication; Attribute Certiﬁcate (AC) for au-
thorization; and Access-Rule Certiﬁcate (RC) for propagation of access control policy.
Compared to an IC, an AC contains attributes that specify access control information
associated with the AC holder (such as group membership, role, security clearance),
and normally it has comparatively shorter lifetime without revocation mechanisms. An
RC is a long-lived certiﬁcate with revocation mechanisms, containing digitally signed
sets of rules. RCs enable parties responsible for policy to create and distribute access
control mechanisms remotely and securely and to create rules authorizing access to their
respective resources. Jurecic and Bunz [99] also described a prototype implementation
of role-based access control in combination with attribute certiﬁcates. In this implemen-
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tation, however, attribute certiﬁcates along with other security related public keys, are
stored in an Organizational Directory dictated under X.500.
Tzelepi and Pangalos [178] presented an extended RBAC model where permissions
for access are given based on the semantic content of images. Two extensions are done
to regular RBAC: one introduces the user attribute base which is deﬁned as 〈user id,
user name, domain, location〉; the other extends the general form of Role-Permission
relationship as 〈identiﬁer, s: role, action, t: target, constraint(s, t)〉, where s is deﬁned
as a role and t is deﬁned as an object on which actions can be performed. Access right
is granted only when the constraint(s, t) is satisﬁed. Essentially, these extensions at-
tempted to accommodate context information involved in a request for access to certain
patients’ medical information. Task-based access control model (TBAC) [90] can be a
good complement to RBAC in health care systems. TBAC implements purpose binding
such that a user is granted access only if such an access is necessary for the user to
perform her/his current task and if she/he is authorized to perform this task. RBAC is
not designed to directly enforce purpose binding.
Access control in health care must at minimum meet the stipulations of laws, legal
regulations. With HIPAA [86] taking eﬀect in U.S., many work explored developing
access control systems in compliance with HIPAA requirements. For example, [166]
illustrated an example of implementing context-based access control into health care
setting. Simply speaking, context-based access control is built over either user-based
or role-based access control, but going a step further: access control decisions in user-
based or role-based access control answer questions for example, “Should this person
(or a person who performs this job function) be allowed to access this type of data?”
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while the equivalent context-based question would be, “Should this person (or a person
who performs this job function) be allowed to access this type of data as it applies
to this particular patient?”. The discussion in [166] made use of stored procedures in
a relational database to check some context information constituting a to-be-satisﬁed
condition prior to bestowing the access control privileges; moreover, various aspects
concerning a successful implementation of the model such as the dependency of the
model on core operating system and database security controls were emphasized. Cole
[50] discussed the applicability of RBAC to achieve HIPAA compliance in health care
systems, and provided many useful suggestions on practical implementation.
Other access control models were also studies for health care systems. For example,
[66] explored the possibility of applying Partition Rule Based Access Control (PRBAC)
to civilian uses such as in health care practice. PRBAC is an advanced computer access
control technology for computer network applications. PRBAC is adaptable to the needs
of speciﬁc communities, allowing the authorities responsible for the security policy of a
community (partition) to deﬁne the rules for controlling access to sensitive information
within the community, enforce those rules within their community, as well as to relate
their rules with those of another community to enable information to be exchanged in
a controlled fashion. In essence, PRBAC involves conveying authorizations in X.509
type certiﬁcates, target data sensitivities in labels, and security policies in PRBAC
Information Files (PIFs). PRBAC provides a standardized Access Control Decision
function that compares user authorizations against target data labels according to a
deﬁned security policy. The ability to specify widely varying security policies in PIFs
provides the PRBAC mechanism great ﬂexibility to meet the needs of users as diverse
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as in health care systems.
From what we have reviewed so far, it is clear that RBAC is a right access con-
trol model for health care systems. But RBAC by itself may not be enough in some
circumstances, and it has to be extended in many aspects to meet the dynamic, com-
plex setting and varying security demands in health care systems, or for satisfying legal
requirements. To that end, in what follows we emphasize many features that should
be incorporated in RBAC. Developing such an access control module in practice may
require considerable engineering eﬀort, but implementation of some of the features may
follow a modularized approach, providing “features on demand”.
• While it supports authorization at the discretion of roles in general, the access
control module should also supports user-based access control. User-based access
control is a useful complement to RBAC in many circumstances, and is further
a requirement by HIPAA. Implementing user-based access control in RBAC can
refer to [149, 185]. Augmenting RBAC with mandatory access control property
also has advantages in health care systems [54,130].
• Due to the discrepancies among health care organizations, there may be diﬀerences
between organizational roles and system roles. An organizational role is a natural
position in an organization, while a system role refers to a capsulation of access
rights in the target system. Separation of organization roles and system roles is
eﬀective in system design and maintenance for health care systems. The methods
suggested in [142] should be incorporated into RBAC as basic elements.
• Access rights to heath data may change dynamically, depending on the context.
Various contextual factors, such as purpose of requests (purpose binding), aﬃl-
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iation of the requester, location and time of the requests, relationship between
the requester and the patient whose data are being requested, should be consid-
ered. The contextual factors can be implemented as a set of constraint logics
commanding RBAC. The reference of [54] is a good starting point.
• Access control in health care systems involves protection of individualized data.
Informed consent must be implemented such that health care organizations cannot
use health data for purposes other than consented to by patients. Implementa-
tion of informed consent is a practice for compliance with HIPAA. [42] discussed
several issues associating with implementing informed consent. At the technical
level, a way to implement informed consent can follow the method in [2], where a
construction of a centralized, anonymous medical record repository was presented.
• Finer access granularity with respect to diﬀerent data modalities should be achieved.
Taking medical images for example, access restriction can be enforced at the block
level and not simply at the ﬁle level, semantic content of an image should be ex-
tracted and speciﬁed. [177] presented such an access control mechanism over
medical images.
• Routine transactions in health care systems normally involve multiple entities
within individual organizations or even across organizational boundaries. More-
over, joint projects among many organizations such as health care provider and
medical research institutes are also common. As a result, access control in health
care systems should possess workﬂow support. Access control with workﬂow sup-
port must implement strict separation of duty and principle of least privilege. [64]
extended and adapted RBAC to provide adaptive authorization for workﬂows.
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• Access control for health care system must accommodate exceptional accessing,
while without compromising the overall system security: emergency access and
legal auditing are two exemplary exceptional accesses of health data. Exceptional
accessing is either essential due to the nature of health care systems, or for fulﬁlling
law requirements. [2] gave a solution to emergency access of health data by virtue
of emergency access tokens.
• RBAC adheres to the principle of general denial with explicit consent, but au-
thorization taking the form of general consent qualiﬁed by explicit denial is of
particular use in some situations. For example, it is often required to enforce au-
thorization policies similar to: access is granted to Physicians except for Dr. John,
who is the patient’s father in law. Augmenting RBAC with such explicit denial
of authorization oﬀers additional ﬂexibility in access control. [149] presented a
solution to this problem.
• Support of delegation of access rights and responsibilities oﬀers another level of
ﬂexibility in authorization. Two types of delegation should be speciﬁed in health
care systems: doctors can delegate part of their privileges to other qualiﬁed per-
sonnel; patients can delegate their control on the health information to trusted
guardians in case of emergency. [190] proposed a delegation framework based
upon RBAC.
• Strict auditing must be implemented. All accesses to health data must be docu-
mented non-repudiatable.
These are typical features we believe to be useful for access control in health care
systems. Depending on particular applications, more features may be needed.
43
CHAPTER 3
Building A Unified Trust
Infrastructure for Health Care
Organizations
In this chapter, we discuss establishing a uniﬁed trust infrastructure for health care
systems, and more precisely we focus on user authentication in health care setting. We
must point out that a trust infrastructure involves a broader range of issues other than
user authentication, e.g., policies, models, etc, but discussion of them is out of the
scope of this dissertation. User authentication is a fundamental and enabling service for
organizational and inter-organizational trust establishment. Discussions in this chapter
thus lay a foundation to solve other security and privacy issues in later chapters and
beyond this dissertation.
Health care systems represent a complex and cooperative setting as signiﬁed by Fig-
ure 1.1. Due to the varying operational environments and contexts, systems, and security
requirements, many authentication techniques are necessary for their respective advan-
tages. For example, within an organization, it is of particular convenience for interior
physicians and administrative staﬀs to be authenticated for their routine work by using
passwords; in contrary, for inter-organizational cooperation, user authentication relying
on credentials demonstrates advantages because of higher reliability and expressiveness.
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It is thus of interest and importance to investigate tailoring multiple user authentication
techniques into a uniﬁed infrastructure that can provide ﬂexible authentication services
to health care organizations.
3.1 Tailoring User Authentication Techniques Towards A
Unified Trust Infrastructure
User authentication is an enabling service for trust establishment within individual or-
ganizations and across organizational boundaries. Through trust establishment, users
prove their qualiﬁcation and legitimacy for certain services or data. Technically, trust
establishment is accomplished by virtue of user authentication (or identiﬁcation) tech-
niques. A variety of user authentication techniques and modes have been studied and
used in practice, e.g., password, identity certiﬁcate (e.g., X.509 digital certiﬁcate [186]),
attribute-based certiﬁcate, anonymous credential, group signature, and so on1. We next
give a short introduction on these techniques and their potential uses in health care
systems.
Password : Entry of a user ID followed by a password is the most commonly used
means of user authentication since the advent of computers and is still gaining popularity
especially among mobile users. In a password authentication system, each user shares a
password or some simple password veriﬁcation data (PVD) derived from the password
with a single server, and the user only needs to memorize the password and uses it in
1Note that biometrics (e.g., [25]), tokens such as smart card and SecurID card are also useful au-
thentication means in health care systems. But they are normally used for physical access, not for
negotiating trust among several parties, which is our concern.
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user authentication process. One apparent advantage of using password lies in that it
has little or no actual cost since no associated physical accessories such as smart cards,
sensors, scanners are required. Password authentication still demonstrates vitality in
health care systems. For example, it will be of great convenience for physicians to
authenticate to their routine services from within care organizations. Moreover, in some
places such as outpatient clinics where dumb terminals are still used, passwords may be
the only option for user authentication.
However, because of the limited dictionary space where passwords are drawn, pass-
word authentication is susceptible to brute-force dictionary attack, whereby an attacker
enumerates every possible password from the password dictionary for either repeated
one-line logins or oﬀ-line checks against a valid login transcript. The former, known as
on-line dictionary attack, can be thwarted at the system level by limiting the number
of unsuccessful login attempts made by a user. In contrast, the latter, known as oﬀ-line
dictionary attack, is harder to resist. The bulk of research has been dedicated to the
development of password (only) authentication systems that are robust against oﬀ-line
dictionary attack by outside attackers, e.g., [20, 31, 112]. In practice, attackers take on
a variety of forms, such as disgruntled system administrators, hackers, viruses, worms,
accidents and mis-conﬁgurations. As a result, no security measures and precautions can
guarantee that a system will never be penetrated. Once the server housing user pass-
words or PVDs is compromised or corrupt, all passwords or PVDs may fall in the hands
of bad guys. Hence, concern of oﬀ-line dictionary attack against the server database
arises. Existing solutions to this problem are distributing PVDs and the authentication
functionality to multiple servers, e.g., [69, 134, 150]. Unfortunately, these methods may
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be hard for practical use since a user has to simultaneously contact multiple servers
for user authentication. Clearly, an ideal multi-server password authentication system
should allow users to communicate with only one server as in a single-server system
while the authentication data and functionality are still distributed. Shortly, we present
a two-server system that on the one hand solves the limitations of the above multi-server
methods, while on the other hand possesses compatibility with other user authentication
techniques.
Identity certificate: Public key cryptosystems (digital signature and public key
encryption) are absolutely necessary for trust establishment in open, distributed and
cooperative systems such as health care, where it is hard to pre-establish or maintain
secrets shared among diﬀerent parties. A public key cryptosystem uses two diﬀerent
keys: one is a private key and the other is a corresponding public key; the private key
is for creating digital signatures or decrypting the ciphertexts, and the public key is for
verifying digital signatures or creating ciphertexts. A crucial step associating with the
use of public key cryptosystems is binding public keys with their key holders. This is
achieved through certiﬁcation, a mechanism enables a ready assertion of the association
between a public key with its owner. The standard certiﬁcation framework is X.509
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [186], where a (or more ) trusted third party, known
as certiﬁcation authority (CA), issues digital certiﬁcates on users’ public keys. X.509
certiﬁcates certify public keys at the discretion of globally unique individuals, thereby
in nature identity certiﬁcates. In a PKI, as long as multiple CAs are involved, they are
normally organized into a tree hierarchy and at least the root CA is universally trusted.
Attribute-based certificate : As discussed earlier, a X.509 certiﬁcate is essentially
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an identity certiﬁcate, binding a public key to a globally distinguished name. Some-
times, a user’s name is not essential for authorization decisions. What really matters
is whether the key holder in question possesses a certain qualiﬁcation, property or has
been authorized for certain access rights. This leads to the concept of attributed-based
certiﬁcate such as SPKI (Simple Public Key Infrastructure) [65]. Naming conventions
represent the main diﬀerences between attribute-based certiﬁcates and X.509 certiﬁ-
cates: the name in an attribute-based certiﬁcate needs not necessarily to be globally
unique and the certiﬁcate tends to asserts that the key holder possesses some qualiﬁ-
cation or attributes. Based on the basic concept of attribute-based certiﬁcate, many
variants can be constructed, e.g., role certiﬁcate. Role certiﬁcate will provide a direct
support for RBAC in health care systems. Moreover, attribute-based certiﬁcates are
better to be implemented as short-term credentials, which have wide applicability in
inter-organizational transactions due to the advantages on key management.
Anonymous credential : Anonymous credential, ﬁrst introduced in [45], is an en-
abling technique to achieve strong user privacy in user authentication. Upon regular
credentials such as identity certiﬁcate and attribute-based certiﬁcate, anonymous cre-
dentials enable user authentication to proceed in an anonymous manner, that is, diﬀer-
ent authentication executions by the same user cannot be linked (unlinkability). While
regular credentials can be adapted to be pseudonymous, they are unlikely to achieve
unlinkability. With individual privacy becoming increasingly a concern, anonymous cre-
dentials are now more and more emphasized and should be included as an important
privacy enhancing technique in health care systems. This however requires serious con-
siderations to accord with the deployed organizational access control mechanism that
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normally requires recognizing and identifying users. The idemix system [48] imple-
mented state-of-the-art techniques for anonymous credential and demonstrates many
desired features.
Group Signature: Group signature is another commonly used privacy enhancing
technique, ﬁrst introduced in [47]. Informally, a group signature scheme involves a group
of users, each holding a distinct group signing key; using the signing key, a user can issue
a publicly veriﬁable signature on behalf of the group; given a group signature, one cannot
determine the actual signer, nor can one determine whether two signatures were due
to the same signer; in the event of dispute, the group manager (GM), holding a secret
revocation key, can “open” the signatures and reveal the real identity of the signers. The
intuition behind group signature as a user authentication technique is that the ability to
issue valid groups signatures asserts a user’s membership to a certain group. This may be
useful in many scenarios in health care systems. As with anonymous credential, health
care systems should accommodate group signature in their authentication infrastructure.
The group signature scheme proposed in [1] represents the current state of the art.
These are some typical user authentication techniques and modes that are useful to
health care systems. While these technique can be considered and deployed indepen-
dently within individual organizations, it is clearly of huge interest to unify them into a
coherent infrastructure providing ﬂexible authentication services to health care organi-
zations. Let us ﬁrst see an observation: in health care systems represented by Figure 1.1,
an organization needs to verify not only its aﬃliated users, but also users from other
organizations such as partners and business associates. As such, the authentication ser-
vice within an organization must support both organizational and inter-organizational
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trust establishment. Authentication techniques depending on public key cryptosystems,
e.g., identity certiﬁcate and attribute certiﬁcate, are apparently indispensable in such
settings where pre-establishing of secrets is often not feasible and practical. We therefore
suggest each organization establish a security manager dedicated to certiﬁcation, and
other security related matters (e.g.,handling individual privacy, and issuing secret keys
to the aﬃliated users whenever necessary). Given the security manager is established,
the fundamental principle for inter-organizational authentication would in general follow





Figure 3.1: Two-level Inter-organizational Authentication Procedure.
ticates to the organization she belongs to, who in turn certiﬁes her, e.g., issuing her
a credential. Note that this organizational authentication procedure is not necessarily
on-line with respect to the following inter-organizational access; (2) then when the user
initiates an inter-organizational access, the authenticating organization veriﬁes the au-
thenticity of the certiﬁcation. It is clear that each organization essentially establishes
organizational PKI, with the security manager acting as the CA (certiﬁcation author-
ity). Depending on applications, intermediate CAs may be allowed and included in
50
the certiﬁcation path within an organization, in which case, the security manger would
serve as the root CA. For example, each clinical unit or department in a hospital cer-
tiﬁes its own users while the organizational security manager certiﬁes the clinical units
and departments. In practice, the establishment of organizational PKIs may depend on
external PKIs such that security managers themselves are certiﬁed by an outside CA.
Whatsoever, trust between organizations is eventually established by and traced back
to the respective organizational security managers. It is important to note that the
security manager is not necessarily a single entity. Instead, for eﬃciency and security
reasons, a security manager may be a group of entities, working for example in a thresh-
old manner for a single purpose, or for diﬀerent purposes. The exact form of security
manager depends on particular organizations or applications.
We must stress that the establishment of security manager is a practice compliant
with HIPAA [86] (section 164.512(f)), which recommends to set up “privacy oﬃcers” for
overseeing compliance with privacy regulations and policies. Moreover, security manager
acting as a trusted third party (TTP) is of absolute necessity in many security systems.
For example, in a system achieving revokable user anonymity, enlisting a TTP may be
the only way to avoid complete user anonymity.
It is now evident that a way for establishing an organizational trust infrastructure
is to unify the above various user authentication techniques around the organizational
PKI with the security manager acting as a CA or TTP, as outlined in Figure 3.2. It
is noted that the architecture is an open system in the sense that new authentication
techniques can be continuously incorporated into the infrastructure for emerging needs.














Figure 3.2: A Uniﬁed Organizational Trust Infrastructure.
other authentication modes. For example, in identity certiﬁcate and attribute certiﬁcate,
the security manager is a CA issuing certiﬁcates; in an anonymous credential system,
the security manager is an issuing organization that issues anonymous credentials to
users [45]; in a group signature system, the security manger is the group manager (GM)
responsible for system setup, group membership management and anonymity open [1,
47]. What clearly remains is to integrate password authentication into the organizational
trust infrastructure. To that end, we propose a novel two-server password authentication
system that exploits the security manager for managing a back-end server (the other
server is naturally a service server operated by the corresponding service provider in
the care organization). Another motivation for this two-server password system is to
eliminate the single point of vulnerability inherent in traditional single-server systems.
As a result, concern of oﬀ-line dictionary attack initiated at the server side, e.g., in the
event of attacks by unscrupulous insiders or break-ins by outside attackers, is resolved.
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3.2 A Two-server Password Authentication System
We ﬁrst introduce a two-server architecture. Then we present our authentication and
key exchange protocol using password2 upon the proposed two-server architecture: for
ease of security analysis, we ﬁrst give a preliminary protocol, based on which we then
develop our ﬁnal protocol by circumventing the weaknesses in the preliminary protocol.
3.2.1 A Two-server Architecture
The two-server architecture we propose is shown in Figure 3.3: There are two servers
on the server side, a service server and a central server. The front-end service server
is the actual one providing a certain service to users and hence is conﬁgured to be
contactable by users. The central server stays back-end and thus transparent to the
public, and its objective is to assist the service server in user authentication and key
exchange. The central server is managed by the organizational security manager. This
architecture allows us to distribute user passwords and the veriﬁcation functionality to
the two servers in order to eliminate the single point of vulnerability in the traditional
single-server model. This positioning of servers has two salient advantages: (1) since
subject to no direct exposure to the public, the central server is less likely to be attacked,
which in turn increases the overall security of the architecture; (2) users only need
to communication with the service server, hence the demand of bandwidth as well as
synchronization at the user side is substantially decreased.
In practice, the central server is conﬁgured to support multiple service servers, each
2It is common in a password system that a user not only authenticates to but also negotiates a session





Figure 3.3: A Two-server Architecture.
providing a service and managed by a diﬀerent unit or department within a health care
organization, as illustrated in Figure 3.4.
3.2.2 A Preliminary Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol Using
Password
The basic idea of our protocol for the two-server architecture is to distribute the pass-
word veriﬁcation data (PVD) and veriﬁcation functionality to the two servers, for the
purpose of eliminating the single point of vulnerability. In particular, a user’s short
password is split into two long secrets and each is hosted by a server, and neither of the
servers can compromise user passwords by means of oﬀ-line dictionary attacks. In other
words, without compromising both servers, an attacker cannot recover users passwords
by dictionary attacks. We start by listing the notations that are used in the sequel in
this chapter, for ease of referencing.
High level description: Three types of entities are involved in the system, i.e.,
users, service servers and a central server. Users only see the service servers, and the












Figure 3.4: Central Server Supporting Multiple Service
Servers.
party between its users and CS. In this setting, an important observation is that CS
clearly assumes more trust than a SS because of suﬃcient expertise and funds that the
security manager has, together with the fact that CS does not directly expose to the
public. Considering such asymmetry in terms of trust upon CS and SS, adversary model
in our protocol is that CS is semi-honest and each SS is malicious, and CS does not
collude with any SS. More speciﬁcally, CS is honest-but-curious [78], i.e., it follows the
protocol speciﬁcation, with the exception that it may try to derive extra information by
analyzing the protocol transcript (CS is even allowed to eavesdrop on the communication
channel between U and S); on the contrary, a SS may act arbitrarily for uncovering user
passwords. Moreover, in this preliminary protocol, we assume a secret communication
channel between a SS and CS, which can be established by the two parties sharing a
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P , q, p three large primes such that P = 2p + 1 and p = 2q + 1.
g1, g2 elements in QRp, where QRp represents the group of
quadratic residues modulo p. The discrete logs to each other
is not known.
g3 an element in QRP .
π a user’s password.
h(.) a cryptographic hash function modelled as a random oracle
[38].
U , SS, CS identity of a user, a service sever and the central server,
respectively.
Table 3.1: Notations for Two-Server Password System
secret key.
Each user U has a short password π, and π is transformed into two long secrets
π1 and π2, each of which is registered to the service server SS the user belongs to
and the central server CS, respectively, in a out-of-band registration phase. During
authentication, SS and CS together produce a challenge to U using their respective π1
and π2. U responds by applying his password π. With the responding data, SS and CS
help each other verify the authenticity of U . Upon the servers validating U , they reply
to help U authenticate them. In the meantime, SS and U establish a common session
key for subsequent data exchanges.
User registration: in any password system, to enrol as a legitimate user in a service,
a user must beforehand register to the service provider by establishing a password with
the provider. In our system, a user U needs to register to not only the actual service
provider SS but also the central server CS. SupposeU has already successfully identiﬁed
to SS, e.g., by showing his identity card, U picks and splits his password π into two
long number π1 ∈R Z∗q and π2 ∈R Z∗q such that π1 + π2 = π (mod q), where q is a
prime as deﬁned in Table 3.1. U then registers in a secure way π1 and π2 to SS and
56
CS, respectively. As a result, SS stores the account information (U , π1) to its secret
database, and CS stores (U , π2) to its secret database. One may wonder how U registers
π2 to CS, as CS is supposed hidden from U . This is not a problem in practice: U can
contact the security manger that manages CS by normal mail, etc. Upon completion of
the registration, U can request service from SS, by exploiting the protocol in Figure 3.5
for authentication and establishment of a common session key.
The protocol: let p, q, g1, g2 and h(.) be deﬁned as in Table 3.1; we have omitted
modulo p for arithmetic operations in Figure 3.5, as this is clear from the context; we
also omitted a session ID SID for each message and SID serves to prevent replay attack.
We next follow the protocol step by step. To initiate a request for service, U sends his
U SS CS
Input: π input: π1 Input: π2
M1: U, Req−−−−−−−→ M2: U−−−−−−−−→


































= Ss K = h(U, SS, S1S2)
K = h(U, SS, S′c)
Figure 3.5: A Preliminary Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol Using Password.
identity together with a service request Req to SS in M1. SS ﬁrst relays the request
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to CS by sending the user ID in M2, and then selects a random number b1 ∈R Zq
and computes B1 = gb11 g
π1
2 (mod p) using his password share π1. Upon receiving M2,
CS chooses a random number b2 ∈R Zq and computes B2 = gb21 gπ22 (mod p) using his
password share π2. CS then sends B2 in M3 to SS. Upon reception of B2, SS computes
and sends B = B1B2 (mod p) to U in M4. After receiving M4, U selects a ∈R Zq,





a = ga(b1+b2)1 (mod p) and Sc = h(S
′
c),
respectively. U then sends A and Sc to SS in M5. Getting the message, SS computes
S1 = Ab1 (mod p) and sends A, Sc and S1 to CS in M6. Upon reception of M6, CS
computers S2 = Ab2 (mod p) and checks whether Sc
?= h(S1S2) = h(g
a(b1+b2)
1 ): if it
holds, CS is assured of the authenticity of U , and continues the protocol by sending S2
to SS in M7; otherwise, CS aborts the protocol.
Assuming SS receives S2 in M7, it checks whether Sc
?= h(S1S2): if it holds, SS
is convinced of the authenticity of U . At this stage, both servers have authenticated
U . SS then computes and sends Ss = h(CS,SS, S1S2) to U in M8. Immediately after
that SS computes a session key K = h(U,SS, S1S2) and grants U with the requested
service over a secure channel protected using the session key K; otherwise, SS rejects
and aborts the protocol. Upon reception of M8, U checks if h(CS,SS, S′c)
?= Ss: if it
holds, U has validated the servers and then computes a session key K = h(U,SS, S′c).
Remarks: In order to prevent leakage of even one bit of information in π, π1 and π2,
respectively, ideally the corresponding entities should choose their respective random
numbers as even numbers.
Security discussion: in what follows, we analyze the security of the above protocol.
Our analysis is based mainly on the following well-known Decisional Deﬃe-Hellman
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(DDH) assumption [21]:
DDH Assumption: let p, q be deﬁned as in Table 3.1, and g, h ∈R QRp,
it is computationally intractable to distinguish between (g, h, gx, hx) and
(g, h, gx, z), where x ∈R Zq and z ∈R QRp.
Recall that the primary goal of the protocol is to resist oﬀ-line dictionary attacks
by the two servers, where SS is a malicious adversary while CS is a semi-honest adver-
sary. It is easy to see that outside attackers are no more powerful than SS in terms of
uncovering U ’s password. We next examine the protocol against CS, SS and outside
attackers, respectively.
(1) Resistance to CS
According to the adversary model, CS may eavesdrop on the communication chan-
nels to collect protocol transcripts. CS can obtain B1 = B/B2 = gb11 g
π1
2 (mod p) from
M4. However, from B1 alone, CS cannot obtain anything on π1 in an information the-
oretic sense. What remains relevant to CS for oﬀ-line dictionary attacks are [A = ga1 ,
Sc = h((B/gπ2 )
a)] and [S1 = Ab1 , B1 = gb11 g
π1
2 ]. The ﬁrst pair is clearly no easier than
[A = ga1 , S
′
c = (B/gπ2 )
a] for CS to handle. Note that A = ga1 ⇒ g1 = Aa
−1
(mod p)
and S′c = (B/gπ2 )
a ⇒ B/gπ2 = S′a
−1
c (mod p). Under the DDH assumption, CS can-
not distinguish between [A, g1 = Aa
−1
, S′c, B/gπ2 = S′a
−1
c ] and [A, A
a−1 , S′c, z], where
z ∈R QRp. This suggests that CS cannot get anything on π from the ﬁrst pair. For the
second pair, B1 = gb11 g
π1
2 ⇒ B/gπ12 = gb11 (mod p), and again under the DDH assump-
tion, CS cannot distinguish between [A, S1 = Ab1 , g1, B/gπ12 = g
b1
1 ] and [A, A
b1 , g1, z].
This shows that CS cannot learn anything on π1 from the second pair. Consequently,
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as a semi-honest adversary, CS cannot launch eﬀective oﬀ-line dictionary attacks.
It is important to note that in the above analysis, we have implicitly assumed that
CS does not know a = log gA1 . However, were CS a malicious active adversary, such an
assumption would no longer hold, since CS could simply impersonate U , choose a and
compute A = ga1 (mod p). CS could also break the system if it were able to replace the
original A from U with another one based on an a chosen by itself. In both cases, CS
could ﬁnd the password π by oﬀ-line dictionary attacks. To see this, consider the second






1 ]. It follows that (B2/g
π1
2 )
a = (B2/gπ−π22 )
a = Ab1 = S1, so CS could try
every possible password to determine the actual π. This explains at the technical level
why CS is assumed to be a semi-honest adversary.
Observe further that CS relies on direct computation of ga(b1+b2)1 (mod p) to validate
the authenticity of U , and the same thing is also exploited by SS and U to authenticate
each other and negotiate a common session key. This suggests that if CS were a malicious
adversary, it could establish a session key in the name of SS. This is another reason for
CS being semi-honest.
(2) Resistance to SS
First, if behaving as a semi-honest adversary like CS, of help for SS in terms of
oﬀ-line dictionary attack is [A = ga1 , Sc = h((B/g
π
2 )
a)] and [S2 = Ab2 , B2 = gb21 g
π2
2 ].
Following a similar analysis as above, we can show that SS is unable to learn anything
on either π or π2 from the two pairs. What remains to consider is when SS launches
active attacks, in which cases SS may behave arbitrarily such as impersonating U , and
modifying and replacing messages. From the security analysis for CS, we know that if
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SS replaces A coming from U with ga1 based on its choice of a and if this is not detected
by CS, SS can obtain π by oﬀ-line dictionary attack. Fortunately, diﬀerent from the
case of CS, this attack cannot succeed for the following reasons: S2 is sent to SS in M7
only after CS has already decided on the validity of Sc
?= h(S1Ab2); it is not possible
for SS to change A while at the same time making Sc
?= h(S1Ab2) pass CS’s test. As a
result, as an active attacker, SS is still not eﬀective in oﬀ-line dictionary attacks.
(3) Security to outside attackers
While no more eﬀective than SS in terms of dictionary attacks, an outside attacker
could attempt to acquire the session key K established between U and SS as follows: (1)
to impersonate any of U , SS and CS. Clearly this reduces to deriving any of π, π1 and
π2 by oﬀ-line dictionary attack; (2) computing the value of g
a(b1+b2)
1 (mod p) from the
protocol transcripts. Of help to this end are Sc, Ss, S1 and S2. Obviously inverting Sc
and Ss is impossible if the underlying hash function is secure. On the other hand, since
the communication channel between SS and CS is secret, the attacker cannot observe
S1 and S2. It is clear that given only one of S1 and S2 does not help the attacker in
computing ga(b1+b2)1 (mod p). This suggests that one-way secrecy of the channel between
SS and CS in fact suﬃces to guarantee the security of our protocol.
Performance analysis: we next examine performance of our protocol. Let |p| and
|h| denote the bit length of p and h(.), respectively. The theoretical computation and
communication costs of the protocol are given in Table 3.2. Since exponentiation compu-
tations predominate an entity’s workload, we only count the number of exponentiations
as the computation performance, and the digit following “/” denotes the number of
exponentiations that can be computed oﬀ-line. Note that by leveraging the techniques
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in [60], gb11 g
π1




2 (mod p) can be computed in a single exponentiation.
In addition, M1 and M2 are not counted in the evaluation of communication cost.
U SS CS
Computation (exponentiations) 3 / 2 2 / 1 2 / 1
Communication (bits) 2|p|+ 2|h| 6|p|+ 3|h| 4|p|+ |h|
Table 3.2: Performance of the Preliminary Protocol.
Table 3.2 shows that our protocol is quite eﬃcient in terms of both computation and
communication, to all entities. Take U for example, U needs to calculate 3 exponentia-
tions, where 2 are oﬀ-line; the communication cost for SS is also low, about 2|p|+ 2|h|
bits in total. As a result, our protocol can readily support wireless applications. It is
also interesting to observe that the protocol technically supports a single central server
with multiple service servers, since from Table 3.2, the workload (in both computation
and communication) of the central server is low. Of course, with adequate funds, the
security manager can always deploy a more powerful hardware for the central server.
Discussion: The preliminary protocol has two main weaknesses: ﬁrst, it is clear that
CS knows the session key K established between U and SS. While CS is semi-honest,
this is not desirable; second, we have assumed a secret communication channel between
SS and CS. We next present our ﬁnal authentication and key exchange protocol by
circumventing all these drawbacks.
3.2.3 The Final Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol
Our intuition to address the weaknesses in the preliminary protocol is that given the
veriﬁcation data on which CS depends to verify the authenticity of U , CS is unable
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to derive the secret U uses to verify the servers, which is also used by U and SS to
compute the common session key.
Adversary model in the ﬁnal protocol in the same as in the preliminary protocol,
but no secret communication channel is assumed. Let P , p, q, g1, g2, g3 and h(.) be
deﬁned as in Table 3.1, and suppose U has already registered π1 to SS and π2 to CS
as in the preliminary protocol, we outline the ﬁnal protocol in Figure 3.6. Note that
arithmetic operations associating with g1, g2 are performed modulo p, associating with
g3 are modulo P .
U SS CS
Input: π input: π1 Input: π2
M1: U, Req−−−−−−−→ M2: U−−−−−−−−→



































= Ss K = h(U, SS,A
b1S2)
K = h(U, SS, S′c)
Figure 3.6: The Final Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol Using Password.
Speciﬁcally, U sends his identity as well as a service request Req to SS in M1,
in order to initiate a service request. SS ﬁrst relays the user ID to CS in M2, and
then selects a random number b1 ∈R Zq, and use his password share π1 to compute
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B1 = gb11 g
π1
2 (mod p). Upon receiving M2, CS chooses a random number b2 ∈R Zq,
which is used together with π2 to calculate B2 = gb21 g
π2
2 (mod p). CS then sends B2
in M3 to SS. Upon reception of B2, SS computes and sends B = B1B2 (mod p) to U
in M4. With B received, U selects randomly a ∈R Zq, and in turn computes A = ga1
(mod p), S′c = (B/gπ2 )






3 (mod P )).
Afterwards, U sends A, Sc to SS in M5. Upon getting M5, SS ﬁrst computes S1 = gA
b1
3




1 mod P ): if it holds, CS is assured of the authenticity of U , and continues
the protocol by computing and sending S2 = Ab2 (mod p) to SS in M7; otherwise, CS
aborts the protocol.
Next, upon reception of S2, SS checks Sc
?= h(SS21 (mod P )): if it holds, SS is
convinced of the authenticity of U , and computes and sends Ss = h(Ab1S2 (mod p)) to
U in M8; otherwise, SS aborts the protocol. So far, both servers have veriﬁed U . Upon
receiving M8, U checks h(S′c)
?= Ss: if it holds, U has validated the server, and computes
a session key K = h(U,SS, S′c); otherwise, U aborts the protocol. SS also computes a
session key K = h(U,SS,Ab1S2).




(mod P )), and SS needs check Sc
?= h(SS21 (mod P )). To make the checks work, it
must hold that g(g
a(b1+b2)
1 mod p)






3 (mod P ). How-
ever, normally ga(b1+b2)1 mod p = (gab11 mod p)(gab21 mod p), but it hods that ga(b1+b2)1
mod p = (gab11 mod p)(g
ab2
1 mod p) (mod p). As g3 ∈ QRP , and g3 is of order p, the
above checks thus hold.
Security: Based upon the security analysis of the preliminary protocol, we only
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need to focus on where the two protocols diﬀer. It is clear that the introduction of
arithmetic operations associating with g3 makes it no easier for SS and CS in terms
of oﬀ-line dictionary attacks. We remain to consider security against outside attackers.
Similarly, outside attackers are no more powerful than SS with respect to dictionary
attacks. We next see whether they can derive the common session key established
between U and SS, as now the communication channel between CS and SS is open. As
a result, compared to the preliminary protocol, an outside attacker can additionally get
S1 = gA
b1
3 (mod P ) and S2 = A
b2 (mod p). The attacker has to obtain Ab1 (mod p) in
order to recover the common session key K. However, the attacker is not able to get
Ab1 from S1 = gA
b1
3 (mod P ), which is equivalent to computing the discrete log of S1.
Notice that for a similar reason, CS cannot derive K either. We thus have addressed
the weaknesses in the preliminary protocol.
Eﬃciency: let |p|, |h| and |P | denote the bit length of p, h() and P , respectively,
the theoretical computation cost and communication cost are listed in Table 3.3.
U SS CS
Computation (exponentiations) 4/2 4/1 3/1
Communication (bits) 2|p|+ 2|h| 5|p|+ 3|h| + |P | 3|p|+ |h|+ |P |
Table 3.3: Performance of the Final Protocol.
From the table, the ﬁnal protocol obtains similar performance as the preliminary
protocol (shown in Table 3.2).
To test the actual eﬃciency, we implemented the protocol using Visual C++: the
communication module was coded uponWinsock 2 (http://www.sockets.com/winsock2.htm),
and the cryptographic operations were coded upon OpenSSL (http://www.openssl.org/);
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we ran the experiments on PCs with Pentium 4 processors (2.1 GHz), 521M RAM, and
Windows XP OS; in our implementation, all computations are done on-line, without
performing any oﬀ-line arithmetic operations in advance (although as shown in Ta-
ble 3.2, some exponentiation operations can be computed oﬀ-line.). Our experiments
use |p| = 1024, and the results show that the average time for executing the protocol is
around 0.3 seconds.
3.2.4 Features of the Two-server Password System
We summarize features of our proposed two-server password system.
• At the architectural level, the two-server system exploits the organizational trust
structure and more precisely the security manager, thereby coherent and compat-
ible with other user authentication techniques and modes.
• At the technical level, the single point of vulnerability inherent in traditional
single-server systems is eliminated. As a result, neither the central server nor
the service servers can compromise user passwords by means of oﬀ-line dictionary
attack.
• As the central sever is hidden from the public, the chance for it under attacks
is substantially minimized, thereby increasing the overall security of the whole
system.
• A user can use the same password to register to diﬀerent services (service servers)
by varying the two shares of the password. This avoids a big inconvenience in
traditional password systems, where a user has to memorize diﬀerent passwords
for diﬀerent applications.
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• Compromising solely the service servers does not lead to the compromise of user
passwords. Therefore, the units or departments managing service servers are
relieved to some extent from strict security management, and they can dedicate
their limited expertise and resources to enhancing service provision to users.
• Users are aﬀorded to assume the higher credit of the organization, while engaging
business with individual units or departments of the care organization.
• Since user authentication must involve the central server, the organization is ac-
tually provided a way to monitor the aﬃliating units or departments, if desired.
3.2.5 Related Work on Password Authentication
While password is one of the earliest user identiﬁcation and authentication techniques,
there is resurgent eﬀort in developing password systems that are resilient against oﬀ-line
dictionary attacks recently. It is a proven fact that public key techniques (e. g., exponen-
tiations in a multiplicative group) are absolutely necessary to make such systems secure
against oﬀ-line dictionary attacks, whereas the involvement of public key cryptosystems
(e. g., public key encryption and digital signature schemes) is not essential [88]. This ob-
servation diﬀerentiates two separate approaches to the development of secure password
systems: combined use of password and public key cryptosystem, and password-only
approach. The former takes into account the asymmetry of capabilities between users
and servers, so a user only uses a password while the server has a public/private key pair
at its disposal. Examples of such public key-assisted password authentication systems
include [34, 76, 88]. With no exception, the use of public keys entails the deployment
and maintenance of a PKI for public key certiﬁcation, and adds to users the burden
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of checking key validity. To eliminate this drawback, password-only authenticated key
exchange (PAKE) protocols have been extensively studied (e.g., [20,31,32,37,112,113]).
The PAKE protocols do not involve any public key cryptosystem and therefore are much
more attractive for real world applications. We believe that any use of public key(s) in
a password system should be avoided, since otherwise the beneﬁts brought by the use
of password would be counteracted to a great extent.
Most of the existing password systems (including PAKEs) were designed over a
single-server model, where each user shares a password or some PVD with a single
authentication server. While PAKE protocols are suﬃciently robust against oﬀ-line at-
tacks mounted by outsiders, they are by no means resilient to oﬀ-line dictionary attacks
initiated at the server side, e.g., in the event of server break-ins by outsiders or mis-
behavior by unscrupulous system administrators. To address this problem, password
systems based on multi-servers were proposed. The principle of the multi-server model
is distributing the password/PVD database as well as the veriﬁcation functionality that
are originally imposed upon a single server to multiple servers in order to eliminate
the single point of vulnerability. As such, without compromising multiple servers, an
attacker is bound not to be eﬀective in oﬀ-line dictionary attacks. The system in [69],
believed to be the ﬁrst multi-server password system, splits a short password among
multiple servers. However, the servers in [69] need to use public keys. An improved ver-
sion of [69] was proposed in [101] which eliminates the use of public keys by the servers.
Further and more rigorous extensions were due to [134] and [150], where the former
built a t-out-of-n threshold PAKE protocol and provided a formal security proof under
the random oracle model [38], and the latter presented two provably secure threshold
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PAKE protocols under the standard model. While the protocols in [134] and [150] are
theoretically signiﬁcant, they have low eﬃciency and high operational overhead. In these
multi-server password systems, the servers are equally exposed to the users and a user
has to communicate in parallel with several or all servers for authentication. This may
either cause problems to resource constrained mobile devices such as hand phones and
PDAs, or has compatibility problem as most existing systems are single-server systems.
Moreover, multi-server systems are also subject to the so called common-mode failures
in practice, that is, if an attacker knows how to break one server, highly likely he can
break others [158].
The password system most closely related to ours is the two-server system recently
proposed by Brainard et al. [27], where one server exposes itself to users and the other is
hidden from the public. While this two-server setting is eﬃcient, it is not a password-only
system: both servers need to have public keys to protect the communication channels
from users to servers. As we have stressed earlier, this makes it diﬃcult to fully enjoy the
beneﬁts of a password system. In addition, the system in [27] only performs unilateral
authentication and relies on the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) to establish a session key
between a user and the front-end server. Subsequently, Yang et al. [187] extended and
tailored this two-server system to the context of federated enterprises, where the back-
end server is managed by an enterprise headquarter and each aﬃliating organization
operates a front-end server. Nevertheless, the system in [187] still does not completely
avoid the use of public keys, as the back-end server holds a public key. Our proposed
system continues this line of research on the two-server architecture, whereas we adopt
a very diﬀerent method at the technical level, which gives rise to a password system
69
requiring no public key whatsoever. Furthermore, our system has no compatibility
problem, since from users’ point of view, users need to communicate with only one
server.
3.3 Concluding Remarks
We suggested building a uniﬁed trust infrastructure for health care organizations that
accommodates various user authentication techniques and modes. The organizational
trust infrastructure enables a health care organization to achieve other aspects of data
security within or beyond organizational boundaries. In particular, each organization
establishes an organizational security manager that manages security related issues;
user authentication techniques are then built around the security manager. To tailor
password authentication to the organizational trust infrastructure, we proposed a novel
two-server password authentication system that enlists the security manager for oper-
ating a back-end server. We must point out that the proposed two-server password
authentication system is a generic user authentication technique, and it clearly has ap-
plications in other contexts than health care systems. What relevant here is that it
makes password authentication uniﬁed with other user authentication techniques under




Scheme for Health Care Services
In Chapter 3, we have discussed user authentication in health care, and in particular, we
suggest building a uniﬁed trust infrastructure for health care organizations that accom-
modates various user authentication techniques and modes. With the organizational
trust infrastructure in place, we are ready to address security issues beyond organiza-
tional boundaries. In this chapter, we present a remote login scheme that allows a health
care organization, e.g., a hospital, to provide a certain service to users, such that users
can access the service from oﬀ-site locations in an anonymous manner. More speciﬁcally,
diﬀerent accesses by the same user cannot be linked by outside attackers. This provides
a useful alternative to the user authentication techniques including the two-server pass-
word authentication system in Chapter 3, when users are willing to achieve strong user
privacy in the login process, where user identiﬁcation occurs.
The development of public networks, especially Internet, enables health care or-
ganizations to allow employees, physicians and patients to access clinical services and
information from oﬀ-site locations. The services provided by health care organizations
can take various forms, e.g., a WWW dental consultation service to patients, or a FTP
service provided by the radiological department of a hospital to physicians belonging
to that department. In such systems, to access a service from a remote-site location,
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a user (a physician or a patient) must initiate a login process with the organization
that provides the service, whereby they ﬁrst identify and verify each other, and upon a
successful mutual authentication they then negotiate a shared session key for the pro-
tection of successive data communication between them. Essentially, this in general falls
into the class of user authentication discussed in Chapter 3, whereas as it will be clear
shortly, we are concerned with more features than the basic user authentication func-
tionality. Numerous work has been dedicated to user authentication and key exchange
in the login process. For example, two widely used systems, SSL (Secure Sockets Layer)
[70] and Kerberos [107] are among the eﬀort, and SSL uses public key cryptosystems
while Kerberos relies on symmetric key cryptosystems; password authentication systems
(as we reviewed in Chapter 3) belong to an alternate class in the sense that users use
passwords for user authentication.
In health care systems, users have a privacy concern in the remote login process, due
to that much sensitive information pertaining to users such as individual professions and
health situations is conveyed from the services (even without knowing the content) they
are accessing. For example, if a user frequently visits the website of a dental service,
most probably the user has dental problem. Furthermore, when widely collected and
compiled, information of this kind might be abused for, e.g., marketing purposes [22].
As such, disclosing the login information clearly harm individual privacy. Ideally, users
should be kept anonymous in the login process while the functionality of user identiﬁ-
cation and key exchange is still enabled. More precisely, only the valid parties at both
ends of the communication could identify each other, and outside attackers should not
be allowed to learn who are in the login process. We further desire a stronger notion of
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user privacy, unlinkability. That is, diﬀerent login sessions by the same user cannot be
linked. Unfortunately, most of the existing approaches, including the aforementioned
techniques, do not take these issues into consideration. Let us ﬁrst take SSL for instance,
it adopts X.509 certiﬁcate [186] for the purpose of user identiﬁcation, so the identifying
information of an individual is explicit in the login process. The same applies to the
password authentication systems where users must input IDs together with passwords
in order for user authentication. Kerberos has similar weakness. As a result, by sim-
ply eavesdropping on the login traﬃc, an outside attacker can readily discern who is
accessing the service.
To address this problem, we present a remote login scheme, by which users can access
health care services from oﬀ-site locations in an anonymous (and unlinkable) manner.
We develop our scheme by rectifying a serious weakness existing in a scheme proposed by
Wu and Hsu [182] that similarly attempted to ensure user privacy in the login process.
4.1 An Anonymous Remote Login Scheme
Since the login scheme deals with a health care organization providing a service to its
aﬃliated users such as physicians and patients, it is built upon the organizational trust
infrastructure, with the security manager of the organization managing security related
matters. We start by giving a high level description of the overall system.
4.1.1 High Level Description
Three types of participants are involved in the system, and they are deﬁned as follows.
• Service providers: A service provider is the party that provides a certain service
73
to its aﬃliated users. A service provider may be a department or a unit within a
care organization or the organization itself. An organization may support multiple
service providers, each providing a certain service. We denote a service provider
as SP for short,
• Users: Users are the parties willing to anonymously access the service provided
by the service provider they are aﬃliated to. For example, users may be dentists
or patients of the dental department in a hospital. A user is denoted as U .
• Security Manager: Security manager is the security manager of the care orga-
nization as established in Chapter 3, trusted by users and service providers. The
security manager is responsible for setting up and publishing system parameters
and issuing a secret token to each user and each service provider. Users and ser-
vice providers use their respective secret tokens in the login process, identifying
each other and negotiating a common session key. The security manager works as
an oﬀ-line party, only getting evolved in a registration procedure.
The system works in the following procedures, as outlined in Figure 4.1. The se-
curity manager ﬁrst sets up system parameters in a system setup procedure. In an
oﬀ-line registration procedure, each service provider and each user register to the secu-
rity manager, who issues a secret token to each registrant. To request service from the
service provider, a user initiates a login session, where the user and the service provider




















Figure 4.1: Procedures of An Anonymous Login System.
4.1.2 Security Requirements
Let U be the whole set of users that had registered to the security manager, and R be
the whole set of login transcripts. Besides common requirements on user authentication
systems, e.g., resistance to impersonation, etc., we further impose the following security
requirements upon the anonymous login system.
1. User Anonymity Given R ∈ R, it is computationally infeasible for a proba-
bilistic polynomial-time outside adversary to decide U ∈ U that R belongs to.
2. User Unlinkability Given R1, R2 ∈ R, it is computationally infeasible for a
probabilistic polynomial-time outside adversary to decide whether R1 and R2
belong to the same user in U . This actually suggests that an outside adversary
is unable to link users based on the content of login transcripts. However, as
the login scheme is most probably for Internet services, an attacker can instead
directly check the IP addresses of the login transcripts for the purpose of linking
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users. We therefore must assume that the anonymous login scheme is built over
a type of networks such as Anonymizer [75] and Mix [44] that circumvent such a
kind of IP address linking .
3. Secrecy of Tokens Neither a user nor the service provider can learn the secret
token of each other.
Deﬁnition 4.1: A login system is anonymous if it satisﬁes all of the above require-
ments.
4.1.3 The Scheme
We are now ready to elaborate on our construction of an anonymous login system.
1. System Setup
To set up system parameters, the security manager does the following:
• Chooses two large primes p and q, and computes n = pq; selects e and computes
d such that ed = 1 mod φ(n), where φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1). Note that e should be
suﬃciently large, e.g., 160 bits.
• Chooses an element g ∈ Z∗n, which is the generator of both Z∗p and Z∗q , that is,
g ∈ QRn.
• Picks a symmetric-key cryptosystem such as AES [4], whose encryption function
and decryption function under the secret key K are EK(.) and DK(.), respectively.
A cryptographic hash function h(.) is also selected.
• Publishes (e, n, g) as public system parameters and keeps (d, p, q) secret.
2. Registration
Suppose a user U or a service provider SP has already identiﬁed to the security
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manager, e.g., a user shows her/his identity card or driver license. Through a secure
channel, the security manager issues a secret token Si to the registrant. Si is computed
as:
Si = (IDi)d (mod n) (4.1)
where IDi is the identity of U or SP , and we suppose IDi ∈ QRn are well-formed, e.g.,
email address or social security number 1. Note that for users, the secret tokens may be
carried directly by users’ smart cards, as we have assumed that each patient or medical
personnel has a personal smart card at her/his disposal; for service providers, as they
reside in the organization, it is not diﬃcult for them to identify to and in turn establish
a secure channel with the security manager.
3. Login
To request service from a service provider SP , user U initiates a login session by
executing the protocol in Figure 4.2 (arithmetic operations are performed modulo n),
where U and SP identify each other and negotiate a shared session key. Note that U
holds a secret token Su = IDdu (mod n) and SP holds Ssp = ID
d
sp (mod n).
The protocol works as follows. User U initiates a login session by sending a service
request Req to the service provider SP in M1. Upon reception of the request, SP
1Recently, [189] gave attacks on this registration step, indicating that an attacker can forge Si.
However, their attacks are only possible if the security manager allows arbitrary IDs for registration
or allows a user to register using multiple IDs. This is clearly not true in practice: registration in any
system is a highly observed and stringent procedure, and users are strictly required to present and prove




input: Su input: Ssp
M1: Req−−−−−−−−−−−−→
k ∈R Zn, z = gkS−1sp
M2: z←−−−−−−−−−−−−
a = zeIDsp
t ∈R Zn,K = at
x = get
s = gtSh(x, T )u
y = EK(IDu)
M3: x, s, y, T−−−−−−−−−−−−→






Figure 4.2: An Anonymous Login Protocol.
chooses k ∈R Zn and computes
z = gkS−1sp (mod n) (4.2)
using his secret token Ssp. z is then sent to U in M2. Upon receiving z, U chooses
t ∈R Zn and does the following computations.
a = zeIDsp (mod n) (4.3)
K = at (mod n) (4.4)
x = get (mod n) (4.5)
s = gtSh(x, T )u (mod n) (4.6)
y = EK(IDu) (4.7)
where T is the current timestamp. Note that K will be the common session key. Af-
terwards, U sends x, s, y, T to SP in M3. When SP receives the message, he ﬁrst
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checks the timestamp T : if it is not within a pre-deﬁned window, SP aborts the proto-
col; otherwise, the protocol continues. For the purpose of user identiﬁcation, SP ﬁrst
computes K ′ = xk (mod n), then proceeds to decrypt y as IDu = DK ′(y). SP then
checks whether IDu is a legitimate user: if IDu is not a legitimate user, SP simply
aborts the protocol; otherwise, SP continues to verify
xIDh(x, T )u
?= se (mod n) (4.8)
If the equation holds, then SP has validated U and grants the requested service, and K ′
will be the common session key; otherwise, request is rejected. We point out the validity
of the common session key K and K ′ is automatically veriﬁed, and no additional round
of interaction between U and SP is needed. To see this, if U and SP compute diﬀerent
keys (K = K ′), the possibility of making Equation 4.8 hold is negligible. This is an
added feature of our system.
We next check the correctness of Equation 4.8. Raising s to the power e, it yields
se = getSeh(x, T )u (mod n) by Equation 4.6
= xIDdeh(x, T )u (mod n) by Equation 4.1 and 4.5 (4.9)
= xIDh(x, T )u (mod n) by RSA
4.1.4 Security Discussions
In this subsection, we examine security of our proposed scheme, and analyze how the
above construction satisﬁes the earlier security requirements.
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First of all, since a timestamp is involved in our protocol, replay attack is thus
prevented. For use of timestamp, we assume synchronization of clocks among the par-
ticipants is not a problem. Analyses that follow are based mainly on the following
assumptions.
RSA assumption [153]: Let N = pq and gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1, where p and q are
unknown large primes. Given y ∈ ZN , it is computationally intractable to
derive x such that y = xe (mod N) with the knowledge of e and N . RSA
assumption is eventually reduced to the hardness of the factorization of N .
DH assumption [56]: Let p = 2q+1 be a large prime, where q is also a large
prime, and g be a generator of Z∗p . Given gx (mod p) and gy (mod p), it is
computationally intractable to compute gxy (mod p). The DH assumption
results from the hardness of discrete logarithm: given y, it is computationally
intractable to compute x such that y = gx (mod p). This assumption is
believed to still hold for a composite modulus (see for example [63,128]).
For clarity of security discussion, we classify possible attacks to the scheme into two
classes: attacks to user U , and attacks to service provider SP . We next in turn examine
each of them.
(1) Attacks to U
Attacks to U could be due to either SP or outside attackers. We ﬁrst check attacks
by SP . Attacks to U by SP are restricted to derive the secret token Su of U , and in turn
impersonate U to request services from other service providers. First, from s = gtSh(x, T )u
(mod n) clearly SP is unable to get Su, since it at least involves computing discrete
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logarithm even gt is known. Instead, SP may proceed in the following steps.
• Attempts to obtain gt from x = get (mod n) in Equation 4.5, in conjunction
K ′ = gekt (mod n).
• Computes Sh(x, T )u = x/gt (mod n).
• Given two prior sessions at time T1 and T2 such that gcd(h(x1, T1), h(x2, T2)) =
12, SP ﬁnds m1 and m2 such that m1h(x1, T1) +m2h(x2, T2) = 1.
• Finally, computes Su = Sm1h(x1, T1)u Sm2h(x2, T2)u (mod n).
However, computing gt (mod n) from x or/and K ′ is computationally intractable,
according to the RSA assumption.
To impersonate U without deriving Su, SP is faced to forge x in Equation 4.5 and
s in Equation 4.6 and make s pass the test in Equation (4.8), i.e., se = xIDh(x, T )u
(mod n). This reduces to the following cases: (a) SP ﬁrst determines a random s, and
then tries to compute x. This is intractable from the DH assumption and provided
that the one-way hash function is secure; (b) SP ﬁrst determines x and then attempts
to compute s, which is computationally intractable from the RSA assumption; (c) SP





(mod n). If SP can ﬁnd a w and set s = IDwu (mod n), such that ew = r + h(ID
r
u, T )
holds, then SP is successful. This is equivalent to determining r such that r = h(IDru, T )
(mod e). According to the well-known birthday paradox [157], such a r can be found
within
√
e trials. Therefore, we stipulate that e must be large enough.
2The probability of gcd(h1, h2) = 1 is expected quite large, where h1 and h2 are two random hash
values. We give a rather rough estimation as follows: suppose |h(.)| = l, then the number of primes
less than 2l is about n = 2l/ln2l. Further, we suppose each hash value has κ prime factors in average.

























. Considering κ n, Pr will be quite large.
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We next consider attacks by outside attackers. Besides launching similar attacks as
PS, an outside attacks may be additionally to break the user anonymity by ﬁguring out
who is in conversation with the service provider SP by observing the data traﬃc along
the communication or to link users. Clearly, outside attackers are no more powerful than
SP with respect to impersonation attacks or deriving the secret token. For attacks to
break user anonymity and user unlinkability, as all of x, s, y, T in M3 vary with sessions,
an attacker is left with no clue to link data. The only way to break user anonymity (and
further user unlinkability) is to compute K (or K ′, which is the same as K). This is no
easier than to break the DH assumption, provided that the underlying symmetric key
cryptosystem is secure.
(2) Attacks to SP
Attacks to SP could be due to either U or outside attackers, whereas they are
restricted to the same objectives, i.e., to derive Ssp or impersonate SP . Clearly, outside
attackers gain no more advantages than U in such attacks. For simplicity, we only
consider attacks by U .
To derive Ssp, U can compute a = gek (mod n) by z in Equation 4.3. However, to
acquire Ssp from z in Equation 4.2, U needs gk (mod n). From the RSA assumption,
we know it is impossible to compute gk (mod n) from e and (gk)e (mod n). Knowing
K ′ = gekt (mod n) does not help either in this aspect as we discussed earlier. We thus
conclude that deriving Ssp is not possible by U .
We proceed to examine how U impersonates SP . If U , in the name of SP , can
successfully share a common session key with another user U ′, then the impersonation
attack is deemed successful. There exist two ways for U to impersonate SP . (1) On
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intercepting the service request from U ′, without knowing Ssp, U simply chooses another
random number m and computes z = gkm (mod n) in Equation 4.2. In such a case, K
computed by U ′ in Equation 4.4 is K = at = gektmet/IDtsp = gekt(me/IDsp)t (mod n).
U is then faced to compute K ′ (the same as K) with the knowledge of x = get (mod n).
Although U can compute gekt (mod n) from x, he cannot compute (me/IDsp)t (mod n)
without knowing t. (2) Another way for U to impersonate SP is to exploit a z of
a past session from SP (we suppose in that session, SP chose kp and U chosen tu,
so z = gkp .S−1sp (mod n) and K = gekptu (mod n)). To do so, U chooses a random
number k′ and compute z′ = gk′ .z (mod n) and sends z′ to U ′ upon intercepting the




.getkp (mod n). To compute K˜ ′ the same as K˜, although U can
compute getk
′
(mod n) from x = get (mod n) in Equation 4.5 sent by U ′, he cannot
compute getkp (mod n) from x and getukp (mod n), according to the RSA assumption
as well as the DH assumption.
We conclude security discussions with the following claim:
Claim 4.1: Our construction is an anonymous login system, satisfying the earlier
security requirements.
4.1.5 Performance Analysis and Implementation Results
For the purpose of performance analysis, we present a comparison between our proposed
scheme with the Wu-Hsu scheme [182] (we shall give a brief review of the Wu-Hsu scheme
shortly) in terms of both theoretical computational and communication performance.
As usual, we only count the number of exponentiations as the computation performance,
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and the digit following “/” denotes the number of exponentiations that can be computed
beforehand. In addition, as noted in Chapter 3, the computation of gtSh(x, T )i (mod n)
needs only one exponentiation by the techniques in [60]. Let |n|, |E| and |T | denote
the bit length of n, E(.) and the time stamp T , respectively, the comparison results are







Our scheme 3|n|+ |E|+ |T | 4/1 4/1
The Wu-Hsu Scheme3|n|+ |T | 4/1 4/1
Table 4.1: Performance Comparison between Our Scheme and the Hu-Hsu Scheme.
From Table 4.1, we can see that our scheme has similar performance as the Wu-Hsu
scheme in terms of both communication and computation.
We also implemented a prototype of the protocol. The source code was written in
Visual C++, and in particular, the communication module was coded using Winsock 2
(http://www.sockets.com/winsock2.htm), and the cryptographic operations were coded
upon OpenSSL (http://www.openssl.org/). The experiments were run on two PCs with
Pentium 4 processors (2.1 GHz), 521M RAM, and Windows XP OS. Our implementation
treated all computations on-line, without doing any oﬀ-line arithmetic operations (so we
can expect an enhancement in the performance of a practical deployment of the protocol
through moderate implementation optimizations). We use |n| = 1024, and the average
running time for the protocol is about 0.2 seconds.
4.1.6 Features of the Login Scheme
The scheme we propose has the following features.
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• Clearly, it achieves user privacy against the public. This is the primary objective
we are interested in. We point out that some user authentication techniques
introduced in Chapter 3, e.g., anonymous credential and group signature, achieve
similar properties, but they are much more computationally expensive.
• Each user only needs to maintain one secret (token), for accessing diﬀerent service
providers.
• Users do not need to hold individual certiﬁcates associating with the secrets they
use. This diﬀers radically from other user authentication techniques that achieve
user privacy such as anonymous credential and group signature discussed in Chap-
ter 3. In this sense, our proposal bears some similarities with the identity based
cryptosystems (e.g., [154]).
• No user secret (e.g., password) is required to be hosted by service providers.
We further see other features of our scheme. In essence, users and service providers
rely on long secrets (secret tokens) for authentication. A user is not expected to memo-
rize such long secrets. This diﬀers radically from the use of passwords as in Chapter 3,
so mobility of uses seems aﬀected. In fact, recall that we have assumed each user in
health care systems has a personal smart card, so mobility of users is supported as users
can carry their secret tokens by the smart cards.
Denial-of-Service (DoS) is a kind of attacks aiming at blocking regular service ac-
cessing, rather than acquiring secret content (e.g., secret keys or plaintexts). In nature,
DoS attacks are hard to resist yet common for on-line applications. In our proposed pro-
tocol (referring to Figure 4.2), the response z in M2 to a user request can be computed
beforehand by the service provider SP , so at this stage the protocol does not suﬀer from
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DoS. Upon reception of M3, SP ﬁrst needs to do an exponentiation (compute K ′) plus a
decryption (compute IDu). Note that to make K ′ in a correct form, which in turn makes
the decryption result in a correct form, an DoS attacker has to do two exponentiations
(compute a and K) and an encryption (compute y). Conversely, a DoS attacker sending
random messages in M3 only costs SP one exponentiation computation. Note also that,
this computation of two exponentiations plus an oﬀ-line exponentiation (compute x) is
the minimum cost that a DoS attacker has to spend in order to lead SP to the more
expensive test (to verify Equation 4.8). Considering these facts, our protocol is thus well
resilient to DoS attacks, a feature important yet hard to achieve in anonymous systems
4.2 Related Work and An Attack to the Wu-Hsu Scheme
Lee and Chang [115] proposed an interesting scheme for user identiﬁcation and key
distribution with user anonymity. However, Wu and Hsu [182] pointed out that the
Lee-Chang scheme suﬀers from some vulnerabilities. The main one is that since the
Lee-Change scheme only implemented one way authentication of users to the service
provider, an attacker can easily impersonate the service provider. Wu and Hsu [182]
further proposed a more eﬃcient scheme for the same purposes by assuming a similar
system setting. Unfortunately, as we shall demonstrate shortly, while the limitations
of the Lee-Chang scheme were rectiﬁed in the Wu-Hsu scheme, a new serious weakness
arises. In particular, the service provider can obtain a user’s secret token at the end of the
login when user identiﬁcation and key negotiation are accomplished. This will deﬁnitely
impair the interest of users, enabling the service provider to freely impersonate a user in
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requesting services from other providers. We must stress that in contrast to password, a
user’s secret token is a long-term strong credential, intended for identiﬁcation in diﬀerent
applications. In what follows, we brieﬂy review the Wu-Hsu scheme, followed by an
attack.
TheWu-Hsu scheme assumes similar system participants, procedures and parameters
as our scheme (the two schemes diﬀer the in login procedure). Consequently, by regis-
tration each user U has a secret token Su = IDdu (mod n), and each service provider SP
holds a secret token Ssp = IDdsp (mod n). The login procedure of the Hu-Hsu scheme
is outlined in Figure 4.3.
U SP
M1:Req−−−−−−−−−−→
k ∈ Zn, z = gkSsp
M2:z←−−−−−−−−−−
a = ze/IDsp








Figure 4.3: The Anonymous Login Protocol of the Hu-Hsu Scheme.
Based on our scheme, it is not diﬃcult to understand the Hu-Hsu scheme, and we
refer interested readers to [182] for a detailed introduction as well as security analysis.
We next demonstrate a serious weakness in the Wu-Hsu scheme, which allows the service
provider to freely impersonate the users who had ever requested services. This happens
because the service provider can obtain the secret token of a user after a successful
execution of the anonymous login protocol as shown in Figure 4.3. To see this, from x,
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y and T , the data sent to the service provider SP by the user U , SP can ﬁrst compute
h′ = h(yk||T ) = h(gket||T ) (mod n) with the k he has chosen, and then compute x/h′ =
Suh(at||T )/h′ = Suh(gket||T )/h(gket||T ) = Su (mod n). This is actually why the test
IDu
?= (x/h(yk||T ))e (mod n) by SP holds, which is eventually reduced to IDu = Seu
(mod n).
4.3 Concluding Remarks
We proposed a remote login scheme for health care services, achieving strong user privacy
(user anonymity and user unlinkability). The scheme has many nice features such as one
secret for multiple services, requiring no certiﬁcate, support of user mobility and more
importantly, resilience to DoS attacks. We developed our scheme by circumventing
a serious weakness in the Wu-Hsu scheme, that is the service provider can learn the
secret tokens of the users who have requested services from it. Our scheme has similar
performance as the Wu-Hsu scheme, in terms of both computation and communication.
While we discuss the proposed protocol in the context of health care system providing
a certain service, the protocol can also be a choice for the underlying authentication
mechanisms in the systems we shall study in later chapters, as long as user privacy in the
login process is a concern. Moreover, the protocol is essentially a generic authentication
technique independent of health care systems, but its introduction to health care setting






The anonymous remote login scheme we presented in Chapter 4, while considering ap-
plications beyond organizational boundaries, deals with relatively simple scenarios in
terms of participants, relationship between participants, and system objectives. In this
chapter, we study a more complex, inter-organizational process, i.e., medication prescrip-
tion. Medication prescription is a fundamental routine service in health care systems,
involving multiple parties, and individual privacy has distinct implications with respect
to diﬀerent parties. Our focus in this chapter is to clarify and address these privacy
concerns. We stress that since this system involves interactions between organizations,
the techniques discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 can be adapted for establishing
trust relationship between organizations before they execute the actual task. But we
deliberately neglect this as it is orthogonal to the issues we study here.
5.1 Introduction
Within the overall context of health data protection, individual privacy involved in med-
ication prescription needs special treatment. First, the involvement of diverse parties,
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especially non-medical parties in the process of medication prescription complicates the
protection of prescription data. Second, both patients and doctors have privacy stakes,
and their privacy concerns should be equally addressed. Third, medication prescription
should not be processed in a truly anonymous manner, because (1) certain involved par-
ties need to conduct useful research on the basis of aggregation of prescription data that
should be linkable with respect to either the patients or the doctors; (2) prescription
data has to be identiﬁable in some extreme circumstances, e.g., under the court order
for inspection or to assign liability. We next give a detailed discussion on these issues.
5.1.1 Privacy in Medication Prescription
As we have made it clear, electronic medical records (EMRs) are gradually substituting
traditional paper based medical records in health care systems, providing more eﬃcient
and timely information exchange and collaboration among various health care organiza-
tions, as well as external business associates. Besides the direct impacts on the quality
and eﬃciency of care provision, the wide use of EMRs eases medical research. For ex-
ample, researchers in care organizations or research institutes often conduct research
on the basis of inspection of clinical data to ﬁnd or evaluate new therapies; managed
care, insurance companies and other providers frequently engage in extensive research
on the cost eﬀectiveness of certain medical treatments and practices, by the analysis of
health data. While these research are important and beneﬁcial, they pose a potential
threat to the individual privacy involved in the underlying health data. From a technical
point of view, it seems enough to de-identify the health data prior to use for statistical
processing (as we shall see in next chapter, simply de-identifying health data in general
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does not suﬃce). However, there are frequent cases in which patients beneﬁt from being
traceable by the research, such as in the assessment of treatment safety [126]. In terms
of medication prescription, more care is needed to deal with prescription data, as it will
be clear shortly.
Ensuring individual privacy contained in medication prescription data is quite rel-
evant in the overall context of health data security [8], primarily due to the fact that
prescription data are an indication of a patient’s health status and history. In other
words, it is by no means very hard to deduce one’s health condition by inspecting
her prescription data. In this sense, there is little diﬀerences between medication pre-
scription data and other kinds of medical records in terms of privacy concern from the
viewpoint of patients. Furthermore, doctors also have a privacy stake in medication pre-
scription data since a doctor’s prescription habit or pattern is reﬂected in the data. Such
information could be exploited for many purposes. For example a hospital, based on the
comparison of doctors’ prescription patterns, may issue guidelines on the prescription of
certain medicines, and doctors are required to follow; those failing to comply with would
be treated negatively. As an another example, medicine companies may take advantage
of doctors’ prescription information for marketing purposes, tempting doctors to pre-
scribe their medicines [15]. The General Practice Research Database [79] maintained in
U.K. serves, among others, exactly this purpose. Patients’ information regarding their
medication purchasing can be clearly used for a similar purpose by medicine companies.
The process of medication prescription is a little peculiar in the sense that it involves
external business associates such as pharmacies and insurers, other than medical related
parties. The involvement of multiple parties would inevitably cause multiple points of
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vulnerabilities in terms of privacy assurance. Moreover, while it is reasonable to presume
medical professionals would be bound by ethical obligation and professional faith in en-
suring privacy of prescription data, it seems baseless to assume the same for non-medical
parties such as pharmacies and insurance companies. Worse yet, legal regulations do
not suﬃce in stopping these organizations from leaking prescription data while they are
being used for, e.g., the aforementioned cost-eﬀectiveness research. Take U.S. for in-
stance, there is no federal law on the protection of medical records kept by pharmacies;
while on the contrary, pharmacies beneﬁt ﬁnancially from selling prescription data: over
99% of prescription claims are collected and processed by PBMs (Pharmacy Beneﬁts
Management Systems) [81].
On the other hand, protection of individual privacy should not result in an anony-
mous medication prescription process. If prescription pads were issued in a truly anony-
mous manner, a wide spread of drug abuses can occur. There was already a thriving
black market on prescription medicines [120]. More importantly, laws and regulations
require pharmacies to maintain records that can be identiﬁed for possible inspection
and preventing drug interactions. For example, section 164.512(2)(d) of HIPAA regu-
lates that disclosure of protected health information including audits may be made to
health oversight agencies for authorized oversight activities. In addition, some current
beneﬁcial research based on prescription data would be rendered impossible once truly
anonymous medication prescription is applied. As a consequence, it is desirable that
prescription data (1) should be kept anonymous in general, but allowed for feasible
anonymity revocation; (2) provide linkability to some parties so as to enable research
on the basis of data aggregation. We stress that linkability of prescription data is also
92
conducive to prevention of fraud by patients and doctors in some cases. Considering
these, we conclude that (1) prescription data of a patient should be identiﬁable to the
insurer for billing purposes, anonymous yet linkable to the pharmacies (or PBMs) for
enabling research or prevention of fraud, and patient anonymity should be revocable
under law provision; (2) anonymity of a doctor should be similarly revocable, and pre-
scription from the same doctor should be anonymous (and unlinkable) to the health care
organization as well as the pharmacy, but linkable to the insurer for fraud prevention.
We shall shortly formalize these points as security requirements upon our medication
prescription system.
5.1.2 Use of Smart Card
Easy and instant access to electronically managed health data and insurance information
is now a key factor determining the eﬃciency and quality of care provision. However, the
involvement of diverse parties in care process, together with the continuously increased
mobility of patients, makes it practically hard to maintain such information in an uniﬁed
and globally available manner. To be more speciﬁc, (1) care provision in general involves
a number of parties such as hospitals, clinics, GPs (General Practitioners), and external
business associates including insurance companies, billing agencies, pharmacies and so
on, resulting in the heterogeneity of information infrastructures and business patterns;
(2) mobility of patients comes from the facts that people on frequent trips may need to
visit doctors in diﬀerent cities or even countries; and some patients may need to seek
appropriate medical treatment beyond local facilities. It is thus clear that it is hard to
achieve the goal of “data availability at the point of care” with the current model of
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statically maintained information repositories. This diﬃculty can be resolved to some
extent by smart cards containing latest personal medical and insurance information,
carried by the patients themselves [55,117].
Medication prescription is among the health care processes that frequently make ref-
erences to patients’ health data and insurance information. In particular, before issuing
a prescription, a doctor needs to inspect a patient’s medical records, complementing
his diagnosis process as well as checking for possible allergies and drug interactions
pertaining to the patient; insurance information is consulted to determine whether the
intended drugs are indeed covered by the patient’s health plan. It is apparent that the
introduction of smart card as a portable personal information repository would signiﬁ-
cantly simplify the process of medication prescription, enabling doctors to bypass several
bureaucratic and time consuming procedures if otherwise information is retrieved from
central databases. Moreover, doctors would be relieved completely from the inconve-
nience and annoyance caused by occasional blockage of network communication.
In addition to being a data storage device, smart card is capable of moderate com-
putation. We take advantage of this to entitle smart card the digital signature signing
capability to sign the electronic prescription pads, asserting the patient’s authorization
to the prescription before collecting the prescribed medicine. This proof of authorization
will be used by the pharmacy to collect payment from the patient’s health plan account
administrated by the corresponding insurance organization.
Besides the ﬂexibility and convenience in accessing personal health and insurance
data, the adoption of smart card in health care systems has many other advantages:
the authenticity of the patients is automatically ensured by holding the cards (note that
94
HIPAA endorses use of smart card for user identiﬁcation), so that many processes would
be automated and sped up, e.g., hospital admissions; with free access to the emergency
data stored in the smart card, emergency treatment would be instant; to name a few.
5.1.3 Delegation of Signing in Medication Prescription
Another important observation in medication prescription is that in practice, it is often
that other people, instead of patients themselves, collect the prescribed medicine. They
may be guardians, relatives, or friends who accompany and take care of the patients to
visit doctors. Passing smart card to others for signing prescription pads would deﬁnitely
increase the likelihood of disclosure of sensitive medical and insurance information stored
in the cards, although smart card oﬀers the ﬂexibility to be carried by other people than
the card owners. From a technical point of view, it is obviously desirable to root out
such a possibility of information disclosure in a practical medication prescription system.
Our solution to this problem is to implement delegation of signing that enables patients
to delegate their prescription signing capabilities to e.g., their guardians, relatives or
friends. As a result, the people who have accepted the delegation of signing from a
patient can use their own smart cards to sign prescription pads and collect medicine
on behalf of the patient. Clearly, delegation of signing avoids the passing of patients’
smart cards to the people who actually sign prescription pads, which guarantees that
smart card is of total personal use. Delegation of signing is an important functionality
in medication prescription, especially for disabled patients. We implement delegation of
signing by a proxy signature scheme proposed in the next section.
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5.2 A Building Block: Strong Proxy Signature
We have seen the need for delegation of signing in medication prescription, a delegation
of prescription signing capabilities. To implement delegation of signing, in this section
we propose a strong proxy signature scheme based on the Schnorr signature scheme
[159]. And it is straightforward to extend it to other DLP-like signature schemes.
5.2.1 Background and Related Work on Proxy Signature
Participants in proxy signature are original signers (delegators) and proxy signers (dele-
gatees), and they work as follows: an original signer delegates her/his signing capability
to a designated proxy signer, so that the proxy signer is authorized to issue proxy sig-
natures on behalf of the original signer. References [139, 181] are among the earliest
work on the idea of proxy signature, and the concept was later systematically studied
in [135], specifying three types of delegations, i.e., full delegation, partial delegation and
delegation by warrant. In full delegation, the original signer simply gives her private
signing key to the proxy signer. This kind of delegation seems to have little practical
signiﬁcance as the original signer loses complete control of her/his singing capability. In
partial delegation, a proxy signing key pair is generated from the original signer’s pri-
vate key, and the newly generated private key is delivered to the proxy signer through a
secret channel. And as the name implies, a delegation by warrant capitalizes on a policy
warrant to certify that the proxy signer is trusted. To satisfy the varying requirements
of practical applications, combination of the last two types of delegation seems practical
and viable. The scheme we propose actually depends on this combination. The schemes
proposed in [135] did not oﬀer non-repudiation to the proxy signer since both the original
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signer and the proxy signer know the proxy signing key. The work in [143] suﬀered from
the same problem. To overcome this drawback, Zhang [191] proposed a non-repudiable
proxy signature scheme, which however was found not secure [119]. Reference [121] ﬁrst
introduced the concept of strong proxy signature where a proxy signature issued by the
proxy signer represents both the original signer’s signature and the proxy signer’s sig-
nature. Non-repudiation with respect to both the original signer and the proxy signer is
thus achieved in strong proxy signature. An earlier scheme in [110] based on the Schnorr
signature was in fact a strong proxy signature, whereas it did not reﬂect the asymmetry
of roles that the original signer and the proxy signer take. The strong proxy scheme
presented in [121] together with the variant designed for mobile agent environment oﬀer
asymmetry of roles, but they are found subject to forgery attacks by the original signer
[165]. We develop our scheme by enhancing the scheme in [121] with the robustness to
forgery attacks by the original signer. Our enhancement also makes the proxy signer a
designated entity, rather than the originally non-designated entity for mobile agents.
To summarize, a strong proxy signature scheme should satisfy the following security
requirements:
• Strong unforgeability: No one (including the original signer) rather than the
designated proxy signer can generate a valid proxy signature.
• Veriﬁability: Anyone can verify the signatures based on the publicly available
parameters.
• Strong identiﬁability: A proxy signer’s identity can be determined from the
proxy signature it generates.
• Strong undeniability: The proxy signer cannot repudiate the signatures it gen-
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erated.
• Prevention of misuse: The proxy signing key pair should not be used for pur-
poses other than the designated ones.
These properties make strong proxy signature an ideal tool for implementing dele-
gation of signing in our system.
5.2.2 A Strong Proxy Signature Scheme
We start by listing notations that are used in this section.
O, PxS, V the original signer, the proxy signer and the veriﬁer, respec-
tively.
p, q two large primes such that q|(p− 1).
g an element of order q in Z∗p .
(xo, yo), (xpxs, ypxs) respective key pairs of O and PxS for the Schnorr signature
scheme, with yo = gxo (mod p) and ypxs = gxpxs (mod p).
σ(m) a digital signature of a message m signed by the Schnorr
signature scheme.
veri(.) the veriﬁcation algorithm of the Schnorr signature scheme.
wd a delegation warrant.
Table 5.1: Notations for Proxy Signature Scheme
We are now ready to present our strong proxy signature scheme, which works in the
following three procedures.
1. Delegation
In the delegation phase, the original signer O chooses ko ∈R Z∗q , and computes
and sends ro = gko (mod p) to the proxy signer PxS. Upon reception of the mes-
sage, PxS selects kpxs ∈R Z∗q , and in turn computes rpxs = gkpxs (mod p) and r =
xpxsh(yo||ro, rpxs) + kpxs (mod q). Afterwards, PxS sends (rpxs, r) to O. Upon re-
ceiving the message, O computes so = xoh(wd, r) + ko (mod q), where wd is the del-
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egation warrant stating the purposes of delegation, valid period of delegation, etc. O
then sends (wd, so) to PxS in a secret channel. PxS checks and accepts as long as
gso = yh(wd, r)o ro (mod p) holds, in which case PxS computes the private proxy signing
key as xs = so + xpxs (mod q). As a result, the proxy signing key pair is (xs, ys), where
ys = gxs (mod p) is the public proxy signing key. Note that wd, ro, r, and rpxs are
public parameters.
2. Signing
To issue a proxy signature on a message m on behalf the original signer O, PxS
simply computes a Schnorr signature (σ(m)) using the private proxy signing key xs,
and publishes (m,σ(m)) as the actual proxy signature.
3. Verification
Signature veriﬁcation is accomplished by checking the following two tests: gr ?=
y
h(yo||ro, rpxs)
pxs rpxs (mod p) and veri(m, σ(m), ys)
?= true. A proxy signature on m is
valid only when both equations hold.
Our scheme has an important feature that both consents from O and PxS are in-
dicated explicitly in the proxy signatures. To see this, r is actually a signature from
PxS and so is a signature from O. For this reason, the delegation warrant wd can be
simpliﬁed. Moreover, recall that r is a signature from PxS on ro||yo, so it is also a coun-
termeasure against the forgery attacks by the original signer O as suggested in [165],
other than demonstrating PxS ’s acceptance of the delegation.
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5.2.3 Security Analysis
We next discuss security of the scheme. As our scheme is an enhancement to circumvent
forgery attacks by the original signers as in [121], we begin with the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 The proposed strong proxy signature scheme is secure against the original
signer’s forgery attack.
Proof : Intuitively, the forgery attacks by the original signer takes advantage
of the fact that O is allowed to change ro by substituting it with r′o = y−1pxs
(mod p) (see [165] for detail). In our scheme, however, ro (together with yo)
is signed by PxS so as to produce r. Since unable to forge PxS ’s signature, O
thus cannot forge r. This avoids the forgery attacks by O. 
We proceed to see our scheme satisﬁes the security requirements upon strong proxy
signature schemes.
Theorem 5.2 The proposed strong proxy signature scheme fulﬁlls all the security re-
quirements listed above.
Proof sketch:
(1) Strong Unforgeability: From Theorem 5.1, O cannot forge valid proxy
signatures. For outsiders, the private proxy signing key contains PxS ’s private
signing key, therefore only PxS can generate valid proxy signatures.
(2) Veriﬁability: (ro, so) demonstrates the consent of O on the delegation;
(rpxs, r) shows PxS ’s acceptance of the delegation; veriﬁability of the signed
message is obviously based on the underlying Schnorr signature scheme.
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(3) Strong Identiﬁability: The inclusion of PxS ’s public key ypxs in the public
proxy signing key ys, implies that PxS is identiﬁable.
(4) Strong Undeniability: The proxy signer cannot repudiate his signatures
because only he can compute the private proxy signing key xs used in the
signatures.
(5) Prevention of Misuse: Expiry date of the proxy signing key can be readily
checked against the validity of the keys held by O and PxS, from which the
proxy signing key is derived. wd serves practically to prevent abuses of the
proxy signing key. In the context of our medication prescription system, proxy
signing keys are intended for the mere use of signing prescription pads. 
5.2.4 A Discussion
An alternative way for generating the proxy signing key is simply that the proxy signer
chooses a key pair as the proxy signing key pair and the original signer certiﬁes it using
her/his signing key by issuing a digital certiﬁcate, and the certiﬁcate states the delega-
tion policy. As a matter of fact, there exists a controversy on the practical signiﬁcance
of proxy signature primitives since they do not demonstrate convincing eﬃciency ad-
vantages over this alternative method. Indeed, our proposed scheme faces the same
problem. However, one thing is clear regarding our scheme that both the original signer
and the proxy signer are explicit from a valid proxy signature itself, together with the
public proxy signing key. This as we shall see shortly, is quite critical to make prescrip-
tion data linkable with respect to patients. Furthermore, since a private proxy signing
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key contains the private signing key of the proxy signer, the proxy signer thus cannot
aﬀord to transfer the proxy signing key pair to others.
5.3 A Privacy Preserving Medication Prescription System
In this section, we elaborate on our construction of a medication prescription system,
where individual privacy of patients and doctors is appropriately protected with respect
to diﬀerent parties. Smart card is exploited as a data repository containing latest per-
sonal health and insurance information, as well as a computational device for signing
prescription pads (by a regular digital signature or our proposed proxy signature). The
proxy signature proposed in previous section is used to implement delegation of signing,
allowing patients to delegate their prescription signing capabilities to other people.
5.3.1 Basic Idea
Let us look at the (electronic) medication prescription process in real world. A patient
visits her doctor, and on the basis of the diagnosis, the doctor will prepare a prescription
pad. To that end, the doctor normally connects to the central medical record database
for checking allergies and possible harmful drug interactions or medical history concern-
ing the patient. In addition, the doctor may enquiry an information system maintained
by the patient’s insurer to determine whether certain intended drugs are covered by
the patient’s health plan. Upon completion of medicine selection, the doctor signs the
prescription pad, which would serve as an evidence that the doctor vouches for the
safe use of the medicines. The prescription pad is then directed to the pharmacy and
added to the patient’s medical records. The patient later goes to the pharmacy, and
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the prescription pad is retrieved. The pharmacy collects enough evidence in ﬁling the
prescription to meet the requirements of law regulations. Then the pharmacy charges
the insurer (or the patient) for the prescription upon the patient’s authorization (signed
by the patient) and delivers the prescribed medicines to the patient. The prescription
pad may then be forward to the PBMs for statistical research. Our construction will
basically follow this processes, but taking protection of individual privacy into account.
We next clarify several aspects of our system.
Smart card is useful or even critical to the above process in several places. First,
smart card can serve as a portable data repository, containing latest personal health and
insurance information. As a result, it is no longer necessary for the doctor to retrieve
information from the central databases maintained by the health care organization and
the insurance company. This is of a particular advantage when the hospital a patient
visits is not her registered care provider. For example, the patient seeks treatment at a
diﬀerent city or at a foreign country. Second, smart card is an especially ideal device for
hosting the private signing key, and signing electronically the prescription pad when the
patient goes to the pharmacy to collect medicine. Similarly, smart card is also used to
host the proxy signing keys for the purpose of implementing delegation of signing, yet
another major characteristic of our system. Under our proposed strong proxy signature
scheme, to delegate her prescription signing capability, a user (the original signer) nego-
tiates a proxy signing key with the intended person (the proxy signer) who then stores
the key in her/his own smart card. A user can be both the original signer who delegates
her prescription signing capability to other people, and the proxy signer who accepts
prescription signing capability from other people. The accommodation of delegation of
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signing makes our system more realistic.
Recall that a central objective of our construction is to protect individual privacy
of patients as well as doctors in medication prescription, and such a protection should
still support useful research on the basis of data aggregation. To that end, we in general
adopt the following methods. (1) For patients, each patient applies for a pseudonym
from her insurer, and the insure links the pseudonym with the patient’s real identity.
This is reasonable since it is the insurer that pays the prescriptions at the absolute dis-
cretion of individual patients. Consequently, patients engage in medication prescription
in the name of pseudonyms, thereby gaining anonymity. Transactions under the same
pseudonym apparently oﬀers linkability. Revocation of anonymity can be done by the
insurer when necessary. (2) For doctors’ part, each doctor joins a group established by
the care organization. We exploit the security manager of the organization as a group
manager overseeing the group (for clarity reasons, we call it group manager instead of
security manager in the sequel). The group manager holds a key pair for the group, and
whenever a doctor issues a prescription, the group manager signs a “group signature” in
the name of the group, so anonymity of doctors is achieved. Given a signed prescription
pad, only the group manager is able to identify the doctor who issued it. We assume
the group manager is independent of the care organization in the sense that the group
manager would not do anything in favor of the care organization, e.g., help the organiza-
tion to link a speciﬁc doctor’s prescription data. We point out that the functionality of
the above “group signature” can be achieved by an oﬀ-the-shelf group signature scheme
such as [1, 47]. However, virtually all existing group signature schemes are not eﬀective
in revocation of group members, thereby insuﬃcient for a dynamic group. For this rea-
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son, we choose to let the group manager sign using a regular digital signature scheme
on behalf of the doctors. To diﬀerentiate doctors while keeping their privacy, the group
manger issues each doctor a pseudonym, which serves to hide the real identity of the
doctor.
However, it may be argued that the group manager issuing “group signatures” on-
line for every doctor might become a bottleneck, aﬀecting overall performance of the
system. Actually, there exist two methods for the group manager to compute “group











Figure 5.1: Two Modes of Group Signature
directly passes the prescription pad m to the group manager for signing, then the group
manager signs m and sends the signed pad σ(m) to the pharmacy; in case (b), the doctor
ﬁrst delivers m to the pharmacy which later relays m to the group manager for signing.
The latter actually oﬀers the ﬂexibility that the prescription can be signed at any time
before the patient collects the medicine, alleviating to some extent the situation that
the group manager would becomes a system bottleneck. We therefore implement the
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latter method in our construction.
As we made it clear, patients (as well as doctors) would rely on pseudonyms to
achieve anonymity. However, it is noted that long term linkable pseudonyms would risk
the patients being identiﬁed. To address this problem, we accommodate the ﬂexibility
for readily renewing pseudonyms. In particular, the prescription signing key of a patient
is rendered short term. That is, the signing key is certiﬁed to be valid within a short
period of time, e.g., half a year; or once the patient feels her privacy is at risk, she is able
to revoke her pseudonym and the associated signing key (in which case, the signing key
is announced in a public CRL (Certiﬁcate Revocation List), and then applies for a new
pseudonym and a new signing key). The same applies to her proxy signing keys. Under
the strong proxy signature scheme in last section, a proxy signing key is derived from
the signing keys of both the original signer and the proxy signer. Naturally, revocation
of either party’s signing key will result in the revocation of the proxy signing key. As a
signing key is rendered short term and certiﬁed under a pseudonym, it apparently does
not suﬃce for identiﬁcation purposes in some cases. We then employ a long term key,
master key, to associate with the real identity of a patient. The master key is intended
for user identiﬁcation and authentication under the real identity of a patient, and may
be used beyond the context of medication prescription. As a result, there are three kinds
of keys in a patient’s smart card, that is, the master key (long term), the signing key
for prescription signing (short term), and proxy signing keys (short term) if the patient
has accepted delegation of signing from other people.
Based on these discussions, we are ready to formally deﬁne the parties involved in
our medication prescription system.
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5.3.1.1 Deﬁnition of Entities
We list in the following the main entities involved in our medication prescription system.
• Patients: A patient P is the entity to whom a prescription is issued. P holds a
personal smart card hosting her latest health and insurance data. For medicine
prescription, P needs to show insurance information pertaining to her health plan
(P needs to enrol in a health plan). P also has a signing key in the smart card. To
collect the prescribed medicine, P is required to sign the prescription pad using
the smart card, to show her consent on the prescription. This authorization will
be recognized by the insurer to pay the prescription.
• Proxy Signers: A proxy signer PxS accepts delegation of signing from one or
several patients. A proxy signer herself may be a patient. As a proxy signer of a
patient P , PxS has established a proxy signing key with P and stores the proxy
signing key in her own smart card. PxS may be required to sign the prescription
pad and collects the prescribed medicine on the behalf of P .
• Doctors: A doctor DR is the entity that issues prescriptions. For issuing a
prescription, DR signs the prescription pad to claim his assurance of the prescribed
medicine beneﬁting the patient from medical perspective. The signature can be
potentially used as a non-repudiable evidence to assign liability if the prescribed
medicine caused disputes. To achieve individual privacy, doctors need to join in
a group, e.g, established by the care organization they belong to.
• Insurers: An insurer I is the party providing health beneﬁts plan to patients,
thereby paying the prescriptions. I may need to engage in certain statistical
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research. In our system, I issues pseudonyms to the patients who enroled in a
health plan, certiﬁes the patients’ public prescription signing keys, and revokes
anonymity of the patients when necessary. In addition, we designate I to be
responsible for detection of fraud committed by doctors.
• Pharmacies: A pharmacy PH involves ﬁling prescriptions. In ﬁling a prescrip-
tion, PH must collect suﬃcient evidences, including signatures from both DR
and P , and collects payment from I and delivers the medicine to P . PH may also
engages in statistical research for better medicine provision.
• Group Manager: The group manager GM is actually the security manager of
the care organization, managing privacy issues of doctors. GM signs prescription
pads for doctors who are in the group he manages. GM is responsible for revoking
anonymity of doctors when required.
There are other entities involved in our medication prescription system, such as
certiﬁcation authorities that issue public key certiﬁcates to related entities, and law en-
forcement agencies overseeing medication prescription. However, their roles are straight-
forward, and we do not explicitly discuss them.
We next specify privacy requirements upon medication prescription systems, based
on earlier discussions on individual privacy in medication prescription.
5.3.1.2 Privacy Requirements
1. User anonymity Actual identities of patients and doctors are hidden by means
of pseudonyms. Anonymity, however, can be revoked by the corresponding des-
ignated trusted parties. In particular, patient anonymity can be revoked by the
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insure I, and doctor anonymity by the group manager GM .
2. Linkability of patients Under the provision of anonymity, diﬀerent prescrip-
tions to the same patient P are linkable to the pharmacy PH. This is essential
to enable research by PH.
3. Linkability of doctors Under the provision of anonymity, prescriptions issued
by the same doctor DR are linkable with respect to the insure I. This is essential
for fraud detection by I.
4. Unlinkability of doctors Prescriptions by the same doctor DR should be
anonymous and unlinkable to the pharmacy PH.
5. Least data disclosure Unless absolutely necessary, prescription data are kept
conﬁdential. In other words, disclosure of prescription data is based on a need-
to-know basis.
Deﬁnition 5.1: A medication prescription system is said to be privacy preserving
if it satisﬁes the above privacy requirements.
5.3.2 Protocols
In this section, we give our construction of a smart card enabled medication prescription
system. Our construction closely follows the real-world medication prescription process
described earlier. Our system in general consists of four procedures as outlined in
Figure 5.2. Typically, (1) in an oﬀ-line system initialization procedure, patients enrol
in a health plan oﬀered by the insurer I, and doctors join a group managed the group
manager GM . Each participant establishes and gets the corresponding keys; (2) in the
prescription preparation phase, a patient P (or together with a proxy signer PxS) visit a
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doctor DR, where DR diagnoses P and prepares a prescription pad for P . Subsequently,
DR directs the prescription pad to a pharmacy PH; (3) PH then initiates a prescription
signing procedure, where the prescription pad is forward to the group manager GM for
signing (in the name of a group); (4) ﬁnally, P or PxS goes to the pharmacy PH to
collect the prescribed medicines in the prescription ﬁling procedure, and PH gets the




















Figure 5.2: A Medication Prescription System.
We next elaborate on these procedures, and the notations that are used in the sequel
are listed in Table 5.2.
1. System initialization
In this procedure, each involved entity gets itself prepared for the engagement into
the prescription process, including establishing necessary keys and obtaining correspond-
ing certiﬁcates.
Suppose the patient P has already established his long term master key (mPKP ,mSKP )
and gotten the certiﬁcate under his real identity. P then enrolls in an insurer’s health
plan. To do this, she establishes her short term signing key (PKLP , SKLP ), contacts
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LP , LDR pseudonyms of P and DR, respectively.
THi, i = 0,1,... transaction header that minimally contains a transaction ID,
inception expiration date, insurance and health plan identi-
ﬁers.
ki, i = 0,1,... random session keys.
EU (m) encryption of m under U ’s public key by a semantically se-
cure public key cryptosystem.
{m}k symmetric encryption of m under CBC mode with key k.
EMk1,k2(m) {m,MAC(k2,m)}k1 , where MAC(k,m) is the crypto-
graphic message digest of m with k
SU(m) digital signature on m by U ’s private key. We assume clear-
text signatures, e.g., SU (m) = σ(m)||m, where σ(m) is the
exact signature of m.
GS(m) “group signature” on m produced by GM .
Rx a prescription pad.
(mPKU ,mSKU ) master key pair of entity U ; mPK is public key and mSK
is private key.
(PKU , SKU ) signing key of entity U ; PK is public key and SK is private
key.
(pPKU , pSKU ) proxy signing key delegated to U from other people.
Table 5.2: Notations for Medication Prescription Protocols.
and directs to the insurer I the public part of the signing key PKLP . I generates a ran-
dom pseudonym LP for P, issues a certiﬁcate for the signing key under the pseudonym,
ﬁnalizes the health plan with P and enters related information together with LP into
a private database for P. Insurance information, LP and the certiﬁcate are delivered to
P via a reliable channel, e.g., a registered postal mail. I is also supposed to have a key
pair for the asymmetric encryption E(). P then negotiates with each proxy signer PxS
for delegating her prescription signing capability and helps PxS generate proxy signing
keys (pPKPxS, pSKPxS). P herself may be a proxy signer by accepting others’ del-
egation and generates correspondingly the proxy signing keys (pPKP , pSKP ) that
are delegated to her. Finally, public parts of the generated key materials, insurance
information obtained from I are added to P ’s smart card. Note that secret parts of the
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keys are generated directly inside the smart card. The process is depicted as follows.
(M1) P → I: Sp = SP (Enroll Req, PKLP )
(M2) I → P : CertLP = SI(PKLP , LP , T ),
EP (k1), {SI(Insurance Info)}k1
(M3) P ↔ PxS: establish (pPKPxS , pSKPxS)
In M1, Enroll Req is an enrollment request stating which plan to enrol and PKLP
is the public part of the short term prescription signing key. Note that P computes Sp
using her master key (mSKP ) to authenticate her real authority to I. In response, I
returns to P the certiﬁcate CertLP under a pseudonym LP for PKLP and the insurance
information (Insurance Info) under the enrolled health plan in M2. T , included in the
certiﬁcate, is the expiry date of CertLP . In order not to be leaked, the signed insurance
information is encrypted by a random session key k1. In M3, P exchanges information
with a proxy signer PxS, establishing the proxy signing key (pPKPxS, pSKPxS) for
PxS. P may also set up for himself (pPKP , pSKP ) by accepting delegations from
other people. Recall that a proxy signing key is derived from both entities’ short term
prescription signing keys under the strong proxy signature scheme introduced in last
section. So the proxy signing key (pPKPxS, pSKPxS) is created by (PKLP , SKLP )
together with (PKPxS , SKPxS), and is valid only when both of them are valid.
A doctor DR joins a group, established by the aﬃliated care organization, where
DR is entitled and certiﬁed the capability in issuing prescriptions. The group manager
GM of the group will be the actual entity that commits “group signatures” on behalf
of the group members. GM issues DR a random pseudonym LDR and certiﬁes DR’s
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signing key (PKDR, SKDR) under the real identity of DR.
To issue “group signatures” for the group members, GM chooses a signing key
(note that this signing key is a key pair for a regular digital signature) and obtains the
certiﬁcate from related certiﬁcate authority CA. GM also chooses a key pair for the
asymmetric encryption E(.) and obtains the certiﬁcate from the corresponding CA.
The pharmacy PH prepares a key pair for the asymmetric encryption E(.) and
obtains the certiﬁcate from the corresponding CA.
2. Prescription preparation
Patient P visits doctor DR, and presents his personal smart card and signs a random
message on the ﬂy to DR, proving his successful enrollment in a particular health
plan. The diagnosis process by DR may be complemented by the health data stored
in the smart card. Upon completing the diagnosis, DR prepares the prescription. To
that end, DR makes references to the medical data in the smart card for checking
drug allergies, drug interactions, and insurance information for determining whether
certain drugs are indeed covered by P ’s health plan. DR then generates an electronic
prescription pad including no identities of P and DR. Afterwards, DR delivers the
prescription pad together with the information regarding LP to the pharmacy PH.
Note that DR should be anonymous to PH. Finally, DR updates P ’s smart card by
adding to it the particulars of current visit and prescription.
(M4) P → DR: Slp = SLP (Tstmp), CertLP
(M5) DR → PH: EPH(k2, k3),
e = EMk2,k3(TH0, Rx, Slp), CertLP ,
Pe = EGM (LDR, S = SDR(TH1, e))
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In particular, in M4, P computes a signature Slp on Tstmp, the current time-
stamp, using his prescription signing key to show his successful enrolment in a health
plan oﬀered by insurer I. The prescription is sent by DR to PH in M5, where k2 and k3
are random session keys for PH to decrypt and check e; TH0 and TH1 are transaction
headers as deﬁned in Table 5.2; Rx is the prescription pad including a serial number
Prescription Id; Pe is intended only for GM to decrypt, and S is a signature on e under
the real identity of DR which serves to tell GM who issues the prescription. CertLP
included in M4 and M5 is used to verify Slp .
3. Prescription signing
The pharmacy PH transfers the prescription to the group manager GM for signing.
To minimize the likelihood of leaking prescription information, it makes sense to hide
the exact prescription content from GM . This however will not cause trouble because
GM is in charge of anonymity revocation of doctors, so is able to keep the scrambled
message traceable; this would also prevent GM from otherwise substituting certain
drugs for discriminative purposes against P . Therefore, in our system, GM issues a
“group signature” to the encrypted prescription. GM includes in the “group signature”
a linkable token in an attempt for insurer I to link doctors’ data. GM then returns the
signed prescription to PH. The process is illustrated by the following steps:
(M6) PH → GM : Pe, CertLP
(M7) GM → PH: Gs = GS(TH2, e, {DR, S}k4 ,
EGM (k4), e˜ = EI(LDR))
In M6, PH relays Pe received in M5 to GM. GM then decrypts to get LDR and
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S. Since S is a signature (under DR’s actual identity) on e, GM veriﬁes e. From LDR,
GM retrieves from his database the real identity corresponding to LDR, and checks
against the one indicated by S. In M7, GM returns to PH the “group signature” on
e, where TH2 is a transaction header, k4 is a random session key and is encrypted by
GM ’s public key, so {DR, S}k4 can be opened only by GM ; e˜ is the ciphertext created
by insurer I ’s public key, thereby openable only by I, and e˜ is intended for I to link
doctors’ prescription data. Since PH keeps an original copy of e, he can detect GM ’s
possible modiﬁcation of e by comparing the returned signed e with the original copy.
Apparently, PH has also no chance to substitute drugs in the prescription.
4. Prescription filing
To collect the prescribed medicines, the patient P or the proxy signer PxS goes
to the pharmacy PH, where P or PxS signs the prescription pad using her own smart
card. Signatures of both P and DR are the evidences that must be collected by PH
in compliance with law regulations for legal sale of medicines. PH gets the electronic
payment from the insurer I by providing I the prescription record, and delivers the
medicine to P or PxS. The following steps outline the process.
(M8) PH → P : k2, k3, Gs
(M8′) PH → PxS: k2, k3, Gs
(M9) P → PH: S˜ = SLP ( Prescription Id, Slp)
(M9′) PxS → PH: S˜ = SPxS( Prescription Id, Slp)
(M10) PH → I: EI(k2, k3), Gs, S˜, CertLP
(M11) I → PH: Electronic Payment, Si = SI(Prescription Id, Slp)
Speciﬁcally, prior to signing, P or PxS must verify the prescription. To that end,
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PH submits Gs to P ’s (or PxS’s) smart card in M8 (or M8′), where k2 and k3 are the
same session keys as in M5 for decrypting e included in Gs. Note that we assume the
submission channel from PH’s workstation to the smart card is secure, so k2 and k3 are
sent in clear. Upon conﬁrmation, P or PxS signs the prescription in M9 or M9′. The
Prescription Id, together with Slp obtained from e, uniquely identiﬁes a prescription. To
collect payment, PH forwards the signed prescription Gs, signature S˜ and the encrypted
session keys k2, k3 to the insurer I. Upon validating the prescription, I pays the bill and
returns a signature Si to PH. At this point, a successful prescription session completes
and PH may pass the prescription data to a PBM for statistical research. Gs, S˜ and
Si are a set of complete evidences of a prescription to be collected by PH. Note that
we have avoided the prescription to be signed in a recursive fashion, i.e., one entity
signs upon another entity’s signature. Verifying such a recursively signed message must
proceed in a sequential manner. Instead, Gs, S˜ and Si can be veriﬁed independently
and in parallel.
5.3.3 Security Discussions
In this section, we discuss how the above protocols meet the earlier privacy requirements.




(1) User anonymity. User anonymity requires that actual identities of pa-
tient P and doctor DR are appropriately protected, but revocable to the desig-
nated entities. In the above construction, P and DR engage in the process of
prescription with respective pseudonyms, with the only exception in the sys-
tem initialization step. In particular, P interacts under its real name with the
insurer I to apply for a pseudonym as well as the certiﬁcate for the prescription
signing key, and to negotiate health plan; DR communicates with the group
manager GM to acquire its pseudonym and credential for issuing prescription.
Both cases, however, are deemed reasonable considering the fact that I and
GM are the designated entities for anonymity revocation of I and DR, respec-
tively. The real identity of DR is also included in messages M5, M6, M7, M8
(M8′) and M10. But notice that in all cases, only GM can decrypt the corre-
sponding ciphertexts to read the identity. Moreover, no identity information
of P and DR is incorporated in the prescription pad Rx. Considering these
facts, anonymity of both patients and doctors are achieved.
Anonymity revocation of P is clear in the sense that given any signed prescrip-
tion data under the pseudonym LP , only the insurer I can map LP to the real
identity of P . As to DR, in M7, GM includes {DR, S}k4 and EGM (k4) in
Gs, which are readable only to GM and thus anonymous to other entities.
This suggests that given a valid prescription data Gs, only GM can tell which
doctor exactly issued the prescription.
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(2) Linkability of patients. It requires that under the provision of
anonymity, prescriptions to the same patient P are linkable to pharmacy PH.
Linkability of patient to PH follows immediately if the prescriptions to P are
signed by P himself in M9. If the prescriptions to P are signed by a proxy
signer PxS in M9′, according to a property of our proposed strong proxy
scheme, i.e., identities of both the original signer and the proxy signer are
explicit in a valid proxy signature, linkability of the patient is also achieved.
(3) Linkability of doctors. It requires that under the provision of
anonymity, prescriptions issued by the same doctor DR are linkable wit respect
to insure I. Prescriptions issued by the doctor are signed by group manager
GM in M7. GM includes e˜ = EI(LDR) in the group signature Gs. Since the
insurer I is able to decrypt e˜ using its private key, linkability of doctors to
I is thus achieved. E() is a semantically secure public key cryptosystem, by
reading e˜ without decryption, no one can do the same linking.
(4) Unlinkability of doctors. It requires that prescriptions issued by the
same doctor are anonymous and unlinkable to pharmacy PH. Anonymity of
doctors to PH holds true as we already discussed in the ﬁrst requirement. It
then suﬃces for us to show that Gs is unlinkable to PH. What included in Gs
are TH2, e, {DR, S}k4 , EGM (k4) and e˜: TH2 is random; e and {DR, S}k4
are also random encrypted by random session keys; so is EGM (k4); and as we
just discussed, from e˜ no one including PH can do the same linking as I who
can decrypt e˜. Unlinkability of doctors to PH is thus achieved.
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5) Least data disclosure. It requires that unless absolutely necessary, pre-
scription data should be kept conﬁdential. It would be quite hard to precisely
deﬁne and then prove the implication of least data disclosure in the system.
We however mention two salient facts of our system relating to this require-
ment. First, to protect the information including the prescription data stored
in a patient’s smart card, the patient delegates her signing capability to other
people to avoid her card being carried by others, which otherwise may risk
disclosing information in the card. Second, to avoid unnecessarily disclos-
ing information while without aﬀecting the responsibilities it takes, the group
manager GM is designed to “blindly” sign prescriptions. 
5.3.4 Revocation of Delegation of Signing
In some cases, a patient may want to revoke the delegated prescription signing capability
of a proxy signer. Revocation of delegation of signing in our system can be achieved
following a similar way as revocation of public keys in a PKI. More speciﬁcally, a dele-
gation of signing revocation list (DoSRL) is maintained by e.g., the insurer who issues
public key certiﬁcates to patients (the original signer and the proxy signer); each item
in the DoSRL contains a pair of public keys of the original signer and the proxy signer,
suggesting that the delegation relationship between the two keys was revoked; as such,
the validity of a strong proxy signature must ﬁrst be checked against the DoSRL to see
whether the involved keys have been published in the DoSRL: if the keys are in the
DoSRL, the proxy signature is deﬁnitely invalid; otherwise, it continues the regular Ver-
119
iﬁcation function of the strong proxy signature scheme. It should be noted that DoSRL
works exactly as CRL (Certiﬁcate Revocation List) in a PKI.
5.4 Smart Card Aspects
Needless to say, security of the smart card is of paramount importance in our system.
We consider the smart card as a tamper resistant device that oﬀers signiﬁcant resistance
to physical attacks. The smart card is equipped with a crypto-coprocessor for perform-
ing crypto-algorithms. The SLE66CX microcontroller family from Inﬁneon Technologies
[16] and the AT90SC microcontroller family [92] from Atmel seem suﬃce for our system
since they perform fast discrete logarithm computations by hardware. There are nor-
mally three types of memories constituting the storage system of a smart card, namely
working memory, program memory and user memory. Working memory is made up of
Random Access Memory (RAM) chips, providing temporary storage for the data ex-
changed during program execution. Data in working memory will get lost when power
is oﬀ. Program memory is a kind of nonerasible Read Only Memory (ROM). The oper-
ating system and the security module that enforces security mechanisms reside in this
area. The content of program memory is entered when the chip was manufactured, and
any later attempt to modify it would ruin the card. User memory, taking advantage of
EEPROM technology, is programmable in the sense that it can be erased and re-written
by electronic means. All personal data used in our system including medical records,
insurance information, key materials (master key, signing key and proxy signing keys
from other people if any) are stored in this area.
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We organize the user memory into distinct sections to accommodate data requiring
diﬀerent maintenance and access control. Note that the allocation of space is theoretical,
and the precise structure and the data access control will be implemented in accordance
with existing standards [94–96].
• Secret Section
This section is designed to be written only once and cannot be read from the
outside by either physical or logical means [173]. The data in this area are re-
tained throughout the life cycle of a smart card, and can only be read by its own
microprocessor. The following data are archived in this section.
– the card manufacture’s PIN.
– the card holder’s long term master key: The master key serves to authen-
ticate the patient’s actual identity, e.g., when the patient enrols in a health
plan by interacting with the insurer.
• Sensitive Section
This section is similar to the secret section, but allows for occasional updates. The
following information is stored here.
– the card issuer’s PIN (CIN): The card issuer in our system may be a pa-
tient’s primary health care provider organization. CIN serves to protect the
application data against unauthorized operations such as erase and write.
– The card holder’s PIN (CHN): The card holder is obviously the patient
herself in our system. CHN is used to activate certain functionalities of the
smart card, e.g. to review the protected information.
• Working Section
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This section can be erased and rewritten, whereas such updates can be accom-
plished only by designated entities, the card issuer or holder in our case. The
information in working section is read protected, write protected, or erase pro-
tected through appropriate access control codes (CIN or CHN), depending on the
nature of the data. The following data are managed in this section.
– private part of the card holder’s short term prescription signing key: The
signing key serves to sign electronically the prescription when the patient
collects the medicine in the pharmacy.
– private part of the short term proxy signing keys delegated to the card holder:
The card holder may agree to be the proxy signer of other people in terms
of prescription signing. Be this the case, the proxy signing keys are stored
in this area.
– medical information: the medical information set includes coded personal
medical records, consultation details and prescription information.
– insurance information.
• Public Section
Data in public section can be read free, requiring no protection. The following
data are stored in this area.
– serial number of the card.
– pseudonym and related information.
– emergency medical information: such information includes blood type, drug
allergies, etc.
– public keys and their corresponding certiﬁcates: These include the delegation
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warrants stating delegation policy for the use of the proxy signing keys.
To summarize, we list the data (and sections) managed in the user memory in Ta-
ble 5.3. Note that the size quantities are not accurate, normally bigger than the actual
data sizes.
Data (Section) Size (bytes) Reading Erasing Writing
Secret section 40 Forbidden Forbidden Forbidden
Sensitive section
CHN 10 Forbidden CHN CHN
CIN 10 Forbidden CIN CIN
Working section
signing key 30 Forbidden CIN CIN
delegated keys 90 (30×3) Forbidden CIN CIN
medical records 40 CHN CIN CIN
consultation info. 1,500 (50×30) CHN CIN CHN
prescription info. 1,200 (120×10) CHN CIN CHN
insurance info. 250 CHN CIN CIN
Public section
pseudonym info. 10 Free CIN CIN
emerg. med. info. 20 Free CIN CIN
pub. sig. key 450 Free CIN CIN
pub. prox. keys 1,350 (450×3) Free CIN CIN
Table 5.3: Data Management in Smart Card
We clarify some particulars presented in the table.
• By Reading Forbidden, the data can only be read through the microprocessor of
the smart card.
• The design of the data structure for medical record is merely indicative instead
of descriptive. In other words, we code the medical record using a well-structured
template. As a result, most of the ﬁelds accept binary values “YES” or “NO”.
Reference [117] provided an example of such a structured template. For example,
if a patient has “Obsessive-compulsive disorder”, the corresponding ﬁeld will be
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“1”. Similarly, all ﬁelds are ﬁlled with either “1” or “0”. In this way, the 40-byte
space allocated for the patient’s medical records can accommodate 320 ﬁelds.
• We assume that discrete logarithm based public key cryptosystems (e.g., the
Schnorr signature scheme [159]) are used to compute digital signatures and is-
sue key certiﬁcates. This makes typically 160-bit private keys, 256-byte public
keys, and 148-byte digital signatures. A public key (short term) certiﬁcate is
simpliﬁed to contain minimally the user’s name, CA’s name, expiry date and a
digital signature on them. Other certiﬁcates, such as those for proxy signing keys,
may contain a simpliﬁed version of policy. With these, the length of a public key
together with its certiﬁcate is expected not to exceed 450 bytes.
• For the master key, as it is for long term use, the public key certiﬁcate should
be produced in a standard format. For the limited space, we don’t include this
certiﬁcate in the smart card, thereby not providing a veriﬁer the convenience
to verify a signature oﬀ-line. This however does not degrade the eﬃciency of
our medication prescription system, for the master key is used only once in the
initialization phase.
• The area for consultation details and prescription information is writable under
the card holder’s PIN (CHN). With this, our system oﬀers the ﬂexibility that
such information can be added to the smart card under the authorization of the
patient. This is signiﬁcant when the patient visits a doctor in other place than
his primary health care organization.
• We allow information regarding the latest 30 consultations and 10 prescriptions
being stored in the smart card. Removal of this kind of information is on a “ﬁrst
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in, ﬁrst out” basis. For the limitation of space, a card holder is permitted to be
the proxy signer of at most three people. Therefore, maximally 1,350 (450×3)
bytes of space is allocated for proxy signing keys and their certiﬁcates.
• The total space to accommodate all the data is estimated to be 5 Kbytes. There-
fore, a smart card with 8 Kbytes memory suﬃces for our system.
As a ﬁnal note, we point out some existing health card systems for the comparison
with ours. The Health Smart Card in Texas [82] serves mainly as a medical data con-
tainer, and the Health Card in France [140], besides containing health care information,
is intended more as a paying means for health services. The Health Professional Card
(HPC) [35] has been standardized on European level as CEN prEVN 13729 “health
Informatics - Secure User Identiﬁcation - Strong Authentication using Microprocessor
Cards” [46] as well as consistently on the German national level as the HPC Protocol
[89]. HPC is more on providing identiﬁcation services with security functionalities such
as digital signature and encryption.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
We have proposed a smart card enabled medication prescription system, with the fol-
lowing features distinguishing it from the system in [8]. First, the introduction of smart
card carrying personal health and insurance information greatly simpliﬁes the process of
diagnosis and medication prescription, while smart card in [8] is used only for prescrip-
tion signing. Second, pre-approval for a prescription from the insurer in [8] is no longer
deemed necessary in our system, because doctors can get enough insurance information
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from a patient’s smart card to support the prescription preparation procedure. Third,
we identiﬁed and accommodated the need for patients to delegate their prescription
capabilities to other people, e.g., their guardians. This is good to protect privacy of
the information stored in personal smart cards, making our system more acceptable in
practice. The work in [8] did not consider delegation of signing.
We believe that our proposed system is quite practical considering smart cards have
already been deployed in some health care systems, e.g., [35, 82, 140]. Implementation




Preserving of Health Data in
Outsourcing
In Chapter 5, we discussed to achieve user privacy (patients and doctors) towards some
organizations that are involved in the medication prescription process, while still en-
abling these organizations to collect useful prescription data for the purpose of conduct-
ing research based on these data. The work in this chapter in general continues such
kind of study on “achieving user privacy while enabling research”, whereas we consider a
diﬀerent scenario: a health care organization (e.g., a hospital) outsources the health data
in its repository to other organizations (e.g., medical research institute) so as to enable
research by the receiving organizations. For example, a hospital may need to outsource
clinical records in its autonomous databases to a research institute in an attempt to
discover a new drug or evaluate a new therapy. A main diﬀerence between the scenarios
considered in this chapter and in Chapter 5 is that the data to be shared (outsourced)
in this chapter are an aggregation of medical records while in Chapter 5 are individual
records (a record for every prescription session). This suggests that we need to consider
privacy protection at a level beyond individual data items, e.g., some statistic properties
of the whole data set should be taken into consideration. Moreover, the outsourcing care
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organization in this chapter does not have direct business association with the receiving
organizations with respect to the data to be outsourced. Consequently, the receiving
organizations actually involve “secondary” use of medical records, and outsourcing care
organization has more interests to be protected from the receiving organizations.
It is now clear that we are concerned with protection of health data in secondary
use, in which case, two important issues have to be addressed: one is the privacy protec-
tion for individuals referred to in the outsourced data; the other is copyright protection
over the outsourced data. We present a uniﬁed framework that seamlessly combines
techniques of binning and digital watermarking to attain the dual goals of privacy and
copyright protection. Our binning method is built upon an earlier approach of gener-
alization and suppression by allowing a broader concept of generalization. To ensure
data usefulness, we propose constraining binning by usage metrics that deﬁne maximal
allowable information loss, and the metrics can be enforced oﬀ-line. The watermarking
algorithm we propose watermarks the binned data in a hierarchical manner by leveraging
on the very nature of the data. The method is resilient to the generalization attack that
is speciﬁc to the binned data, as well as other attacks intended to destroy the inserted
mark. We prove that watermarking could not adversely interfere with binning. We
implemented the framework and conducted extensive experiments on the algorithms,
and the results show the robustness of the proposed framework.
We remark that the entity in a care organization responsible for outsourcing is the
security manager of the organization. However, we do not explicitly discuss how the
security manager enforces the protection mechanisms and how the security manager
contacts the receiving organization, as this is straightforward and orthogonal to the
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issues we study here.
6.1 Introduction
Nowadays, eﬀective sharing of health data is essential to foster the collaboration within
the health care community and with other parties such as research institutes, managed
care, and pharmaceutical companies, so as to enhance the quality and eﬃcacy of care
provision. For example, a hospital may need to outsource clinical health records in
its autonomous databases to a medical research institute in an attempt to discover
a new therapy or evaluate a new treatment. Such need is clearly shown by research
trends in the area of health care management and procedures that are increasingly
based on extensive analysis of clinical data. And it is well recognized that research of
this kind promises many advantages such as improvements in care provision, reduction
in institutional costs, enhancement in organizational administration, better treatment
alternatives, development of predictive and diagnostic support systems, to name a few.
These beneﬁts, however, come at the expense of care organizations outsourcing health
data for secondary use.
The dissemination of health data could also be to satisfy legal requirements. As
reported by the National Association of Health Data Organization in 1996, 37 states in
the United States had legislative mandates to gather personal health information from
hospitals for cost-analysis purposes [138].
The direct release of health data invariably violates individual privacy. Data must
be thus properly processed before delivery in order to protect privacy of the individuals
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they refer to. A straightforward method for achieving individual privacy is to de-identify
(anonymize) the data, by replacing any explicit identifying information by some random
placeholders. For instance, a randomized value may be used to substitute the name or
social security number of each patient. This alone, however, does not suﬃce to guarantee
the full anonymity of medical data as pointed out by numerous studies (see for example,
[91, 168, 170, 172]). An example often outlined is re-identiﬁcation by linking attributes
such as birth date, zip code that are shared by the anonymized health data and some
externally collected voting records. This has motivated many more advanced approaches
in the literature (see Section 6.2). Of particular interest is the approach of generalization
and suppression [168,170,172] that represents values by corresponding more general but
semantically accordant alternatives.
The sharing of health data also exposes data holders to the threat of data theft.
Related to this, yet another important protection requirement regarding outsourced
health data arises, that is, how to protect data ownership (copyright). It is quite obvious
that health data are an important asset to the data holders (health care organizations)
who have collected and compiled the information. Incentives to unauthorized data
distribution arise from an increasingly thriving data industry where ﬁrms such as biotech
companies collect, compile, share or sell (bio)medical data for proﬁts. Even though
there are laws concerning copyright and ownership rights, we need eﬀective mechanisms
to establish and protect the holders’ rightful possession of the data. Consequently
and naturally, digital watermarking techniques, initially proposed for the protection of
multimedia content [41,100], have been recently also applied to relational data. As such,
digital watermarking techniques represent a viable solution for the problem of enforcing
130
ownership of health data. However, a main diﬀerence of health data with respect to
data from diﬀerent domains is represented by the need of also assuring privacy. It is
thus clear that when dealing with outsourced health data, both individual privacy and
data ownership must be protected. To meet these dual needs, we propose a framework
that integrates techniques of binning and digital watermarking. Under our framework,
the health data to be outsourced would undergo two consecutive steps of binning and
watermarking, respectively.
To summarize, the main contributions of our work in this chapter include:
1. A uniﬁed framework that seamlessly combines binning and digital watermarking
for the protection of both individual privacy and data ownership. We give both
theoretical and experimental analysis on the “seamless-ness” of the combination.
2. A binning algorithm that enforces the functionality of “binning”. The method
bins downward, and extends an earlier approach of generalization and suppression
by allowing a broader concept of generalization.
3. A hierarchical watermarking scheme that is resilient to various attacks attempting
to remove the embedded mark, and especially robust against the newly discovered
generalization attack. In addition, we propose an elegant solution to the rightful
ownership problem concerning watermarking.
4. The adoption of usage metrics for preserving data quality with respect to the
intended usage. We deﬁne our usage metrics by modelling information loss, and
propose an oﬀ-line enforcement of usage metrics.
5. Experimental studies of the proposed framework.
Compared to existing approaches, a main innovative aspect of our work is represented
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by a downward binning process to address the satisfaction of k-anonymity speciﬁcation,
due to the oﬀ-line enforcement of usage metrics; our watermarking algorithm is a novel
hierarchical scheme that exploits the very nature of the underlying data, which also
provides a neat solution to the rightful ownership problem.
We start by providing some background knowledge as well as related techniques in
next section.
6.2 Background and Related Techniques
Conceptually, the health data to be outsourced and thus protected can be viewed as
a relational table organized into rows and columns. Each row of the table is a record
describing an individual/entity, and each column represents a distinct attribute of all
individuals/entities. For example, a table for patient information would store patients’
name, social security number, zip code, race, birth date, gender, visit date, and so on,
as a series of columns, and a row of the table is a record about a particular patient. A
column is essentially a semantic domain comprising of a set of possible values. A row
is also termed a tuple, which consists of an ordered n-tuple of values, where n is the
number of columns. Based on the identifying information they contain, columns are
categorized into three types. Some columns explicitly identify individuals (e.g., name,
social security number), so they are called identifying columns. Some other columns
contain potentially identifying information that could be linked with other data sets
to re-identify individuals, even without the presence of identifying information. Such
columns are called quasi-identifying columns. Typical examples of quasi-identifying
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columns include zip code, birth date, gender and so on. The rest of columns contain
no identifying information. Of particular interest is the quasi-identifying columns with
respect to the protection of individual privacy as the identifying columns can be simply
substituted by randomized tokens and columns containing no identifying information in
fact need no disposal at all. Therefore, unless explicitly stated, our later discussions are
restricted to the quasi-identifying columns.
Basically, two classes of technique are closely related to our work, namely, informa-
tion disclosure control and database watermarking, respectively.
6.2.1 Information Disclosure Control
Nowadays, person-speciﬁc data are collected widely, and then shared for business or
legal reasons. An important issue has to be addressed is the control of information
disclosure, i.e., the privacy of individuals/entities referred to in the released data must be
protected. Information disclosure comes in the form of either the identity of an individual
is directly revealed or something about an individual is learnt from the released data.
By convention, we call the former identity disclosure and the latter attribute disclosure
[116]. Attribute disclosure in a broad sense can include inferential disclosure whereby
certain characteristic of the individuals can be inferred by analysis of the released data
[61]. In this work we will restrict ourselves to the identity disclosure problem, and we
refer interested readers to [184] for in-depth discussions on attribute disclosure.
As stated earlier, simple de-identiﬁcation (anonymisation) by stripping or replacing
explicit identifying information such as names or social security numbers in the under-
lying data does not suﬃce to protect the privacy of individuals. Experiences showed
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that linking the anonymized data with other externally available data sets such as re-
gional voting records and hospital discharge records, still risks re-identifying individuals
[91,133,168,170,172].
One well known approach to identity disclosure control is to transform quasi-identifying
columns to entertain k -anonymity constraint (k is a constant), i.e., data are generalized
and suppressed in such a way that every record is indistinguishable from at least k -
1 other records, so that no search can be narrowed down to a particular individual
[91, 168, 170, 172]. The satisfaction to k -anonymity can also be understood as: records
containing the same value constitute a bin, and the size of every bin is at least equal
to k. By deﬁnition, generalization deals with replacing a value with a more general
but semantically accordant value, while suppression deals with preventing data releases.
Generalization of categorical attributes is based on the fact that the representation of
medical data can be normally arranged into a domain hierarchy tree (DHT), where the
most general description of the data is at the root of the tree while the leaves denote
the most speciﬁc descriptions. Figure 6.1 shows a DHT on the type of roles: leaf nodes
represent all possible particular roles a column may assume, and generality of the de-
scription increases with the level along the tree, until the root node that distinguishes
no speciﬁcity. A generalization proceeds by replacing the values represented by the leaf
nodes by their corresponding ancestor nodes at a higher level. For instance, the set
of {Neurologist, Gynecologist, Radiologist, Cardiologist} may each be generalized as
Doctor, Medical Personnel, or even Hospital Staﬀ in Figure 6.1, depending on the level
of privacy it aims to achieve. A valid generalization in [168, 170, 172] requires all its
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Figure 6.1: A Domain Hierarchy Tree (DHT) for A Column Tepresenting the Types of
Roles in A Medical Domain.
Clearly, generalization and suppression result in a loss of speciﬁcity, thereby making
the re-identiﬁcation process harder. However, the tradeoﬀ between the level of privacy
and the amount of information loss must be carefully evaluated, as too much gener-
alization could possibly render the data useless while slight generalization could not
provide adequate protection. [97] suggested associating usage based metrics with the
process of meeting k-anonymity. Our framework incorporates the same idea of usage
metrics, but we deﬁne a diﬀerent set of metrics, and more importantly, our metrics can
be enforced oﬀ-line. Metrics in [97] are deﬁned in accordance with the broader notion
of generalization allowed therein, which does not require all generalization nodes stay
at the same level. The binning method in [118] follows a similar broader deﬁnition of
generalization. Considering the ﬂexibility and ﬁner granularity it oﬀers, our binning
algorithm also includes such a broader notion in extending the generalization and sup-
pression in [168, 170, 172]. Moreover, the oﬀ-line enforcement of usage metrics enables
a downward binning in our context, which has eﬃciency advantage over binning that
proceeds upwards.
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Another approach to the identity disclosure problem is to perturb the data by adding
noise or swapping values, while at the same time maintaining some statistical properties
of the entire data set [72, 114]. Perturbations apparently cause data loss, so it is again
vital to determine the right tradeoﬀ between information loss and privacy – a topic
which is now under active research [62,188]. From the discussions so far, we know that
identity disclosure control essentially deals with sharing data in such a way that the
released data remains useful with respect to its intended usages while safeguarding the
privacy of individuals to which the data refer.
6.2.2 Watermarking of Relational Data
Digital watermarking has long been investigated for copyright protection, mainly over
multimedia content, e.g., images, audio and video clips [41,100]. There have been recent
eﬀorts in watermarking relational databases. Due to the very nature of relational data
such as low noise bandwidth, strict deﬁnition of semantics, etc., watermarking techniques
for databases turned out not to be a direct deployment of techniques for multimedia data.
A seminal approach to watermarking relational data is presented in [7]. However, the use
of Least Signiﬁcant Bits (LSB) embedding in the scheme makes it inherently vulnerable,
as a simple ﬂipping of LSBs would completely destroy the inserted mark. [155] proposed
a method for watermarking numbers that is robust because the mark embedding relies
on data distribution rather than on trivial LSB modiﬁcation. The idea has later been
integrated in a framework for watermarking numeric attributes of relational databases
[156]. A theoretical investigation on watermarking techniques for databases and XML
documents is presented in [5], which attempts to achieve watermarking while preserving
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a set of parametric queries in a speciﬁed language.
Another approach [171] was recently proposed dealing with watermarking categor-
ical attributes in databases. In essence, the data to be watermarked in our context
become categorical after binning, so our watermarking also reduces to handling categor-
ical data. Unfortunately, such approach cannot be directly applied to our case because
it is susceptible to a kind of generalization attack (see Section 6.5).
6.3 Overview of Our Framework
To simultaneously attain the goals of protecting individual privacy and copyright pro-
tection regarding outsourced health data, we combine techniques of binning and digital
watermarking into a uniﬁed framework. As shown in Figure 6.2, the framework com-
prises two key components, i.e., binning agent and watermarking agent, dedicated to
binning and watermarking, respectively. In the framework, the health data to be out-
sourced would undergo two consecutive steps of transformation. Speciﬁcally, the binning
agent ﬁrst bins the data to satisfy k-anonymity speciﬁcation. Afterwards, the binned
data are watermarked by the watermarking agent by inserting within the data a mark,
which, upon extraction, asserts provable ownership. The data resulting from these trans-
formations are then expected to adequately protect both privacy and copyright, thereby
qualiﬁed for outsourcing. Both binning and watermarking are governed by usage metrics
in order to preserve data usability. Next, we shall discuss some speciﬁc aspects of the
framework.
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Figure 6.2: Protection Framework for Outsourced Health Data.
watermarking are allowed to introduce with respect to the intended data usage (see
Section 6.4). Transformation exceeding the bounds is assumed to render the data useless.
k-anonymity Speciﬁcation: k-anonymity speciﬁcation includes the system parameter k,
and possibly also the set of quasi-identifying columns to be binned and other relevant
constraints pertaining to binning.
Binning Agent: Driven by the binning algorithm, the binning agent attempts to bin
the data to satisfy k-anonymity speciﬁcation while at the same time adhering to the
usage metrics. After binning, each bin is guaranteed to contain at least k records,
so no speciﬁc individual can be identiﬁed. The binning algorithm takes as input the
original data, the k -anonymity speciﬁcation, the domain hierarchy trees for each quasi-
identifying attribute, and the usage metrics. We suggest a preprocessing step to create
the domain hierarchy trees and determine the system parameters.
Watermarking Agent: The watermarking agent continues to process the binned data by
embedding an owner-speciﬁc mark. The underlying watermarking algorithm exploits a
secret watermarking key (may contain several elements), known only to the data owner,
to manipulate the process of mark embedding. Without having possession of the secret
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watermarking key, no one can erase the inserted mark from the data. Watermarking
also observes usage metrics, ensuring that it does not corrupt the data in terms of the
anticipated usage; the domain hierarchy trees are needed as well for inspection by our
watermarking algorithm.
6.4 Binning Algorithm
Our binning algorithm extends the approach of generalization and suppression in [168,
170, 172] by allowing a broader notion of generalization as in [97], which does not re-
quire all generalization nodes of a generalization to be necessarily at the same level of
the domain hierarchy tree. In particular, a valid generalization G is represented by a set
of generalization nodes SG in the domain hierarchy tree that satisfy the following con-
dition: The path from every leaf to the root along the tree encounters one (to guarantee
generalizability) and only one (to guarantee deterministic generalization) generalization
node in SG. This deﬁnition includes the case of a leaf node itself being a generalization
node. We have seen domain of a categorical attribute being organized into a domain
hierarchy tree (e.g., Figure 6.1); we next describe the generalization of a numeric col-
umn. It is accomplished by ﬁrst dividing the domain space of the column into a series of
disjoint intervals, and then pairwise combining them into a binary tree. With the tree,
generalization proceeds in the same way as for a categorical attribute. As an example,
Figure 6.3 depicts the construction of a binary domain hierarchy tree for the column
Age with domain [0, 150). In order to avoid over-binning the data, intervals should be
of moderate size (smaller) and they need not to be of equal size.
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Figure 6.3: Constructing Binary DHT for A Numeric Attribute.
Clearly, binning makes data less speciﬁc and more general, thereby resulting in some
information loss. It would make no sense to meet k-anonymity speciﬁcation if that
renders the data useless, thus data quality must be preserved. We suggest constraining
the binning process to abide by usage metrics specifying a set of maximal allowable
information loss. More information loss than as speciﬁed would substantially degrade
the data quality with respect to the intended data usage.
6.4.1 Usage Metrics
Consider ﬁrst a categorical column c that associates with a domain a hierarchy tree
T , e.g., Figure 6.1. If Pharmacist is generalized to Paramedic, under our deﬁnition of
generalization, child nodes of Paramedic would become indiscriminatable. This in turn
implies that all entries in c containing Pharmacist/Nurse/Consultant would become
indiscriminatable. This concept of indiscrimination leads to our approach for quantifying
information loss InfLossc for the column c as follows. Suppose a generalization results
in a set of generalization nodes {p1, p2, ..., pM}; let Si be a set containing the leaf nodes
of the subtree that is rooted at pi, and the number of entries in c containing values in
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SM is the set of leaf nodes of the tree T . We allow some leaf
nodes to remain ungeneralized given that k-anonymity speciﬁcation is already met, in
which case |Si| = 1.
We next consider a numeric attribute c, e.g., Age. Suppose the domain of c, whose
lower and upper bounds are L and U , respectively, is generalized into M intervals. The
lower and the upper bounds for these intervals are Li and Ui, respectively, i = 1..M .
Let ni be the number of entries in the column c whose values fall between Li and Ui,








Once all InfLossi, i = 1..CN (CN is the total number of the columns to be gen-
eralized) are determined, a normalized loss InfLoss is computed by averaging over all






Likewise, other forms of information loss, e.g., total information loss can be de-
ﬁned. Finally, based on the deﬁnition of information loss, usage metrics for controlling
information loss are deﬁned in general as following:
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InfLossi ≤ bdi ∀i = 1, ..., CN (6.4)
InfLoss ≤ bdavg
where B = {bd1, ..., bdCN} ⊂ R and bdavg ∈ R deﬁne the bounds for maximal allowable
information loss.
In practice, the enforcement of the above metrics in a normal way might not be
ideal as it involves calculating information loss and in turn checking against the bounds
after every step of binning. Fortunately, we can implement an oﬀ-line enforcement,
yielding a set of maximal generalization nodes in each domain hierarchy tree. Maximal
generalization nodes are deﬁned as 1) they constitute a valid generalization; 2) each of
them being the highest node in the domain hierarchy tree to which the corresponding
leaf nodes can be generalized under the usage metrics. Usage metrics in the form of
maximal generalization nodes are obviously much easier to enforce, only requiring that
none of the leaf nodes be generalized beyond its corresponding maximal generalization
node. It is preferable that the maximal generalization nodes are directly given as the
usage metrics, rather than being transformed from the form of Equation 6.4.
We note that a generalization comprising the maximal generalization nodes triv-
ially satisﬁes k-anonymity speciﬁcation given that the data are binnable. The point is
to meet k-anonymity while minimizing information loss. It is thus clear that binning
would yield a set of generalization nodes that are lower than or at most equal to the
maximal generalization nodes. This reasonably reﬂects the underlying principle that
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binning is not allowed to damage data usefulness. Let us consider the earlier example
of generalizing a numeric attribute, where we suppose the set of intervals in satisfying
k-anonymity is depicted by the leaf nodes of the tree in Figure 6.4: enforcement of the
usage metrics might most likely allow for further generalizations, yielding the set of
maximal generalization nodes denoted as elliptic nodes.
Maximal Generalization Node
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Figure 6.4: A DHT by Enforcing Usage Metrics.
6.4.2 Binning
We decompose binning into two steps, i.e., mono-attribute binning and multi-attribute
binning. The mono-attribute binning step bins attributes individually so that each
transformed attribute satisﬁes k-anonymity. The multi-attribute binning step is required
because, while each attribute satisﬁes k-anonymity, combinations of them may not.
Consider an example of a transformed table, where 36 people have an age between
25 ∼ 50 and 8 people are doctors, each satisfying k-anonymity speciﬁcation with k = 6.
However, there might be only 4 people who are aged between 25 ∼ 50 who are also
doctors.
For ease of referencing, we list in Table 6.1 the variables and functions that will be
used in this and the next section.
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Notation Meaning
tr the domain hierarchy tree for an attribute
tbl the table to be protected
mingends the set of minimal generalization nodes
maxgends the set of maximal generalization nodes
ultigends the set of ultimate generalization nodes
k the system parameter for k-anonymity
k1, k2, η elements of the secret watermarking key
wm, wmd actual and replicated mark, respectively
Parent(nd, tr) returns the parent node of nd in tr
Children(nd, tr) returns the set of child nodes of nd in tr
Siblings(nd, tr) returns nd together with its sibling nodes in tr
Leaves(tr) returns the set of leaf nodes of tr
SubTree(nd, tr) returns the subtree of tr rooted at nd
Duplicate(wm) duplicates wm to produce wmd
Val2Nd(v, nds[]) returns the node in nds[] that represents v
Nd2Val(nd) returns the value represented by nd
SetµBit(v, b) sets the least signiﬁcant bit of v to be the bit b
Index(nd, S) returns the index of nd in the set S
MajorVot(wmd) majority voting over wmd
Table 6.1: Variables and Functions
6.4.2.1 Mono-attribute Binning
For an individual attribute, our binning starts from the maximal generalization nodes
downwards along the domain hierarchy tree, until reaching a set of lowest nodes that
constitute a valid generalization catering to k-anonymity speciﬁcation. We term such
nodes minimal generalization nodes. Our way of downward binning is an advantage
oﬀered by the oﬀ-line enforcement of usage metrics. The mono-attribute binning is
basically an exhaustive trial procedure in a search for the minimal generalization nodes.
For this reason, compared to previous work that bins upward along the tree (e.g., [118]),
downward binning turns out to be more eﬃcient. The intuition is that the higher level
on the tree, the less nodes are to be tried. Note that the observance of usage metrics
is directly accomplished by starting binning from the maximal generalization nodes.
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Figure 6.5 outlines the algorithm for generating the set of minimal generalization nodes.
GenMinNd(tr, maxgends, tbl, k)
1. mingends← NULL
2. foreach node nd ∈ maxgends
3. subtr ← SubTree(nd, tr)
4. mingends← mingends⋃ SubGMN(subtr, tbl, k)
SubGMN(tree str, tbl, k)
1. if NumTuple(str, tbl) < k
2. return NULL
3. forany node nd ∈ Children(str.root, tr)
4. if NumTuple(SubTree(nd, str), tbl) < k
5. return {str.root}
6. tmpset← NULL
7. foreach nd ∈Children(str.root, str)
8. subtr ← SubTree(nd, str)
9. tmpset← tmpset⋃ SubGMN(subtr, tbl, k)
10. return tmpset
NumTuple(tree str, tbl)
1. int num = 0
2. foreach tuple ti ∈ tbl
3. if ti.val ∈ Leaves(str)
4. num← num + 1
5. return num
Figure 6.5: Mono-attribute Binning Algorithm
We employ a simple rationale in generating a minimal generalization node: a node
is minimal if itself meets k-anonymity, but not all of its child nodes do. This might lead
to an over-generalization of the data. A more aggressive strategy could be enlisted, e.g.,
a node is not minimal if any of its child nodes satisﬁes k-anonymity.
6.4.2.2 Multi-attribute Binning
Multi-attribute binning involves further binning attributes, each of which already satis-
ﬁes k-anonymity. However, for an individual attribute, the set of allowable generaliza-
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tions for the purpose of multi-attribute binning is already deﬁned by the nodes between
the minimal generalization nodes and the maximal generalization nodes. Consider Fig-
ure 6.6: the set of allowable generalizations constrained by the minimal generalization
nodes and the maximal generalization nodes are enumerated as {30, 31, 45, 46, 33, 22},
{30, 31, 32, 33, 22}, {30, 31, 21, 22}, {20, 45, 46, 33, 22}, {20, 32, 33, 22} and {20,
21, 22}. As a result, the set of allowable generalizations for the entire table is the enu-
meration of diﬀerent combinations of allowable generalizations for all attributes. Let
the number of quasi-identifying columns be CN , and ni be the number of allowable
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Figure 6.6: A DHT for Illustrating Multi-attribute Binning.
Among these allowable generalizations, some do not satisfy k-anonymity, and are
thereby invalid; the remaining are valid for k-anonymity. Nevertheless, not all these
valid generalizations are equally satisfactory. The point here is to choose among them
an ultimate generalization that results in the minimal information loss. Nodes in this
ultimate generalization are called ultimate generalization nodes. Clearly, the calculation
of information loss can be done by using Equation (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3), although this
may not be ideal as it may incur unacceptable computation penalty. Instead, we prefer
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simplifying this calculation by solely considering “speciﬁcity loss” regarding the domain
hierarchy trees. Let the total number of leaf nodes of a tree be N and the number of
generalization nodes of an allowable generalization be Ng, we deﬁne speciﬁcity loss due
to generalization to be (N −Ng)/N . This approach of estimating speciﬁcity loss results
in a more eﬃcient implementation, but it may reduce accuracy.
Figure 6.7 outlines the above approach for determining the ultimate generalization
nodes. The function EnumGen(.) enumerates all distinct combinations of allowable
generalizations among attributes, and the function Selection(.) determines the general-
ization that incurs least speciﬁcity loss.
GenUltiNd(mingends[1..CN], maxgends[1..CN], tr[1..CN])
1. for i = 1..CN
2. allowblgens[i]← {genj | genj is a generalization
constrained by mingends[i], maxgends[i] in tr[i]}
3. allgens← EnumGen(allowblgens[i], i = 1..CN)




5. ultigen ← Selection(validgens)
Figure 6.7: Multi-attribute Binning Algorithm
6.4.2.3 Binning Algorithm
A relevant observation to make is that the identifying columns are most likely to be the
key attributes (e.g., primary key) of the table, containing the most important part of
information. Hence it is frequently useful to maintain the identifying columns traceable
to the data holder in health care domain. For instance, as reported in [67], in some
cases patients may beneﬁt from being traced in research such as the assessment of
treatment safety. Moreover, many real-world clinical projects such as those in [111] and
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in [68] support traceability of the medical data. Based on this observation, our binning
algorithm adopts an one-to-one replacement for data in the identifying columns. In
particular, we replace each data by its encrypted value that is generated by an encryption
function E() e.g., AES. We point out that keeping the identifying columns unsuppressed
and unmanipulated further is also important for watermarking. Figure 6.8 outlines our
complete binning algorithm, comprising the encryption of the identifying columns and
the binning of the quasi-identifying columns. Given the ultimate generalization ultigen
yielded by multi-attribute binning, the function Bin(.) works by simply replacing each
value in the quasi-identifying columns by the value represented by its corresponding
node in ultigen.
Binning(tbl, ultigen)
1. foreach tuple ti ∈ tbl
2. ti.ident.val ← E(ti.ident.val)
3. ti.quasi-ident.val ← Bin(ti.quasi-ident.val, ultigen)
Figure 6.8: Binning Algorithm
6.5 Watermarking Algorithm
By its very nature, watermarking modiﬁes the data to be watermarked, thereby further
degrading data quality. Watermarking works under a general assumption that the un-
derlying data can tolerate a certain degree of quality degradation. The tolerance closely
relates to the bandwidth for insertion, implying that watermarking would fail unless the
data can be modiﬁed. The discovery of the available bandwidth appears to be challeng-
ing in the case of watermarking relational data [156,171]. We next explain how to ﬁnd
the desired bandwidth channel for insertion in the binned data.
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6.5.1 Bandwidth Channel
In our context, columns of a table after binning become essentially categorical, and data
modiﬁcation by watermarking is equivalent to the permutation of data. We advocate
that a binned table can actually accommodate some degree of data permutation, thereby
providing the desired bandwidth channel for watermarking.
From earlier discussions, we know that generalization of a node in the hierarchy tree
to its parent node renders indiscrimination among this node and its sibling nodes. In
essence, a random permutation of values represented by these nodes equals the eﬀect of
the generalization. As long as such a generalization is allowed, watermarking relying on
the data permutation would deﬁnitely work. Recall that the set of maximal generaliza-
tion nodes deﬁned by usage metrics are normally atop the set of ultimate generalization
nodes resulting from binning. Hence, generalizations between the two levels still respect
usage metrics, which in turn guarantee the viability of watermarking. It is important
to notice a special case where a ultimate generalization node itself is also a maximal
generalization node. Permutation of such nodes might result in information loss above
the threshold set by usage metrics. However, watermarking aﬀects only a small fraction
of the data set, and hence such excessive loss is expected to be minor. As a matter of
fact, this is the price that any watermarking must pay. More importantly, we can readily
tackle this scenario by slightly modifying the way a maximal generalization node is de-
ﬁned. Speciﬁcally, in determining the set of maximal generalization nodes, the bounds
in Equation 6.4 are given slightly lower than actually required for sustaining data usage,
so that a small fraction of the table is allowed to be generalized to the values represented
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by the maximal generalization nodes. Note however that such transformation on a large
scale would deﬁnitely destroy the data.
6.5.2 Watermarking at A Single Level
A direct way to take advantage of the above bandwidth channel is to consider permuta-
tion at the level of each ultimate generalization node (together with its sibling nodes).
The exact primitive enabling bit insertion works as follows. Suppose an ultimate gener-
alization node p needs to be permutated, and p and its sibling nodes compose a sorted
set S. To insert a bit b, our basic idea for determining a target node q in S such that
p → q encodes the bit b is: the index of q in S is even, if b = 0; the index of q in S
is odd, if b = 1. However, this does not suﬃce since some elements in S may not be
ultimate generalization nodes, so if the target node q is not an ultimate generalization
node, validity of the generalization (see Section 6.4) is violated. To solve this issue,
we shall continue the permutation process downward among the child nodes of q, and
possibly even lower, until an ultimate generalization node is reached. Our deﬁnition of
generalization guarantees the reachability. This idea of achieving embedding by data
permutation is similar to [171], but we do within ﬁner domains (sub-domain of the col-
umn), and more importantly we have solid justiﬁcations for permutation. Unfortunately,
watermarking at this single level is susceptible to a kind of generalization attack that
can completely destroy the inserted bits without knowing the watermarking key.
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6.5.2.1 Generalization Attack
The generalization attack is speciﬁc to the binned data. It works as follows: the attacker
starts a further generalization on the watermarked table, generalizing each value to the
value represented by a higher generalization node in the domain hierarchy tree. Because
of the gap between the maximal generalization nodes and the ultimate generalization
nodes, the table would sustain data usage. The generalization attack appears fatal as it
does not require the secret watermarking key at all. A careful analysis indicates that it
is the way we consider watermarking only at the level of ultimate generalization nodes
that makes possible the attack. To thwart this attack, we must additionally water-
mark all intermediate levels between the maximal generalization nodes and the ultimate
generalization nodes. This constitutes the basic idea of our hierarchical watermarking
scheme.
6.5.3 A Hierarchical Watermarking Scheme
In the hierarchical watermarking, we consider watermarking at every level, from the
maximal generalization nodes to the ultimate generalization nodes. Speciﬁcally, for an
ultimate generalization node p to be permutated, watermarking starts by ﬁrst deter-
mining the maximal generalization node q that corresponds to p, followed by executing
permutations downward along the domain hierarchy tree from the level of the child
nodes of q, until the target node is an ultimate generalization node. The exact primi-
tive enabling permutation at each level is the same as above. Consider Figure 6.6 for
example (for illustration’s sake, we need to intentionally take the minimal generaliza-
tion nodes therein as the ultimate generalization nodes), where node 46 is going to be
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permutated. First, the corresponding maximal generalization node 21 is determined.
Next, permutation proceeds within nodes 32 and 33. If the target node is node 33, then
permutation stops; otherwise, the permutation continues within nodes 45 and 46, and
eventually stops.
To avoid a large scale alteration, watermarking is ideally restricted to a (small)
portion of the whole data set. We leverage on the (encrypted) identifying columns
of the binned table to select some tuples for embedding, recalling that the encrypted
identifying columns are assumed to keep intact1. Based on a secret key k1 together with
a secret tunable parameter η, tuples ti in the table tbl satisfying the following equation
are chosen for insertion:
H(ti.ident, k1) mod η = 0 ∀ti ∈ tbl (6.5)
where H() is a cryptographic hash function e.g., MD5 or SHA1, and tbl.ident denotes
the encrypted identifying columns of tbl. Note that the way of secretely selecting tuples
directly pertains to the resilience of watermarking.
Typically, the available bandwidth is greater than the bit length |wm| of the mark
wm. This aﬀords a multiple embedding of wm for robustness reasons. That is, we
repeatedly embed wm many times until the available bandwidth is exhausted. In mark
detection phase, the ﬁnal mark is determined by majority voting over all the recovered
copies. A straightforward way to achieve multiple embedding is to duplicate wm for l
times into wmd, as long as we attempt an l-embedding, and then to insert wmd in place
1In case the identifying columns cannot be relied on, we can establish virtual key attributes as in
[123] by turning to other columns
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of wm.
Take tbl.c, a quasi-identifying column of tbl for example, our hierarchical watermark-
ing algorithm by integrating the above ideas, is outlined in Figure 6.9. The function
MaxGNd(nd, tr, maxgends) returns the maximal generalization node that associates
with nd.
Embedding(tbl, tr, maxgends, ultigends, k1, k2, η, wm)
1. bits wmd ← Duplicate(wm)
2. foreach tuple ti ∈ tbl
3. if H(ti.ident, k1) mod η = 0
4. node targnd← Val2Nd(ti.c, ultigends)
5. targnd ← MaxGNd(targnd, tr, maxgends)
6. do
7. targnd← Permutate(targnd, tr, ti, k1, k2, wmd)
8. while targnd /∈ ultigends
9. ti.c ← Nd2Val(targnd)
Permutate(node nd, tr, tuple ti, k2, bits wmd)
1. sortedset S ← {si | si ∈ Children(nd, tr)}
2. int indx←H(ti.ident, k2) mod |S|
3. indx← SetµBit(indx, wmd[H(ti.ident, k2) mod |wmd|])
4. return sindx
Detection(tbl, tr, maxgends, ultigends, k1, k2, η, wm)
1. bits wmd ← NULL /* set wmd to be empty */
2. foreach tuple ti ∈ tbl
3. if H(ti.ident, k1) mod η = 0
4. node tmpnd← Val2Nd(ti.c, ultigends)
5. bit[] b = NULL, int i = 0 /* reset */
6. do
7. sortedset S ←{si | si ∈ Siblings(tmpnd, tr)}
8. int indx← Index(tmpnd, S)
9. b[i]← indx&1
10. i← i + 1
11. tmpdnd← Parent(tmpnd, tr)
12. while tmpnd /∈ maxgends
13. wmd[H(ti.ident, k2) mod |wmd|] ← MajorVot(b)
14. wm ← MajorVot(wmd)
Figure 6.9: Hierarchical Watermarking Algorithm
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In the algorithm, we exploit distinct keys k1 and k2 for diﬀerent calculations, which is
vital in ensuring that there is no mutual correlation between these calculations. Notice
that the hierarchical scheme enables to insert several copies of a bit at every single
embedding position, and the actual number is equal to the number of levels from the
corresponding maximal generalization node to the ultimate generalization node. Thus,
when recovering a bit from a single embedding position, the bit is determined by majority
voting. Interestingly, in the voting process, we can assign a diﬀerent weight to each copy
from a distinct level, depending on its credit in determining the bit. This is of special
use when enforcing the policy that the copy from a higher level is more reliable than
that from a lower level.
6.5.4 Resolving Rightful Ownership Problem
Robustness to attacks attempting to erase the embedded mark is among the fundamental
requirements of a sound watermarking. However, this does not necessarily imply its
suﬃciency in establishing ownership, because of the attacking scenarios in Figure 6.10
(Dx, Wx and Kx are respectively the original data, the mark and the secret watermarking
key of the entity x, Dw and Dw denote the watermarked data).
Attack 1: the attacker inserts his bogus mark Wa into Dw, which is the owner’s valid
watermarked data, to create a bogus Dw. Now that both Wo and Wa are contained in
Dw, the attacker and the owner can both claim the ownership over Dw. This attack can
be resolved by requiring the attacker and the owner each to present his original data.
As the attacker’s “original” data Dw contains Wo of the owner, false ownership claim
by the attacker is clear.
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Figure 6.10: Rightful Ownership Attacks.
Attack 2: In this case however, the attacker “extracts” Wa from Dw to obtain his
bogus original data Da, so that Da ⊕ka Wa = Dw, where ⊕ka denotes the embedding
function under key ka. This attack is more subtle to handle, since it does not always hold
that Da contains Wo and Do does not contain Wa. So far, the only practical solution
in multimedia watermarking is to restrict Wo to be F(Do), where F(.) is an one-way
function, so that given Dw, it is impossible to acquire Da by the attacker satisfying
Da ⊕ka Wa = Da ⊕ka F(Da) = Dw .
These attacks are in fact the rightful ownership problem originally raised in [169] in
multimedia context. It will be of particular interest to see how the rightful ownership
problem is handled in our case. We notice that virtually none of the existing proposals for
watermarking databases has provided a satisfactory solution to this problem, as either
they considered merely one case of it (e.g., [7, 123]) or they did not address it at all
(e.g., [156,171]). Results from the multimedia sector show that without invoking a third
party for certifying the watermarked data Dw, the rightful ownership problem is solvable
only when the original data are available in court. We believe this directly applies to
the context of databases. Considering the large number of data a table contains, we
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actually suspect the practicality of presenting to the judge the entire original table as
court proof in other proposals. Surprisingly, the nature of the binned data enables us to
elegantly resolve this problem in our context. Recall that the identifying columns of a
binned table to be watermarked are in encrypted format, which means the attacker has
no way to know the clear-texts. So the mark in our scheme is speciﬁed by applying the
one-way function F(.) to a certain statistical value v (e.g., mean) of these clear-texts
of the identifying columns (the attacker cannot get F(v) or forge other valid marks).
In resolving ownership dispute, the owner presents v; decrypts the identifying columns
and does the same statistical computation over the decrypted data to get v′; compares
the two as valid if |v − v′| < τ , where τ is a predeﬁned threshold; extracts the mark
from the table in dispute and compares it with F(v) as usual in a normal watermarking
scheme. Note that most probably, the watermarked table in dispute had been attacked,
e.g., some tuples were deleted or some spurious tuples were added, and this explains
why we acquire the mark from a statistical value instead of the actual clear-texts.
The proposed solution is speciﬁc to our integration of binning and watermarking,
since a normal database does not have encrypted attributes as in our case (in case
the identifying columns are not encrypted, attackers can easily derive other marks). In
nature, we do not violate “original data as court proof”, whereas the integrated property
of our framework provides an eﬀective means to get over direct reliance on the entire
original table, but on a statistic value of the clear-texts of the encrypted columns.
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6.6 Analysis
We next explore the seamlessness of our framework from a theoretical perspective. In
other words, we are concerned with the eﬀect watermarking has on the result of binning.
The main issue is related to the fact that watermarking in our context involves permu-
tation such that some tuples in a bin may be permutated to other bins, and thus some
bins may have, after watermarking, a size less than k. This means that watermarking
may compromise the satisfaction to k-anonymity of binning. Without loss of generality,
we restrict our discussions to a particular quasi-identifying column c, which corresponds
to a domain hierarchy tree having m maximal generalization nodes Ni (i = 1..m), and
ni ultimate generalization nodes associated with each node Ni. We further make the
following assumptions: (i) bins that correspond to the ultimate generalization nodes are
of equal size; (ii) when a bit-embedding proceeds downward from Ni, all the ni ultimate
generalization nodes associated with Ni have equal probability of becoming the target
node when permutations halt. The actual eﬀect of watermarking on binning can be re-
duced to the way any particular bin (BIN ) that corresponds to a ultimate generalization
node UGN is aﬀected by any bit-embedding (E ).
Lemma 6.1 Let the maximal generalization node corresponding to UGN be Nk, and the





Proof : Intuitively, for E to reduce the bin size of BIN by 1, it must hold that
as per our hierarchical watermarking algorithm, 1) the bit chosen by E for
insertion comes from BIN ; 2) afterwards, E executes downward permutations
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(starting from Nk) among the nk ultimate generalization nodes that corre-
spond to Nk, and the target node of such permutations is not UGN . From
assumption (i), probability that the tuple chosen by E comes from BIN is
1∑m
i=1 ni
, and from assumption (ii), probability of the target node not being









Lemma 6.1 states the probability of any particular bit-embedding E permutating a
tuple out of a particular bin BIN . We next check the probability of E permutating a
tuple from another bin to BIN .
Lemma 6.2 Let the maximal generalization node corresponding to UGN be Nk, and the





Proof : For E to increase the bin size of BIN by 1, it must hold that 1) E
selects the tuple for insertion from any, but UGN , of the nk ultimate gener-
alization nodes that are associated with Nk ; 2) the target node of the down-
ward permutations is UGN . From assumption (i), probability of the former
is nk−1∑m
i=1 ni









Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 6.2 suggest that on average, the watermarking process would
neither decrease nor increase the bin size of any bin since Pr− = Pr+. We therefore
conclude that watermarking does not interfere with binning in the satisfaction of k-
anonymity speciﬁcation under the two ideal assumptions.
It is of importance to examine the assumptions from a practical perspective. Making
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valid the ﬁrst assumption is not that hard: we can incorporate “restrained swapping”
(e.g., swapping tuples among bins that correspond to sibling nodes) into binning. In
contrast, the second assumption is more tricky, because its validity totally rests with the
locality of ultimate generalization nodes on the domain hierarchy tree. Even so, we be-
lieve that by relaxing the two assumptions, watermarking still cannot seriously interfere
with binning because: 1) only a small percentage of the whole data gets watermarked;
2) and the use of hash function in the “suitability” selection step (Equation 6.5) renders
a uniform culling, which means no particular bin will be drastically aﬀected. To attest
this, we have done experiments and obtained consistent results (see next section). After
all, we have a simple yet practical method to tackle the interference by applying k + 
( is a small number) to binning in meeting k-anonymity speciﬁcation.
6.7 Experimental Studies
We implemented and conducted extensive experiments on the above algorithms. The
real world data set we experimented on include one (randomized) identifying column and
ﬁve quasi-identifying columns, whose schema is R(ssn, age, zip code, doctor, symptom,
prescription). By a preprocessing step, we created a DHT for each quasi-identifying
column: the DHT for symptom is based on the International Classiﬁcation of Diseases
(ICD-9), and other attributes are on self-deﬁned ontology, e.g., that for age is similar to
Figure ?? but of narrower intervals. The whole data set contains around 20000 tuples.
Experiments were done on a PC with 2G CPU and 512M RAM, and source codes were
written in Microsoft C++. A main simpliﬁcation we made is that a set of maximal
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generalization nodes is directly given to each column as usage metrics.
6.7.1 Robustness of Binning
First, our experiments focus on testing the binning algorithm in satisfying k-anonymity.
By providing to the algorithm diﬀerent values of k, we recorded the corresponding loss
of information. Figure 6.11 shows the relationship of k versus information loss.





















Figure 6.11: k vs. Information
Loss.
From the ﬁgure, multi-attribute binning causes much more information loss than
mono-attribute binning, and once k increases to a certain extent, information loss reaches
a saturation point and becomes rather stable. This is consistent with the rationale in
determining a valid minimal generalization node (Section 4.2), and this could be further
optimized if the more aggressive strategy as introduced there is employed. Further, we
should also note that information loss is closely related to the data size, the number of
quasi-identifying columns and k.
160
6.7.2 Robustness of Watermarking
In this set of experiments, we test the robustness of the hierarchical watermarking scheme
to the attacks that endeavor to destroy the embedded mark, while in the absence of the
secret watermarking key. The following experiments were conducted by implementing
a multiple embedding of a 20-bit mark.
- Subset Alteration
In these attacks, the attacker chooses at random a subset of the data and then modiﬁes
them arbitrarily without aﬀecting the rest of the data. We vary the size of the randomly
altered data, and calculate the corresponding mark loss. Figure 6.12 (a) outlines the
results. Clearly, the results show that our watermarking scheme performs well against
this attack. Even in the case of more than 70% of data loss, our scheme loses only
approximately 30% of mark bits. Another fact shown in the ﬁgure is that smaller η
(more bandwidth) oﬀers more resilience, whereas more alteration to the data would be
incurred. This is a trade-oﬀ that must be carefully considered in practice.
- Subset Addition
In these attacks, new tuples are frequently added to the watermarked set by the malicious
attacker. Although this attack does not involve erasing existing bits, it nevertheless
misleads the selection criteria (Equation (6.5)) to falsely take some of the newly-added
tuples as watermarked, thereby introducing errors in majority voting the ﬁnal mark.
Keep in mind that if the size of the new data exceeds the original data size, priority of
the former would dominate the latter. Figure 6.12 (b) highlights the scheme’s robustness
to the Subset Addition attacks. The results reﬂect the fact that the newly-added bogus
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bits do not take precedence over the existing bits in the majority-voting process.
- Subset Deletion
The attacker randomly deletes a percentage of the tuples in an attempt to remove the
mark. To test the eﬀect of dropping tuples to the loss of mark bits, we continually delete
some tuples each time by the following SQL clause:
DELETE FROM RWHERE SSN > lvali AND SSN < uvali
where lvali and uvali deﬁne bounds of the ith deletion, within which the tuples are to
be deleted. Figure 6.12 (c) plots the series of mark loss due to the deletions. From
the ﬁgure, it indicates that the hierarchical scheme is resilient to the Subset Deletion






























































Figure 6.12: Robustness of Hierarchical Watermarking.
We also tested the information loss due to watermarking, and Figure 6.13 presents





















Figure 6.13: Information Loss of
Watermarking.
6.7.3 Seamlessness of Framework
Finally, we shall examine how watermarking interferes with binning, complementing the
theoretic analysis in the preceding section. The results are presented in Figure 6.14,
where the data in each column respectively represents the total number of bins, number
of bins having bin size changed and number of bins having bin size less than k. It
can been seen that a majority of the bins are aﬀected by watermarking, whereas the
interference is minor in terms of satisfying k-anonymity: none of the bins cannot meet
k-anonymity after watermarking. This is consistent with our analysis that watermarking






















10 73   58   0 96   82   0 20   18   0 56   53   0 97   86   0 
20 68   61   0 88   79   0 20   17   0 52   48   0 90   82   0 
45 52   48   0 81   72   0 20   17   0 47   38   0 79   71   0 
100 42   35   0 62   56   0 18   15   0 36   31   0 59   48   0 
                                               Total number of bins   Number of bins having binsize changed  Number of bins having binsize < k 
k 
Attribute 
Figure 6.14: Eﬀect of Watermarking on Binning.
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6.8 Concluding Remarks
Two important issues inherent to the outsourcing of health data are the protection of
individual privacy and copyright protection over the data. To meet these dual needs,
we integrated techniques of binning and digital watermarking into a uniﬁed framework,
so as to provide comprehensive protection for outsourced data. Under our framework,
health data are in turn binned to meet k-anonymity speciﬁcation, and watermarked to
provide copyright protection. We have discussed at length the development of the bin-
ning algorithm and the watermarking algorithm that provide the two core functions in
our framework, and developed an elegant solution to the rightful ownership problem re-
garding watermarking, which may be diﬃcult to solve in the context of other approaches.
From both theoretical and practical perspectives, we proved that watermarking would
not substantially interfere with binning in the satisfaction to k-anonymity. Experimental
results showed the robustness of the proposed framework.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusions and Future Work
We systematically studied data security and especially individual privacy in health care
systems, focusing on the following closely related issues in particular.
We ﬁrst discussed building a uniﬁed trust infrastructure for individual health care
organizations. To that end, each organization establishes a dedicated security manager
for handling security related matters such as certiﬁcation, issuance of secret keys. The
organizational trust infrastructure is thus built around the security manager, by incor-
porating various user authentication techniques and modes such as short password, iden-
tity certiﬁcate, attribute-based certiﬁcate, anonymous credential, and group signature.
Apart from password, all other authentication techniques can directly enlist the security
manager as the CA or the TTP, we thus focused on unifying password authentication
within the trust infrastructure. Our solution was a novel two-server password authen-
tication system that exploits the security manager operating a back-end authentication
server for assisting the service server in user authentication. Our proposed two-server
password authentication system can also circumvent weaknesses inherent in the tradi-
tional password systems, e.g., oﬀ-line dictionary attacks against the server password
database. The establishment of uniﬁed trust infrastructure within individual organiza-
tions lays a foundation to solve other data security and individual privacy issues in this
dissertation and beyond.
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We were then ready to study security issues beyond organizational boundaries. Our
next proposal was an anonymous remote login scheme that enables physicians or pa-
tients to access clinical services and data from oﬀ-site locations in an anonymous and
unlinkable manner. This is important, as sensitive information on users such as individ-
ual preferences, life styles, health conditions is conveyed from the services (even without
knowing the content) they are accessing. The proposed login scheme was robust to DoS
attacks, a feature essential yet hard to achieve for anonymous systems. We believe the
proposal is a useful tool when users care about user privacy in the login process.
In nature, the anonymous login scheme deals with a relatively simple scenario, which
is still at the level of individual organizations. We then studied a more complex, inter-
organizational process, namely, medication prescription. Medication prescription is a
routine process in health care, involving multiple parties and individual privacy hav-
ing distinct implications with respect to diﬀerent parties. We clariﬁed and addressed
these privacy concerns by proposing a smart card enabled electronic medication prescrip-
tion system. Smart card was extensively used as both a portable repository carrying
up-to-date personal medical and insurance information, and a computing device for elec-
tronically signing prescription pads. To make the system more accord with real world
practice, we implemented delegation of signing, a feature that enables patients to del-
egate their prescription signing capabilities to other people, e.g., their guardians. We
proposed a strong proxy signature scheme to implement the functionality of delegation
of signing.
Our ﬁnal proposal continued the kind of study on “achieving user privacy while
enabling medical research” as in the medication prescription system, but considered
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a quite diﬀerent scenario: a health care organization outsources the health data in
its autonomous database to other organizations, which actually involves “secondary”
use of health data for, e.g., research purposes. In such cases, the health data to be
outsourced are an aggregation of medical records rather than individual records, and
the outsourcing care organization does not have direct business association with the
receiving organizations with respect to the data to be outsourced. Privacy protection
therefore should be enforced upon beyond individual data items, and the outsourcing
organization has more interests to be protected against the receiving organizations. We
recognized two important protection objectives: protection of individual privacy referred
to in the data, as well as copyright enforcement over the data. We presented a uniﬁed
framework that seamlessly combines techniques of binning and digital watermarking
to attain the dual goals of privacy and copyright protection. Our binning method is
built upon an earlier approach of generalization and suppression by allowing a broader
concept of generalization, and our watermarking algorithm watermarks the binned data
in a hierarchical manner by exploiting the very nature of the data. We implemented the
techniques and obtained promising experimental results.
Some of the techniques we proposed in this dissertation may need more eﬃcient al-
ternatives in some situations. For example, it has been shown that ensuring k-anonymity
in general is NP-hard [137]; while our proposed binning algorithm in Chapter 6 does not
have eﬃciency problem if we deal with relatively fewer quasi-identifying columns, it will
not be the case when the quasi-identifying columns are large in number; we therefor need
to ﬁnd more eﬃcient privacy enhancing techniques working with digital watermarking to
achieve similar protection objectives. Therefore, improvement of some of the proposals
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in this dissertation is included in our future agenda.
Implementing or incorporating our proposals into practical health care systems at
the application level is clearly one of our main future focus. To that end, we need to
consider (1) eﬃcient enforcement of our technical proposals upon the access policies of
the care organizations; (2) eﬀective adaption of the proposals to the underlying data
and relevant health standards such as HL7 [83] and DICOM [58].
Another direction for our future work is to develop health care application with
provable security. Information security in general is quite peculiar, in the sense that we
should not only construct a system, but also make it secure. Provable security provides
a proof that a system is secure in the theoretic sense. A common approach for provable
security is to deﬁne the desired security objectives by means of probability theory, and
further demonstrates that the underlying system can meet the anticipated purposes,
provided that some well-accepted computational assumptions (e.g., factorization) hold.
Considering the nature of health care applications, the conﬁdence of provable security
is clearly a desirable objective to ensue.
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